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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ILLINOIS IN
THE AFTERMATH OF THE RYAN
COMMUTATIONS: REFORMS, ECONOMIC
REALITIES, AND A NEW SALIENCY FOR
ISSUES OF COST
LEIGH B. BIENEN∗
Perhaps most telling is the view of Professor Joseph Hoffman, someone who has
devoted enormous time and energy to death penalty reform, spearheading death
penalty reform efforts in both Illinois and Indiana and serving as Co-Chair and
Reporter for the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment. Hoffman
served as a member of an advisory group to discuss an earlier draft of this paper, and
he strongly expressed the view that seeking reform of capital punishment in the
political realm is futile. This is a striking position to take by one who is not morally
opposed to the death penalty and who has worked on numerous reform projects. But
Hoffman cited as grounds for his change of heart the example of Illinois, in which
there were confirmed wrongful convictions in capital cases, a sympathetic Governor,
and a bi-partisan reform commission, but still strong resistance in the state legislature
to reforms specifically targeted at capital punishment. In short, serious concerns
about efficacy in the political realm militate against the undertaking of a new reform
1
effort by the Institute. . . .

∗

Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law.

This Article is dedicated to Neil Alan Weiner, distinguished homicide researcher,
coauthor with Marvin Wolfgang and many others, and my longtime collaborator and friend.
At the time of his untimely death in 2009, Neil Alan Weiner was Research Director at the
Vera Institute of Justice, New York, New York.
1

CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, REPORT TO THE ALI CONCERNING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 5 (2008), available at http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital Punishment_web.pdf
(Annex B).
Note: The Northwestern University Law School Capital Crimes Database of all firstdegree murders in Illinois, 2003–2009 [hereinafter NULSCCD] will be posted on the
Northwestern University School of Law website, along with all data received by the author
in response to FOIA requests to the Illinois State Treasurer and other sources on the
expenditures and appropriations of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When I first came to Illinois from New Jersey in 1995, nothing
suggested change was coming in the pattern or practice of capital
punishment in Illinois. There were more than 160 people on death row in
Illinois. 2 By contrast, in 1996 New Jersey had twelve people on death
row. 3 The New Jersey Office of the Public Defender had a strong statewide
administrative structure and a centralized budget. The New Jersey
Department of the Public Advocate spent millions of dollars for defense
attorneys to challenge every aspect of every death sentence imposed after
reenactment in 1982. 4 The public defenders then brought each death
sentence to the extraordinarily conscientious New Jersey Supreme Court for
constitutional review and proportionality analysis.5 Capital practice in
Illinois had none of these institutionalized traditions.
The author acknowledges the continuing and much appreciated support of the
Northwestern University School of Law, and especially that of Dean David E. Van Zandt
and Associate Dean Kimberly Yuracko. The faculty research funds have supported this
research and data collection effort over a far longer period than was required for this Article.
I am deeply grateful. Special thanks to Jonathan Sabo, Northwestern University School of
Law, J.D. 2011, for his outstanding contributions, and to successive staff and editors of the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for their expertise, patience, and dedication.
Thanks also to the members and staff of the Illinois Capital Punishment Reform Study
Committee, and especially Thomas P. Sullivan, Richard D. Schwind, David Olson, Walter
Hehner, and many others. I am in your debt. Many state and county staff members have
also been extremely helpful. Special thanks to Peggy Anderson at the office of the Cook
County Clerk and to the many others who assisted. The expertise and proximity of
Northwestern University School of Law’s Bluhm Legal Clinic and the Center on Wrongful
Convictions were of great assistance and inspiration. Special thanks to Rob Warden, Tom
Geraghty, Jennifer Linzer, Dolores Kennedy, and many others. Our expert librarians are
always vital to my research: Marcia Lehr, Pegeen Bassett, and other library staff in Chicago
and Evanston. Many students and interns worked on this article and the data collection
effort: Christopher Tansey devoted many hours and days to the tables; Jason Grago also
provided great assistance; other helpers included Sarah Pfander, Cate Schur, Alex Yastrow,
and many others. Thanks always to Juana Haskin and to Cecilia Torres.
2
The Illinois death row population in 1996 was 164. Leigh B. Bienen, The
Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The
Appearance of Justice?”, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 169 tbl.2 (1996).
3
Id. at 166 tbl.1. New Jersey reenacted capital punishment in 1982, and it was not until
1992 that the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a particular death sentence met the
stringent requirements of judicially-mandated proportionality review. See State v. Marshall,
613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992). See generally infra Part IV.D.
4
See Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 36 (1988) (describing the
methodology and results of the extensive research project begun at the New Jersey Office of
the Public Defender and later taken over by the Supreme Court of New Jersey).
5
Bienen, supra note 2, at 139–40. Proportionality review was one of the reforms
instituted “[s]o that death sentences would no longer be cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual,” along with a structure of aggravating
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Nor was there any state court or institution in Illinois that would have
been inclined to or capable of undertaking the kind of comprehensive
system-wide review and analysis of capital case processing such as that
conducted by the New Jersey Supreme Court under the rubric of
proportionality review. The Illinois Supreme Court was unreceptive to
constitutional challenges to the statute or to the system. 6 Since the 1970s
the court has consistently refused to consider constitutional challenges to
the application of the statute based upon evidence of racial or geographic
disparities in death penalty prosecutions and sentencing. 7 There were brief
moments, first in 1979 and then again in 1984, when the constitutionality of
capital punishment was a live issue before the Illinois Supreme Court and
federal courts in Illinois. 8 However, since that time the Illinois Supreme
Court has indicated in numerous opinions and through other institutional

and mitigating factors to guide the sentencing decision. Id. A court conducts proportionality
review by “comparing the death sentence on appeal with similar cases throughout the state”
to ensure that the defendant is not being disproportionately punished. Id. “Heightened
judicial scrutiny at the appellate level, with the inclusion of proportionality review, has since
been viewed by some justices as fundamental to the constitutionality of the death penalty
itself.” Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey was exceptional in, immediately after
reenactment, declaring its intention to review patterns and discrepancies introduced by
prosecutorial charging practices, irrespective of their origin and whether caused by
differences in charging patterns, sentences, or other factors. See State v. Koedatich, 548
A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in
New Jersey: Felony Murder Cases, 54 ALB. L. REV. 709, 732–35 (1990) [hereinafter Bienen,
Reimposition of Capital Punishment]. Additionally, in State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059
(N.J. 1992), and State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987), the court considered as
axiomatic that it had the authority and duty to review county prosecutors’ charging decisions
in the selection of cases for capital prosecution.
6
See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 641 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. 1994) (dismissing defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial).
7
See People v. Lewis, 473 N.E.2d 901, 914 (Ill. 1984), stating:
The defendant’s argument for proportionality review must also fail. The Illinois Constitution,
the death penalty statute, and the Supreme Court Rule 603 all provide for direct appeal to this
court of any conviction for which the death penalty has been imposed. The entire court record is
available to the reviewing court for examination, thus disclosing the evidence which motivated
the imposition of the death sentence. This court has consistently found that these review
procedures sufficiently protect against the arbitrary imposition of capital punishment. (citations
omitted).
8
See People v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415, 433–34 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J., dissenting) (noting
that four of the seven sitting justices have said and continue to adhere to the view that the
Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it allows prosecutors too much
discretion in charging decisions); Lewis, 430 N.E.2d at 1363–85 (Ill. 1981) (concurring and
dissenting opinions from six of the seven justices explaining their views on the
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute); People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 397
N.E.2d 809 (Ill. 1979) (holding Illinois death penalty statute constitutional over vigorous
dissent of three of seven justices); see also Leigh B. Bienen, The Quality of Justice in
Capital Cases: Illinois as a Case Study, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1998).

1304

LEIGH B. BIENEN

[Vol. 100

signals that it is uninterested in any system-wide challenge to the capital
punishment system. 9
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court ruled that statewide
proportionality review was not required in order to comply with the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 10
Since then the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that it need
not and would not in the future use proportionality review to conduct a
systematic statewide analysis of the patterns in the application of the death
penalty arising from the fact that the 102 elected county state’s attorneys
each individually select cases for capital prosecution. 11 The state high court
has regularly affirmed death sentences, and has expressed the view that the
scope of its review would be purely procedural. 12 However, an external
study of Illinois death sentences found that as of 1995, 40% of the death

9
There has never been the institutional will or the leadership within the Illinois criminal
justice system for an enterprise such as the comprehensive analysis of capital case
processing undertaken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey under the leadership of Chief
Justice Robert Wilentz in the 1980s and 1990s. After his death, the character of that court
changed significantly. See Leigh B. Bienen, Not Wiser After 35 Years of Contemplating the
Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 91 (2008). For a description of how a change in
supreme court justices can influence outcomes of death penalty litigation positively, see Rob
Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMONOLOGY 381, 389–391 (2005) (discussing how a change in justices affected the
outcome in People v. Lewis) and Bienen, supra note 2.
10
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984).
11
See People v. King, 488 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. 1986); see also ex rel. Carey, 397 N.E.2d
809 (Ill. 1979). The Illinois Supreme Court will on occasion conduct intra-case
proportionality review, that is, compare the death sentence under review with the sentences
received by codefendants in the same case. See, e.g., People v. Byron, 647 N.E.2d 946, 957–
58 (Ill. 1995). See generally Warden, supra note 9.
12
See Erickson, 641 N.E.2d at 455. In her dissent, Judge McMorrow noted:

Illinois once had a well-publicized reputation for having devised post-conviction requirements
that created a “procedural labyrinth . . . made up entirely of blind alleys” that effectively
insulated the court from ruling on the merits of a defendant’s constitutional challenges to his
criminal conviction and sentence. Our Post-Conviction Hearing Act was adopted in 1949 to
overcome these shortcomings. Unfortunately, the majority’s decision harkens back to this earlier
era, when technical rules of procedure were manipulated in order to avoid or preclude
substantive review of the criminal defendant’s constitutional arguments.

Id. at 468 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
The purpose of the Fundamental Justice Act, enacted in 2003, was to give the Illinois
Supreme Court authority to review death sentences on grounds of fairness. 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West Supp. 2010); see infra Appendix A, no. 14, p. 5. The court has
not yet overturned a single death sentence on the basis of the new amendment since its
enactment.
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sentences that reached the stage of federal habeas corpus under the former,
more permissive federal rules were remanded for retrial or resentencing. 13
In 1995, capital punishment was firmly entrenched in Illinois and
appeared impregnable. Public support for the death penalty was high. 14 No
strong legal institutions or powerful political constituencies challenged it.
The 102 elected county prosecutors, the state legislators, the attorney
general, and the Governor all were strong supporters, and Illinois had begun
conducting executions. 15 No court or legal authority in the jurisdiction
seemed likely to interfere with the steady accumulation of death sentences
coming up from the county prosecutions or the inevitability of future
executions. Capital cases continued to be prosecuted; death sentences were
imposed in the trial courts and affirmed on appeal; although the appeals
took a while, executions had begun, and the prospect was only of more
impending executions.16 Given the breadth and number of the aggravating
factors in the Illinois death penalty statute, 17 it seemed in 1995 as if there
was always a capital case being zealously investigated and prosecuted, or an
execution on deck. Nothing seemed poised to interfere with that
progression.
By the year 2000, however, everything had changed. In 1999,
Governor George Ryan had been elected, though he was at that time a
supporter of capital punishment. As a legislator, Governor Ryan had voted
for the reenactment of the death penalty, and in March of 1999, soon after
taking office, he presided over an execution. 18 However, accumulating

13
Warden, supra note 9, at 381–82 (“A landmark study found that forty-three percent of
Illinois death penalty cases had been reversed on direct appeal or at the post-conviction stage
as of 1995. Of the cases that graduated to the federal habeas corpus stage, the study found
forty percent had been remanded for retrial or re-sentencing.”).
14
Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty–It’s Getting
Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1448 (1998) (“In 1994, when Professor Phoebe
Ellsworth and I published a review of research on death penalty attitudes in the United
States, we began by noting that ‘support for the death penalty [is] at a near record high.’
That finding, like most of the others we reported, has not changed. . . . ”) (footnotes omitted).
15
Warden, supra note 9, at 382 (noting that 12 of the 289 individuals sentenced to death
in Illinois after Furman had been executed).
16
States that abolished capital punishment, such as New Jersey, New York, and New
Mexico, either had not reinstated executions or had only executed volunteers prior to
abolition. See State by State Information Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state# (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) [hereinafter
DPIC State by State]. Once a state begins executions, it is unlikely it will abolish the death
penalty. It is almost as if the state decisionmakers feel it would be unfair to those already
executed to declare the system unconstitutional once someone has been executed under it.
17
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010)
18
See Warden, supra note 9, at 406 (describing Ryan’s role in the Korkoraleis
execution).
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egregious evidence of many wrongfully convicted persons on death row in
Illinois led Governor Ryan to impose unilaterally a moratorium on
executions in the state as of January 2000.19 Illinois was the first state to
impose such a moratorium, but since 2000, several other states have done
so. 20
Then the legislature established the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in
1999, effective in 2000. This fund was created partly in response to the
highly publicized exonerations and the large number of innocent people
found on death row in Illinois. 21 By 1999, thirteen death row inmates had
been exonerated by independent investigations of the facts supporting their
convictions, including revelations that their confessions were coerced, and
DNA tests had identified others as the actual murderers. 22 Next, in 2000
Governor Ryan appointed a high profile Governor’s Commission on Capital
Punishment (Governor’s Commission or Commission). The Commission
was composed of respected members of the bar with a variety of
backgrounds and perspectives, and reported its findings in April 2002. 23 In
January 2003, Governor Ryan responded most dramatically to these
findings by taking the unprecedented, historic step of commuting 161
capital sentences in one fell swoop, emptying the Illinois death row.24
These actions were completely contrary to the seemingly unshakable
and widespread support for the current system of capital punishment in the
state legislature, in the courts, and throughout other legal institutions in the
19

See Lawrence C. Marshall, Walter C. Reckless Memorial Lecture: The Innocence
Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 579 (2004). Explaining
Ryan’s motivation, Marshall stated:
Governor Ryan . . . understood that the system’s error rate in determining guilt has implications
not only on the accuracy of convictions, but also on the trustworthiness of capital sentences. If a
system had proven itself so flawed at answering the relatively easy, objective question of
whether a defendant committed a crime, how could that system possibly be trusted with the far
more complicated question of whether someone who has been convicted should be sentenced to
death? . . . Governor Ryan understood that even if all 171 Illinois death row inmates were, in
fact guilty, that did not mean that the broken system’s decision that they should die was one
worthy of trust.
20
For an up-to-date list of the status of the death penalty in various states, consult DPIC
State by State, supra note 16.
21
Barbara J. Hayler, Moratorium and Reform: Illinois’s Efforts to Make the Death
Penalty Process ‘Fair, Just and Accurate,’ 29 JUST. SYS. J. 423, 424 (2008) (documenting
the passage of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act following the exoneration of Anthony
Porter).
22
Warden, supra note 9, at 399–407.
23
ILL. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
commission_report/index.html [hereinafter ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT].
24
One hundred fifty inmates were sentenced to life in prison without parole, three were
sentenced to forty years in prison, and four were pardoned outright. Id. at 382 n.6.
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state. The 2000 moratorium on executions and the 2003 commutations
were without state or national precedent, and introduced an entirely new
dynamic into the state capital punishment system. 25 Both events had
enormous repercussions in Illinois and elsewhere. Other states also found
innocent people on death row and declared moratoriums on executions in
what became a cascading, national phenomenon. 26 At the same time, some
state courts imposed a statewide moratorium on executions while state and
federal litigation over the constitutionality of lethal injection as a mode of
execution was pending. 27 This called to an immediate halt executions in the
state without waiting for action by the legislature or the governor. Soon the
death penalty had been put on hold by courts throughout the country. 28
The cost of the death penalty has recently become a salient issue
nationally because many states are in budget crisis, including Illinois, which
has one of the largest budget deficits in the country. 29 Illinois has never
conducted a systematic study of the cost of the death penalty. The 2002
Governor’s Commission focused on and found significant racial and
geographic disparities in the operation of the Illinois capital punishment
system, but did not address the issue of cost. 30 Indeed, until recently,
25
Marshall, supra note 19, at 573 (stating that the U.S. criminal justice system is in “the
midst of a revolution,” created by “the advent of forensic DNA testing and hundreds of postconviction exonerations”). Ironically, public opinion supported both the continuance of
capital punishment and the moratorium. The public apparently approved of having a death
penalty but not of executing anyone. See Warden, supra note 9, at 406.
26
See Austin Sarat, Introduction: Is the Death Penalty Dying?, 42 STUD. L., POL. &
SOC’Y 1 (2008). In some states, litigation challenging lethal injection was the occasion for
the declaration of a de facto moratorium on executions, thus relieving the governor of the
state from having to take unpopular political action. Id.
27
Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 701, 703 (2008); see also The Honorable Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A
Judge’s Experience in Lethal-Injection Litigation, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 735 (2008). See
generally Symposium: The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 701 (2008) [hereinafter Lethal Injection Symposium]. Also note that because a
moratorium on executions had already been imposed in 2000, Illinois did not have a lethal
injection challenge pending in the courts.
28
See Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 775–79 (2008).
29
Mary Williams Walsh, Eight States Have Shortchanged Pensions, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B3. A major contributor to these budget shortfalls is the drastic
underfunding of pension plans. Id. (describing the $54 billion gap in Illinois between the
cost of benefits promised to retirees over the next thirty years and the amount of money
actually set aside).
30
The Illinois 2002 Governor’s Commission report contained an appendix by Pierce and
Radelet, finding evidence of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty in
Illinois. See GLENN L. PIERCE & MICHAEL L. RADELET, RACE, REGION, AND DEATH
SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS 1988–1997 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/
ccp/ccp/reports/techinical_appendix/section_1/a_race_region death.pdf. Subsequently, this
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discussions of cost were not considered relevant to the issue of the
reenactment or maintenance of the death penalty, and some continue to hold
the view that the higher cost of sentencing someone to death should not be a
factor for legislators or prosecutors to consider. 31 Yet at a time when state
governments are not meeting their most basic obligations, how can the
state’s policy of maintaining capital punishment alone be immune to
considerations of cost and relative value?
This Article references systematic cost studies from other states and
reports how other states have addressed the issue of cost. 32 There is no
reason to think that the capital punishment system in Illinois is unique or
different. What other state studies have documented emperically is also
observed in Illinois:
• large trial and appellate costs associated with the prosecution and
appeal of capital cases, followed by capital retrials; delays in the
carrying out of death sentences, with new and repeated challenges
to the procedures for imposing the death penalty continually
brought forward in the federal and state courts; 33
• additional corrections costs associated with maintaining a special
segregated death row, with its own legally mandated requirements
for security and access to legal counsel, increased costs associated
with long pretrial incarcerations, and special training and
personnel required for staff during capital trials and after the
imposition of the death penalty; 34

research was published in Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death
Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002).
31
See N.J. DEATH PENALTY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N
REPORT 80–81 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/
dpsc_final.pdf (Russo, dissenting) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT]. Russo’s dissent
states:
The financial costs of capital punishment have been used both to justify and criticize the death
penalty. I have heard many justify the death penalty on the grounds that the State should not
have to spend thousands of dollars per year to maintain a convicted killer for the rest of his life.
Conversely, the argument has often been made that trial and appellate costs that result from fair
enforcement of capital punishment make it too expensive. Both of these arguments are utter and
sheer nonsense. If the death penalty is wrong, it is wrong; if it is not wrong, it is not wrong. It
doesn’t matter what it costs. The taking of a human life is something far too important to be
influenced either way by costs.
32

See infra Part IV.
See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (Gerald Uelmen ed.,
2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA REPORT] (discussed infra Part IV.C).
34
Id. at 141–42; Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in
North Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498, 523–24 (2009).
33
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• large payments to judges, court personnel, defense lawyers,
state’s attorneys, and appellate lawyers on both sides to comply
with the complicated and demanding requirements of capital trials
and their direct and collateral appeals; 35
• arbitrary patterns in the selection of cases for capital prosecution
and the imposition of the death penalty within the state, wide
county disparities in policies and implementation, and vast
differences in how capital punishment is prosecuted between
states and within individual states; 36
• a decline in the number of murders unrelated to the imposition of
the death penalty, 37 a decline in the number of death sentences
imposed, and a decline in the number of state executions during
the period 2000–2009, along with an increase in the time to
execution for those states which do carry out executions; 38 and
• a large number and proportion of exonerations relative to the
number of persons sentenced to death, executed, or both, calling
into question the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent,
as an example of rational punishment, or as an imposition of a
just result. 39
35

See generally ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR'S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23.
See infra Part II.C for discussion of sentencing disparities; see also James S. Leibman
& Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1659 (2006).
37
Between 1995 and 2005, the murder rate fell over by 30% nationwide (8.2 to 5.5 per
100,000) and by over 40% in Illinois (10.3 to 6.0 per 100,000). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT tbl.301 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/2010edition.html (Homicide Trends: 1980 to 2005); U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics,
Crime—State
Level:
State-by-State
and
National
Trends,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm (select “State by
State and national trends” table; then select “Illinois” under "Choose one or more States” and
“Violent crime rates” under “Choose one or more variable groups”; then press “Get Table”
button”).
38
Denno, supra note 27, at 710; see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The
Transformation of Capital Punishment, Rosenthal Lecture at Northwestern University
School of Law (Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with author).
39
See Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective
Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science Research, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 173 (James R. Acker, Rovert M. Bohm & Charles S.
Lanier eds., 1998).
36

On balance, deterrence hypotheses for capital punishment have fared quite poorly. Considering
severity, comparative studies consistently showed a pattern of higher or similar levels of
homicide in death penalty compared to abolitionist jurisdictions. . . .
. . . [M]ost criminologists seem convinced that capital punishment is not a more effective
deterrent for murder than imprisonment. In fact, the American Society of Criminology, the
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Some of these developments are chronicled here for Illinois,
particularly the documented costs and the current and recurrent patterns and
practices in capital case prosecution and sentencing since the establishment
of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and the passage of the 2003 reforms. 40
The legal changes introduced by the Illinois legislature, the Illinois
Supreme Court, police, prosecutors, and many other state agencies and
principals were part of a complicated, serious effort to reform a state
criminal justice system correctly perceived to be flawed. 41
The states are not alone in reassessing the cost and effectiveness of
current capital punishment systems. The American Law Institute (ALI), the
institution charged with monitoring developing case law and the overall
efficacy of criminal code provisions, has recently completed a national
review of the effectiveness of the death penalty in the states.42 As a result,
the ALI removed the death penalty provisions from its highly influential
Model Penal Code in October 2009. 43 This is momentous, as the Model
Penal Code statutory formulations provided the theoretical foundation for
almost all state statutes when state legislatures reenacted capital punishment
after Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia. 44 This means that the ALI
has now repudiated the elaborate provisions for statutory aggravating and

largest professional association of criminologists in the U.S., passed a resolution in 1989
condemning the death penalty for a variety of reasons, including its lack of utility as a deterrent
to murder. This consensus may in part account for the fact that only a few capital punishment
and deterrence analyses have appeared in the professional literature in the last few years. In
short, for many criminologists, the capital punishment and deterrence question is a dead issue.

Id. at 173 (internal citations omitted).
40
See infra Part II.C.
41
For a description of the Illinois reforms, see John Cullerton, Kirk Dillard & Peter G.
Baroni, Capital Punishment Reform in Illinois–A Model for the Nation, J. DUPAGE COUNTY
BAR ASS’N (April 2004), http://www.dcba.org/brief/aprissue/2004/art10404.htm; infra Part
II.B.
42
See AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2009) [hereinafter ALI COUNCIL
REPORT].
43
Am. Law Inst., Message from ALI Director Lance Liebman (2009),
http://www.ali.org/_news/10232009.htm.
44
Bienen, supra note 2, at 139.
So that death sentences would no longer be “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual,” the revised capital punishment statutes which followed Gregg
introduced a structure of aggravating and mitigating factors intended to guide the discretion of
the sentencer. In Gregg the Court held that the infirmities of the former capital punishment
schemes had been addressed by Georgia’s revised statute. The Georgia statute restructured the
decision to impose the death sentence by requiring the jury to make specific factual findings as to
the presence or absence of statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating factors.

Id. (footnotes omitted); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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mitigating circumstances that introduced a weighing process for jury
decisionmaking that almost all death penalty jurisdictions have followed
since the time of reenactment.45 These exact provisions were instituted in
Illinois. 46 However, the state death penalty statutes based on these
provisions, including Illinois’s, remain in effect.
In Illinois, the discovery of so many innocent people on death row,
followed by the dramatic commutations and the emptying of a large death
row, spurred the passage of a number of legislative and procedural reforms
to capital punishment practice in Illinois and the establishment of the
Committee to Study the Reform of the Death Penalty in 2004. Now in
2010, for the first time in decades, the abolition of the death penalty and the
establishment of a permanent moratorium on capital prosecutions and
executions have become possibilities in Illinois. 47 This Article will provide
an overview of the changes and developments in capital case prosecutions
in Illinois after the Ryan commutations, summarize some of the findings
and recommendations of the 2002 Governor’s Commission and the Capital
Punishment Reform Study Committee (CPRSC or Committee), and present
new data on patterns in capital charging and sentencing in Illinois. I hope
this information will help to inform the present debate over maintaining the
death penalty, in Illinois and elsewhere.
This Article is not a cost study, but it does present a substantial amount
of existing data on costs and expenses related to capital punishment in
Illinois between 2000 and 2009. 48 In the absence of a statewide, systematic

45

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (withdrawn 2010); STEIKER & STEIKER, supra
note 1, at 2–3; see Bienen, supra note 2, at 139–40:
In Gregg the Court held that the infirmities of the former capital punishment schemes had been
addressed by Georgia’s revised statute. . . . Gregg and its companion cases upholding the
revised capital statutes sent a clear signal to the state legislatures: enact a capital punishment
statute resembling the Georgia statute, including a provision for proportionality review, and that
statue [sic] will be upheld by the Court.

See also id. at 140 n.33 (“The majority of the 12 states whose mandatory capital punishment
schemes were declared unconstitutional in 1976 responded by enacting statutes similar to the
Georgia statute upheld in Gregg.”).
46
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, pt. 9–1 (1977).
47
There is currently a bill in committee at the Illinois legislature to abolish the death
penalty. Death Penalty Abolition, H.B. 5687, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); see
also Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 964–65 (2005)
(describing a “shift in momentum” in favor of abolition prompted by a series of exonerations
around the country during the late 1990s).
48
See infra tbls. 1–7; NULSCCD, supra note 1. These are data from the Illinois state
treasurer and the Cook County treasurer given to the author of this Article in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request in 2010; see also Death Penalty Costs, S. Res. 297, 95th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009). This resolution calls for a cost study of capital punishment
conducted by the Illinois Criminal Justice Authority.
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cost study, this Article aggregates data from various sources, most
importantly the state and county expenditures on capital punishment from
the recently established Capital Litigation Trust Fund, and from other state
funding sources. 49 New data on some part of the cost of wrongful
convictions in Illinois are also included because those exonerated have
proceeded to successfully sue the state and counties for their wrongful
convictions. 50
While the cost data reported here are incomplete and do not purport to
be comprehensive, when considered together, the information presented
here does tell us that Illinois would have saved tens of millions of dollars a
year if at the time of the imposition of the moratorium in 2000, it simply
had abolished capital punishment. In this present time of budget crisis, the
legislature and other state authorities need to reexamine the purpose and
value of the capital punishment system.
II. THE ILLINOIS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND

The Illinois capital punishment system is similar to those in effect in
the majority of states with a death penalty. A defendant is “death-eligible”
if he is charged with a first-degree murder that includes at least one of the
twenty-one “special circumstances,” or enumerated statutory aggravating
factors. 51 If a county state’s attorney decides that one or more of these
circumstances exist and then decides to prosecute the case as a capital case,
the state’s attorney will file a “notice of intent” to seek the death penalty. 52
If the state’s attorney does not withdraw the notice of intent prior to trial
(which has been estimated to occur in about 60% of the cases in Illinois) 53
and the defendant does not opt for a bench trial, the case will be tried before
a special “death-qualified” jury. 54 Death-qualified juries must be composed
of jurors who would be willing to impose the death penalty. These
specially qualified jurors are selected according to a set of complicated

49

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.C.
51
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
52
Id. at 5/9-1(d). The Guidelines for State’s Attorneys included in Appendix A describe
the criteria and principles which the state’s attorneys have adopted as descriptive of their
decisionmaking process at this first stage.
53
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 90 (2010) [hereinafter
CPRSC FINAL REPORT] avaliable at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/
CPRSC – Sixth and Final Report.pdf. This may be done as part of a plea agreement or for a
variety of other reasons.
54
Id. at 16.
50
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procedural standards first announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois. 55 After the
death-qualified capital jury is seated, the case proceeds to capital trial.
If the state’s attorney intends to prosecute a murder as a capital case,
he must file a notice of intent to do so within 120 days of arraignment. 56
The notice must include a reference to the specific aggravating factors that
will be the basis of the capital prosecution.57 Under the present practice,
however, the statutory time limit of 120 days from arraignment for the
filing of a notice of intent is routinely waived by the defense or ignored by
both parties. 58 If the defense does not waive the time limitation, a state’s
attorney who is on the fence may be more likely to declare the case capital
in order to meet the deadline and preserve the option, whereas additional
time for the decision might make it less likely that the case would be
declared capital.
It is also relevant that as soon as the case is declared capital, the
defense counsel must immediately begin preparation for a penalty phase
trial and begin to develop mitigating evidence. Thus, it may be in the
interest of the public defender not to object to the waiving of the time
55
Death qualification of jurors has generated an enormous amount of literature and
litigation. Its foundation was laid in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968), in
which the Supreme Court decided that general objections to, or religious scruples against,
the death penalty do not disqualify prospective jurors from service in a capital case. For a
small part of the extensive literature on Witherspoon and the effect of death qualification, see
Samuel R. Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judicial Appraisal
of Empirical Data, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 7 (1984); see also William J. Bowers, Marla
Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors’
Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1476, 1484–86 (1998); Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury
Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 450–54 (1998).
56
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(c). Prior to the establishment of this rule, the notice of intent
could be filed any time prior to the beginning of the capital trial. If the notice of intent was
not filed until late in the proceedings, the defense was often unable to prepare for the
possibility of a capital trial and unprepared at the time of trial.
57
Id. The notice shall specify any and all of the twenty-one statutory aggravating factors
the state intends to prove at the penalty phase of the capital trial. Id.
58
In public testimony at the hearings conducted by the Capital Punishment Reform
Study Committee, both defense counsel and state’s attorneys testified that the 120-day filing
requirement was routinely waived by the defense.

A trial judge said that, in deciding whether or not to serve a capital punishment notice, there are
often strong budgetary and public relations incentives for elected State’s Attorneys to take
advantage of the availability of funds from the CLTF, rather than using county funds to pay the
expenses of first degree murder cases. Another judge said this pressure exists in almost all
downstate counties. One of our own knowledgeable Committee members, who is involved in
capital trials, said he suspected, although he could not prove, that some State’s Attorneys from
sparsely populated downstate counties filed Notices of Intent to seek the death penalty in order to
avoid having the costs paid with county funds.

CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 98.
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limitation. An extension of time beyond the 120 days allows more time for
negotiation over a plea bargain as to either sentence or charge. Plea
bargaining to drop the capital charge occurs routinely.59 If the purpose of
the 120-day time limit was to restrain the use of charge bargaining over the
capital charge in potentially capital cases, then waiving the time
requirement obviates that purpose.
Assuming the notice of intent is filed and not dropped, the case
proceeds to capital trial. In the first phase of the capital trial, the guilt
phase, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the trial
court judge or to the death-qualified jury that the defendant is guilty of firstdegree murder, as well as the other offenses in the indictment. 60 The trial
court jury does not address the statutory aggravating or mitigating factors at
the guilt phase. The indictment must specify the crime of first-degree
murder and that the defendant committed the homicidal act or hired another
to do so. 61 If the jury does not acquit but also does not find the defendant
guilty of death eligible first-degree murder, then the death-qualified jury is
dismissed and the trial judge simply sentences the defendant in accordance
with the law governing terms and sentences in noncapital cases. 62
If the jury finds the defendant guilty of death-eligible murder, the
capital trial proceeds to the next stage, the penalty phase. The deathqualified jury or the trial court judge then must first decide as a matter of
fact whether the state has proven the existence of one or more of the
statutory aggravating factors before weighing them against statutory
mitigating factors presented by the defense.63 Both the defense and the

59

Id. at 124.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). For example,
if a defendant is indicted for first-degree murder and armed robbery, the prosecutor at the
guilt phase must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder
with the requisite intent and by his own conduct (or paid another), and that the defendant is
guilty of the robbery or other felony predicate.
61
Non-slayer participants in felony murder are not eligible for capital prosecution in
Illinois. Id. at 5/9-1(b)(6)(a)(i). “The majority of states with capital punishment statutes
have some version of the felony aggravating factor as one of the criteria for the imposition of
the death penalty.” Bienen, supra note 5, at 727 (1991) (annotating state statutory provisions
enumerating the felony factor).
62
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g).
63
ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 138. The state’s attorney
may then present evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors at the penalty phase:
60

The establishment of nonstatutory aggravating factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to
authorize imposition of the death penalty. Nonstatutory aggravating factors may be considered
by the jury in selecting an appropriate sentence once a defendant is found eligible for the death
penalty, but they are not, and cannot be, used to determine that eligibility, as the Supreme Court
has explained: “[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function
at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death
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prosecution may present any evidence at the penalty phase that is reliable
and relevant. 64 The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the factual basis for one or more statutory aggravating
factors. 65 After the factual finding of the existence of one or more statutory
aggravating factors, the prosecution may introduce evidence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors, and the defense may present evidence of mitigating
factors, under this reduced standard of admissibility. The reason for the
relaxation of the evidence rules at this stage of the penalty phase is so that
the defense and the prosecution may present evidence of mitigation and
aggravation that might not meet the ordinary rules of admissibility, e.g.
testimony of relatives about events in his childhood, educational
experience, or other relevant mitigating evidence, and for the prosecution to
present additional aggravating evidence that might not have been
admissible at the guilt phase. 66
The penalty-phase jury finds the factors and the judge sentences based
upon the jury’s findings. If the death-qualified jury unanimously
determines that there is at least one aggravating factor and no mitigating
factors present, or the trial court judge makes such a determination, the trial
court judge is required to sentence the defendant to death.67 If the
unanimous jury or the judge decides the statutory aggravating factors
outweigh the statutory mitigating factors found, the judge is required to
sentence the defendant to death. 68 However, if in a jury trial, one or more
jurors conclude that death is not the appropriate sentence, the trial judge is
required to sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment pursuant to
requirements of the sentencing statutes.69
If the trial court judge imposes a death sentence, an execution date is
set, and the appeal of the capital sentence bypasses the intermediate
appellate division and goes directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.70 The

penalty. But the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating
factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be
sentenced to death.

United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 878 (1983)).
64
In Illinois and elsewhere the rules for the admissibility of evidence at the penalty phase
of a capital case are typically relaxed for both the defense and the prosecution. The only
requirement for admissibility is that the evidence be relevant and reliable. See, e.g., People
v. Banks, No. 103933, 2010 WL 572105, at *20 (Ill. Feb. 19, 2010).
65
See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 137–38.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 152.
68
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
69
Id.
70
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 603.
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Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence “if the court finds
that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case . . . [and] shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.” 71 This
is a new rule. Previously, some Illinois Supreme Court precedent implied
the court may have considered its jurisdiction to be limited to procedural
matters. 72 If the Illinois Supreme Court sets aside the death sentence, it
may remand the case to the trial court for another capital trial, or in some
circumstances the Illinois Supreme Court may hold that the defendant may
not be re-prosecuted capitally. 73 If the Illinois Supreme Court upholds the
death sentence, a series of postconviction appeals will be made to both state
and federal courts. 74 As an appeal of last resort, the person sentenced to
death may appeal for a commutation from the Governor. 75
Under the Illinois capital punishment statute, a large percentage of the
first-degree murders committed in Illinois are technically eligible to be
prosecuted as capital cases. 76 The Illinois capital punishment statute
contains twenty-one statutory aggravating factors that qualify a murder for
capital prosecution. 77 These factors are unusually expansive, creating a
large pool of potentially death-eligible cases throughout the state.78 The
most important and most frequently charged factor is the felony statutory
aggravating factor, which renders death-eligible the actor who causes the
death of the murdered individual with intent during the course of a felony
that is an inherently violent crime, or during the attempt to commit an
inherently violent crime. 79 Although the 2002 Governor’s Commission
Report recommended narrowing the scope of the felony factor, the

71

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i).
Cullerton et al., supra note 41. Under its authority to set aside or modify death
sentences on the grounds of the violation of state or federal constitutional principles, the
court always could set aside death sentences.
73
See e.g., People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (2004) (prohibiting state from
seeking death penalty when retrying defendant whose conviction was reversed after his
original sentence had been commuted from death to life in prison).
74
ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 165–66.
75
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12. It was under the Governor’s clemency powers that Governor
George Ryan commuted the death sentences in 2003. See also NULSCCD, supra note 1
(Notices of Intent).
76
ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 66.
77
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
78
This issue of the over-inclusiveness of the Illinois statutory aggravating factors was
addressed, but not effectively changed, by the 2003 reforms. The Governor’s Commission
unanimously recommended that the Illinois statute be revised to reduce the list of eligibility
factors (then numbering twenty) that qualify a defendant for capital punishment. See ILL.
2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 67–73.
79
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(6) (emphasis added).
72
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legislature has not been willing to strictly limit or remove it. 80 When
considered together, several other imprecise or expansive statutory
aggravating factors could be used to characterize the circumstances of
almost any first-degree murder. 81 Since few first-degree murders are
ineligible for capital prosecution, the discretion of county state’s attorneys
to declare a case capital is of paramount importance.
B. THE REFORM AND ITS AFTERMATH

1. The Impetus for Reform
Illinois became the symbol for all that was wrong with the death
penalty in America when, in a series of cascading revelations beginning in
the late 1990s, more than a dozen persons on death row were discovered to
be innocent of the crimes for which they had been convicted and sentenced
to death. 82 These death sentences had been upheld through all state and
federal stages of direct and collateral review. These cases, which were
widely publicized in Illinois and elsewhere, involved false and coerced
confessions, faulty eyewitness identifications, and cases in which the
evidence of the defendants’ guilt was primarily established through the
testimony of jailhouse informants. 83 The Illinois Supreme Court had even

80
The 2002 Governor’s Commission Report was highly critical of the overuse of the
felony factor, and came close to recommending its elimination. A majority of the members
recommended a list of five factors that excluded the felony factor, while a minority
recommended the same five factors plus retaining the felony factor. ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23 at 73–74. Neither position, majority nor minority, was
accepted by the general assembly. Instead, the statute relating to homicides committed
during the course of a felony was rewritten to reduce the former list of fifteen predicate
felonies to nine, and a twenty-first eligibility factor was added, involving homicides
committed in the course of an offense of terrorism. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(21).
81
The other very broad statutory aggravating factors include: “the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant
created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result . . . ” 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(11); “the murder was committed as a result of the intentional
discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present
within the motor vehicle,” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(15); and “the murdered
individual was subject to an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person
against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act of 1986.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(19).
82
See Marshall, supra note 19, at 577–79; Warden, supra note 9, at 411–26.
83
The lead up to the reforms and the establishment of the Ryan Commission are
described in SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 16–46 (2003). They are also described in Marshall, supra note
19; and Warden, supra note 9; see also Michael P. Toomin, Capital Punishment Reform and
the Illinois Supreme Court: At the Forefront of Change, 92 ILL. B.J. 642 (2004).
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upheld the death sentences imposed by a trial judge who had been accepting
bribes regularly during the time of the capital trials before him. 84
Most dramatic was the exoneration of Anthony Porter, who, although
innocent of the murder for which he was sentenced to die, came within days
of being executed.85 His and similar wrongful convictions were only
discovered after extensive and longstanding investigations by journalists,
lawyers, students, volunteers, and many others.86 Many of those whose
convictions were overturned or commuted later sued the county, the City of
Chicago, or the state for their wrongful convictions. 87
Governor Ryan’s 2000 moratorium on executions was the first
statewide moratorium on executions in the country.
It provoked
88
considerable comment, not all of it favorable. Moratoria in other states
At the same time, litigation regarding the
quickly followed. 89
constitutionality of lethal injection was gaining traction, and several states
implemented moratoria on executions until this issue was settled. 90 The
history of the Governor’s moratorium, the commutations, and other aspects
of the reform movement in Illinois has been chronicled elsewhere.91 This
84
For a discussion of this series of cases, see Bienen, supra note 8, at 212. The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the death sentences imposed by Judge Maloney even though the
petitioners argued the judge “came down hard” in cases where he was not bribed in order to
avoid what proved to be an accurate suspicion that he was “on the take.” Indeed, this
behavior was confirmed in the evidence presented during his trial and conviction. During
the time when he was accepting bribes, Judge Maloney imposed eight death sentences. A
divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn these death sentences, but they
were later reversed by the United States Supreme Court essentially adopting the stinging
dissent. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).
Then, and only then, did the Illinois Supreme Court overturn these death sentences, although
the State continued to argue even after the United States Supreme Court opinion that the
defendants had waived their right to attack their convictions on due process grounds. People
v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ill. 1998).
85
The story of the commutations has been chronicled elsewhere. See Marshall, supra
note 19; Sarat, supra note 26; Warden, supra note 9.
86
Warden, supra note 9, at 410.
87
The monetary awards to date from those lawsuits for those sentenced to death are
presented in Table 7, infra p. 1364.
88
Austin Sarat, Mercy, Clemency, and Capital Punishment: Two Accounts, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 273 (2005) (describing how death penalty supporters “demonized
Ryan” while, among death penalty opponents, “Ryan became an instant hero, and his
decision became a signal moment in the evolution of new abolitionist politics”). The
moratorium has continued to be controversial.
89
States with a current moratorium on executions include Illinois, New Mexico,
Arkansas, Nevada, North Carolina, California, Maryland, Kentucky, and Nebraska. The
Death
Penalty
in
Flux,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFORMATION
CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux (last visited March 17, 2010).
90
For a history of the lethal injection litigation, see Denno, supra note 27.
91
See TUROW, supra note 83; Sarat, supra note 26; Warden, supra note 9.
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section will focus on the effects of the reforms that followed the
moratorium in 2000 and the Ryan commutations in 2003, including the
work of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee and the practical
effects of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on capital prosecutions in
Illinois.
2. The Specifics of the Illinois Capital Punishment Reforms
What are commonly referred to as the Illinois Capital Punishment
Reforms of 2003 were enacted in several different legal forms (and some
before 2003) and institutionalized in various governmental bodies and
agencies. They included: the Governor’s unilateral moratorium on
executions (in 2000) (discussed in Part I above); the establishment of the
Capital Litigation Trust Fund by the legislature within the Illinois Treasury
(effective 2000) (discussed in Part II.B.3 below); the establishment of the
Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee by the legislature in 2003);
rule changes put in place by the Illinois Supreme Court (recommended by
the Report of the Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases in
1999, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2001); changes to police
procedures and practices (recommended by the 2002 Governor’s
Commission and other sources, adopted piecemeal at various times and in
various forms); and other miscellaneous recommendations regarding police
and court procedures. 92 Some recommendations that have not been adopted
seem trivial and would require little effort, such as the recommendation that
a copy of all notices of intent filed be sent to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Yet this would actually have a profound effect upon the ability of
researchers, and practitioners, to track the interpretation of the death penalty
statute throughout the state over time.
The patchwork nature of the reforms is confusing; nonetheless, several
overarching features are noteworthy. Although the well-regarded 2002
Governor’s Commission made eighty-five recommendations, very few of
them were enacted or put into effect. 93 Most importantly, the Commission
recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court conduct proportionality

92

For a description of these reforms, see Cullerton et al., supra note 41; Hayler, supra
note 21; Toomin, supra note 83; Warden, supra note 9.
93
The Commission’s Report contained eighty-five recommendations, none of which
were adopted by the 2002 general assembly. The Ryan commutations took place in January
2003. During the 2003 general assembly, a number of the Commission recommendations
were enacted and signed into law by then-Governor Rod Blagojevich. For a detailed
description of the work of the Commission by one of its members, see TUROW, supra note
83, at 25–32, 63–102. Thomas Sullivan was the Co-Chair of the 2002 Governor’s
Commission and later the Chair of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee.
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review, and establish a statewide capital crimes database.94 The court and
the legislature have consistently refused to adopt these recommendations. 95
Some of the reforms that were adopted, however, include:
• Requirements for the electronic recording of custodial
interrogations of suspects in homicide investigations;
• Changes in recommended procedures for police lineups;
• Recommendations for the processing of DNA evidence and
defense accessibility to that evidence;
• Requirements for a pretrial hearing on the reliability of evidence
proffered by a jailhouse informant;
• The recommendation that state’s attorneys establish guidelines for
the prosecution of capital cases; 96
• The establishment of training programs for prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges;
• A provision authorizing the Illinois Supreme Court to overturn a
death sentence if the court finds the death sentence is
fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case; 97 and
• The establishment of the Capital Punishment Reform Study
Committee (CPRSC).
The mandate of the CPRSC was to study and report to the general
assembly regarding:
The impact of reforms on the issue of uniformity and proportionality in the
application of the death penalty including, but not limited to, the tracking of data
related to whether the reforms have eliminated the statistically significant differences
in sentencing related to the geographic location of the homicide and the race of the
victim found by the Governor’s Commission on capital punishment in its report issued
98
April 15, 2002.

94

ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 166–68.
Comparative proportionality review in death cases is not required by the United States
Constitution, and has never been a feature of the review of capital sentencing under the
Illinois constitution. People v. Thompson, 853 N.E. 2d 378, 404–05 (Ill. 2006). A statewide
capital crimes database was authoirzed, but not funded, by the Illinois Capital Crimes
Database Act in 2007. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3930/7.6.
96
See infra Appendix A and Part II.E.
97
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). That provision
has never been acted upon or invoked by the Illinois Supreme Court, according to the
attorney general’s office. Nor, some have argued, did the Illinois Supreme Court need any
such authorization to overturn a death sentence in the interests of justice or procedural due
process. See Bienen, supra note 8, at 197–207.
98
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3929/2(b)(1) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). The CPRSC
formalized its purpose in the following language:
95

A majority of the Committee members concluded that their function under the enabling statute is
to evaluate the impact of the reforms to the Illinois capital punishment system enacted by the
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The CPRSC collected data and commissioned surveys of police,
prosecutors, judges, administrators and other criminal justice personnel.99
It addressed issues of proportionality and county-by-county disparities as
part of its mandate to study the effect of the Ryan reforms on the previous
finding of statistically significant differences in sentencing related to the
location of the murder, geographical differences based upon where the
homicide took place and was prosecuted, and the race of the victim. The
CPRSC’s own commissioned research found that although geographic and
county disparities had been reduced by the reforms, they were not
eliminated. 100
3. The History of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and Its Impact
The Capital Litigation Trust Fund (CLTF) was created in 1999,
effective January 1, 2000, to promote fairness in the defense and
prosecution of death penalty cases.101 This bipartisan legislation was
approved overwhelmingly after thirteen persons had their death sentences
overturned. Although the passage of the reform legislation was spurred by
publicity surrounding wrongful convictions and inadequate representation
by the defense in some capital cases, the CTLF was set up from its
inception to provide funds to county state’s attorneys as well as to public
defenders in the trial regions and in Cook County. 102 In some states, such
93rd General Assembly against the backdrop of the reforms that have been implemented by the
judiciary and other government agencies, as well as other reforms proposed by the Governor’s
Commission which may be necessary or advisable to adopt in order to make fully effective the
reforms already adopted.

CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 4. For a description of the work of the CPRSC, its
structure, compliance with the open meetings act, etc., see id. at 4–8.
99
The author of this Article was the Chair of Subcommittee 2, with the authority to study
proportionality review and geographic disparity. This subcommittee took upon itself the
task of beginning to create a database of first-degree murders throughout the state from
2003–2008. The results of this research and its methodology will be made public on the
Northwestern University School of Law library website. Survey research and data
compilation for the Committee, reproduced in Appendix B infra, was conducted by Dr.
David Olson and his colleagues at Loyola University. Id. at 9.
100
See infra Part II.D (discussion of Tables A–F); see also CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra
note 53, at 108–09.
101
Capital Crimes Litigation Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/124 (West 1993).
102
The CLTF also allocates money to the Appellate Office of the Attorney General and
the Appellate Office of the Public Defender, as well as to appointed defense attorneys from
the private bar. CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 84. Attorneys from the private bar
represent indigent capital defendants at a set hourly rate of reimbursement when there is a
conflict of interest for the public defender, e.g. the public defender is representing a
codefendant in the same crime, or when the Office of the Public Defender is unable to
represent the indigent defendant for another reason. Federal funding for the Capital
Resource Center within the Office of the Public Defender ceased in Fiscal Year 1996.
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as North Carolina, additional funds for capital cases have been allocated
only for the defense. 103 In Illinois, the purpose of the CLTF from the
beginning was to grant funds to county prosecutors and to the attorney
general, as well to public defenders, and to appointed counsel for the
defense of capital cases.
Prior to the enactment of the CLTF, some counties may not have had
the economic resources to prosecute a capital case. 104 In the current
economic crisis in Illinois, that may again be the circumstance. The
establishment of the CLTF removed much of the financial burden from the
counties in Illinois at least for a brief period of time. Even with the
assistance of funds from the CLTF, however, the state will not reimburse
the county for all of the costs of a capital case. The salaries of state’s
attorneys and staff public defenders may not be subject to reimbursement
by the CLTF, although the state’s attorney’s office may charge the expenses
of investigators and support staff, proportionate to the amount of work they
do on capital cases, to the CLTF. 105
One purpose of enacting the CLTF was to provide competent counsel
for the defense and prosecution of capital cases, especially in rural areas or
in less populated counties. 106 Assigned defense counsel in the counties,
especially in rural counties, may have worried that taking on the defense of
a capital case would dominate or even destroy their practices. That concern

MICHAEL J. PELLETIER, OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009, Part III.F , available at http://www.state.il.us/Defender/ar09.html.
103
Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498 (2009).
104
In New Jersey, for example, there was a period after the reenactment of capital
punishment when no capital cases were prosecuted in Essex County (the county which
includes Newark) although there were at least fifteen felony murders during the relevant
time period where there was a factual basis for seeking the death penalty. See Bienen, supra
note 2, at 199 n.250.
105
The Cook County state’s attorney used the CLTF to pay for attorney training; other
general expenses, such as computer expenses and indirect costs; $8,914,685.66 in payroll
expenses; and expenditures to send attorneys to capital punishment conferences. Letter from
Paul A. Castiglione, Exec. Assistant State’s Attorney for Policy, Office of the State’s
Attorney, Cook County Illinois, to Leigh Bienen, Re: FOIA Request (July 20, 2010) (on file
with author). For example, the state’s attorneys charged the state for the payment of fees to
mitigation experts and DNA testing. See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of
Expenditures (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
106
House Debate, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session, at 19 (Ill. May 21, 1999), available
at http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans91/t052199.pdf (statement of Representative
Durkin):
[P]rosecutors in downstate on a number of occasions have not been able to proceed with capital
punishment cases, because they’ve stated that it will bankrupt the county, cause these are very
expensive and these are very long trials. So, I think what we’re doing is that we are going to
allow money for both sides. It’s equal funding.
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was not unrealistic. A capital case with its many motions and extensive
preparations can swamp a small town law office. Yet the reported pattern
of capital prosecutions in the rural areas, according to research reported to
the CPRSC, was paradoxical. Namely, more capital cases, proportionately
and absolutely, were prosecuted before the reforms, including before the
establishment of the CLTF, than after the reforms. 107 We may once again
revert to a situation in which some rural counties cannot afford to prosecute
or defend capital cases because of the legislature’s current budget crisis.108
The counties have already been affected by the state delaying payment of
allocated funds to the counties.
The allocation of funds from the CLTF is made from an annual
appropriation made by the legislature to the CLTF. From the outset, funds
were separately set aside for allocation to Cook County, which regularly
accounts for more than 60% of the murders in the state.109 Until the
enactment of a statute in 2010, the Illinois treasurer had no authority to
question the request for funds. 110 His job was simply to disburse the money
that had been appropriated, which was done in response to specific requests
for funds for individual cases from judges in the counties. The mechanism
was that the trial court judge approved the request from the public defender
or appointed attorneys.
The distribution of murders across the state also plays some role in
determining how much money each county receives from the CLTF.
However, outside of Cook County and one or two other urban areas with a
large number of murders, there is a surprising lack of correlation between
the number of murders in the county, the average number of murders per
capita in the county, and the disbursement of funds from the CLTF to that
county. Many counties in Illinois receive no funding because they have no
murders, or no death-eligible murders, or choose not to prosecute their
death-eligible murders as capital cases. Other counties regularly have

107

See infra Part II.D (discussion of Tables A–F).
This is not an unrealistic concern. In some states, public defenders have declared that
they do not have the economic resources to defend capital cases. The recent across the board
cuts to the salaries of public defenders and state’s attorneys will increase the financial strain
on these officials. See Tony Arnold, Cook County Attorneys Running Out of Money to Try
Death Penalty Cases, CHI. PUB. RADIO (May 18, 2010) http://www.chicagopublicradio.org/
Content.aspx?audioID=42045. Nor is this situation unique to Illinois. The New York public
defenders are being sued by indigent defendants because they cannot provide assistance due
to lack of money. William Glaberson, Court Rules That Suit on Public Defender System
Can Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A20.
109
According to the state police, Cook County had 584 murders in 2008 and 522
murders in 2007. CRIME IN ILLINOIS 2008 ANNUAL UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 53 (2009)
[hereinafter CRIME IN ILLINOIS], available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/cii2008.cfm.
110
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(d) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
108
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several death-eligible murders per year, but prosecute some as capital and
others as non-capital, and some urban jurisdictions have dozens of deatheligible murders every year and relatively few capital prosecutions. 111 How
CLTF funds have been spent and to whom they have been allocated are set
out in Tables 1–6, below. The patterns are not what might be expected.
C. COUNTY DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF CAPITAL CASES

The unusual structure of the Illinois criminal justice system contributes
to anomalous patterns in the prosecution of capital cases in Illinois. There
are 102 counties in Illinois, each with the authority to bring criminal
indictments and the independent discretion to decide whether to charge a
murder as a death-eligible offense.112 Each of the 102 counties has its own
elected state’s attorney. Although the 2002 Governor’s Commission
recommended the establishment of a statewide panel to review statewide
patterns in capital case charging, that reform was not enacted. 113 The
recommendation has been endorsed again in 2010 by the Committee to
Study the Reform of the Death Penalty. 114 Some have even argued that it
would be unconstitutional under the state constitution for any superior
authority to review the decision to declare a case capital. 115
Each of the 102 individual state’s attorneys is elected every four years
solely by the electorate in his or her county, and each now has the
independent, allegedly unreviewable authority to designate for capital
prosecution any or all or none of the death-eligible cases in his or her

111

See infra Table 2.
ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 16.
113
Id. at 84. The 2002 Governor’s Commission recommended that the review committee
be composed of the attorney general or designee, the state’s attorney of Cook County or
designee, a state’s attorney from another county chosen by lot, the president of the Illinois
State’s Attorneys Association, and a retired judge, preferably with experience in criminal
law, to be appointed by the Governor. Id.
114
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 79–80.
115
See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 86–87. Addressing
this argument, the 2002 Governor’s Commission report stated:
112

The recommended statutory review procedure will not give rise to constitutional problems.
While the office of State’s Attorney is created by the Illinois Constitution, the powers and duties
exercised by the State’s Attorneys are defined by statute. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-9. . . .
...
In view of the fact that the prosecutor’s authority to seek the death penalty in the first instance is
derived from the statute creating the entire sentencing scheme, a statutory amendment reducing
the breadth of prosecutorial discretion would comport with the Illinois Constitution and
decisional law.

Id.
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jurisdiction. 116 There is at present no central, institutionalized review
system in place to ensure that the charging of capital murder across the state
is uniform or even consistent under the laws of the state across the 102
county jurisdictions. As a result, there are significant county-by-county
disparities in the prosecution of capital cases.
Table 1 is a summary for the State of Illinois of the following for the
period 2000–2009: the number of murders; the number of capital
prosecutions; the amount of money appropriated to the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund; the number of death sentences imposed; the number of
exonerations; and the amount of state payments in cases of wrongful
convictions. The information is separately reported for Cook County and
all other counties for years 2000–2009. Cook County accounted for
approximately three-quarters of all murders, with a significantly higher
murder rate than the rest of the state. The largest number of those murders
in Cook County took place in the City of Chicago. 117
It is noteworthy that while Cook County has the largest number of
murders, as well as the highest murder rate and the largest absolute number
of capital prosecutions, Cook County does not have the highest rate of

116

While the decision to declare a case capital may be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the individual state’s attorney for that county, the Illinois Supreme Court and the attorney
general of the state have the power to review the constitutionality of patterns and practices
across the state as a whole. Indeed, their mandate to enforce the laws requires them to do so.
While the Office of the State’s Attorney is created by the state constitution, the powers and
duties exercised by the state’s attorney are defined by statute. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/3-9005 (West 1993 & 2010 Supp.). The legislature and the Illinois Supreme Court have
the authority and the duty to interpret and review the application of state statutes. The
legislature can amend or remove statutory aggravating factors, or even to repeal the entire
capital punishment system. It is also axiomatic that the state’s attorney’s duty is to comply
with statutory law and to act in accordance with the constitution of the state and of the
United States. Id.
117
The second most populous county in the United States, Cook County includes over
5.29 million residents, making up 41% of the population of Illinois. See CRIME IN ILLINOIS
supra note 109 at 53–60. Cook County encompasses the City of Chicago along with an
additional 128 municipalities, the largest of which include the suburbs of Evanston,
Schaumburg, Skokie, and Arlington Heights. About Cook County, COOKCOUNTYGOV.COM
(2010)
http://www.cookcountygov.com/portal/server.pt/community/government/226/
about_cook_county. Of Cook County residents, 66.8% are white, 25.6% are black, 23.2%
are Hispanic or Latino, and 5.8% are Asian. Id.
The homicide rate for the state as a whole in 2008 was 6.1 murders per 100,000 people.
In total, this comes to 790 murders committed in Illinois; 73.9%, or 584, of those murders
took place in Cook County, a homicide rate of 11.0 murders per 100,000 residents. See
CRIME IN ILLINOIS , supra note 109, at 53–60. Of those murders committed in Cook County,
510, 87.3% took place within Chicago’s city limits, while the remaining 74 murders,
comprising 12.7%, occurred in the surrounding suburbs. Id. at 10–18, 53–60.
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Table 1
SUMMARY TABLE: MURDERS, CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS, CAPITAL LITIGATION
TRUST FUND APPROPRIATIONS, AND STATE PAYMENTS FOR WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS 2000–2009
Cook
County

All Other
Illinois
Counties

(Col. 1)

(Col. 2)

6,272

2,131

8,403

Capital Prosecutions 119

294

213

507

Amount Appropriated to
CLTF

$71,941,100

$37,718,000

$109,659,100

Death Sentences Imposed

6

11 120

17

Exonerations in Death
Cases 121

13

5

18

State Payments for
Wrongful Convictions 122

$55,777,650

$9,195,397

$64,973,047

Murders

118

Totals
(Col. 3)
(Col. 1 + Col. 2)

Source: Illinois State Police; Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office; Illinois State
Treasurer’s Office; Northwestern University, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal
Clinic.

118

2009 figures are pending, and at present unavailable. The figures recorded for 2008
are projected as estimates for 2009.
119
For Cook County, the source is the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. The
figure includes 2009, and the first six months of 2010. For all other counties, the source is
number of cases to which disbursements were made from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund.
120
This figure includes the death sentences imposed on Brian Nelson and Laurence
Lovejoy, whose sentences were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
121
This figure represents the total number of exonerations in Cook County and in all
other Illinois counties, including those for convictions prior to the year 2000.
122
This figure includes the exonerees’ court of claims awards, settlement awards, and
legal fees accrued by defendant counties, cities, or both named in post-exoneration federal
civil rights suits brought by exonerated persons as plaintiffs. It excludes any awards or fees
accrued in 2010. For details, see infra Table 7 (State Expenditures on Wrongful
Convictions).
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declaring murders death-eligible (calculated by dividing the number of
murders by the number of capital prosecutions). Nor does Cook County
account for the largest proportion of death sentences or the largest number
of death sentences imposed over the period 2000–2009. 123 Table 1 shows
that there were some 500 cases which the state’s attorneys noticed for
capital prosecution. 124 These cases resulted in the imposition of seventeen
death sentences. The Capital Litigation Trust Fund appropriated more than
$109 million for the prosecution of these cases, with Cook County
receiving less than three-quarters of the money appropriated. Cook County
accounted for about 70% of all murders. 125 Cook County had the largest
number of exonerations in capital cases, and also the largest awards in cases
of wrongful convictions. Details for these figures are reported in Tables 2–
7.
Table 2 shows the number of murders by county for the years 2000–
2008, the per capita murder rate, the number of capital cases prosecuted,
and the number of death sentences imposed (excluding Cook County),
ranking counties by those with the highest number of murders. 126 The
number of capital prosecutions was calculated by totaling the number of
individual cases funded by the CLTF by county. This figure is not an
estimate or a projection, but a count of distinctly identified cases
individually funded by the CLTF. 127 To the extent that counties served
notices of intent to seek the death penalty and neither the defense nor the
state’s attorney asked for funds from the CLTF, those cases were excluded.
The total of capital prosecutions reported would then be an undercount,
although funds would be expected to be sought from the CLTF if a case

123

Please note that in this discussion, some tables are for the period 2000–2010, some
are for the period 2000–2009, and other tables are organized by fiscal year. The time period
used for each table was determined by the time period for the corresponding data received
from the Illinois state treasurer, the Cook County treasurer, or the Illinois State Crime
Reports.
124
The number of capital prosecutions is a total of the distinct case numbers in each
individual county to which the CLTF granted funds. This allows for a tabulation of the
number of cases by year and county. Cook County detailed data by case were not available
for the entire period. See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file
with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
125
This does not include the appropriations for 2010.
126
Table 2 includes capital prosecutions during 2009 and 2010 and results in Cook
County accounting for 53.5% of all capital prosecutions.
127
In other words, this is not a prosecutor's or defense attorney's recollection of how
many capital cases were prosecuted in the county, it is a record of how many individual
cases the CLTF funded.
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Table 2
Murders, Capital Prosecutions, and Death Sentences Imposed by County,
by Incidence of Murder (Excluding Cook County), 2000–2008 128
Total
No. of
Murders

Average
Annual
No. of
Murders

(Col. 1)

(Col. 2)

Average
Annual
Murders
Per
Capita 129
(Col. 3)

St. Clair

311

34.6

Winnebago

176

Kane

County

No. of
No. of
Death
Capital
Sentences
Cases
Prosecuted 130 Imposed
(Col. 4)

(Col. 5)

13.36

17

1

19.6

6.81

2

0

154

17.3

3.94

14

0

Will

152

16.9

2.92

8

1

Peoria

130

14.4

7.9

4

0

Lake

100

11.1

1.63

13

0

Madison

100

11.1

4.24

18

0

Sangamon

79

8.8

4.59

3

0

DuPage

78

8.7

0.93

21

2

Macon

71

7.9

7.07

14

0

128

The data for 2000–2008 includes the first year of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund
and the last year for which county and state data for murders were available from the Illinois
State Police.
129
Per 100,000 persons.
130
Column 4 includes capital cases that had been certified as death-eligible prior to the
year 2000 and were pending during the date universe displayed. The numbers of capital
prosecutions for each county are the total number of cases, by case number, receiving funds
from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, as reported by the Illinois state treasurer for the years
2000–2008. Co-defendants prosecuted under the same case number were counted as one
case.
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Table 2
(Continued)

No. of
Capital
Cases
Prosecuted130

No. of
Death
Sentences
Imposed

(Col. 2)

Average
Annual
Murders
Per
Capita129
(Col. 3)

(Col. 4)

(Col. 5)

1925

213.9

2.9

210

10 131

5688

632

11.5

271 132

6

Total
No. of
Murders

Average
Annual
No. of
Murders

(Col. 1)
Statewide
(excluding
Cook
County)
Cook
County

County

Source: Illinois State Police Uniform Crime Reports; Illinois State Treasurer’s Office;
Supreme Court of Illinois.

was declared capital after 2000. There is little reason to think this is a
significant undercount of the number of capital prosecutions in the state
during the period.
St. Clair County has the second highest absolute number of murders
after Cook County and the highest murder rate in the state. 133 St. Clair has

131

This figure includes the death sentences imposed on Brian Nelson and Laurence
Lovejoy, whose sentences were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The Supreme Court of Illinois ordered Brian Nelson to be re-sentenced to a penalty other
than death. People v. Nelson, 922 N.E.2d 1056 (2009). It overturned Laurence Lovejoy’s
conviction and sentence and due to trial court error and remanded for a new trial. People v.
Lovejoy, 919 N.E.2d 843 (2009).
132
For Cook County, the source is the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. This
number includes cases which were certified as death penalty eligible prior to the year 2000
and were pending during the date universe displayed. It excludes capital cases originating
during 2009 and 2010.
133
St. Clair County, Illinois, which includes East St. Louis, is located on the
southwestern border of Illinois. The county makes up 1.7% of the state population, with
216,316 residents.
U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts (2008),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html [hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau, State and
County QuickFacts 2008] (select “Illinois;” select each county in Illinois and refer to
"Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area"). Of these, 67.5% of St. Clair County
residents are white, 29.4% are black, 2.8% are Hispanic or Latino, and 1.2% are Asian. Id.
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a high murder rate (13.36/100,000) and a large number of cases were deathnoticed, but only one death sentence was imposed during the entire period.
The total number of murders in other individual counties is significantly
lower.
After Cook County, among the counties with the largest number of
murders, only DuPage County imposed more than one death sentence
during the period 2000–2008. 134 DuPage County accounted for two death
sentences in the period. 135 DuPage County has a low average per capita
murder rate of 0.93, and a total of seventy-eight murders for the entire
period 2000–2008. DuPage County, however, prosecuted twenty-one cases
as capital cases, the largest number of any of those counties with a
relatively large absolute number of murders during the period 2000–2008.
Madison County, with a per capita murder rate of 4.24, prosecuted
eighteen cases as capital cases.136 Kane County, with a total of 154 murders
and an average annual per capital murder rate of 3.94, prosecuted fourteen
cases capitally. 137 Macon County prosecuted fourteen cases capitally, with

In the state as a whole, 79.1% of Illinois residents reported their ethnicity as white, 14.9%
reported as black, 15.2% reported as Hispanic or Latino, and 4.3% reported as Asian. Id.
According to the 2008 Illinois Annual Uniform Crime Report, 35 murders were committed
in St. Clair County in that year. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 162. Of those
murders, 16, or 46.7%, were reported by the East St. Louis police department. Id. East St.
Louis accounts for 13.4% of the total population of St. Clair County. Id. at 162–64.
134
DuPage County, located in the northeast corner of Illinois immediately west of Cook
County, had a population of 929,192 in 2008. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County
QuickFacts 2008, supra note 133. DuPage County makes up a little over 7% of the total
population of Illinois. Of the county’s residents, 83.8% are white, 4.7% are black, 12.6% are
Hispanic or Latino, and 9.9% are Asian. Id. For comparison, in the state of Illinois 79.1%
of residents are white, 14.9% are black, 15.2% are Hispanic or Latino, and 4.3% are Asian.
Id. In 2008, six murders were committed in DuPage County, making the homicide rate 0.6
murders for every 100,000 residents. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 68.
135
This figure does not include the Brian Dugan death sentence imposed in 2010. For a
discussion of the Brian Dugan case, see infra note 241 and accompanying text.
136
Madison County borders St. Clair County to the north and had a population of
267,347 residents in 2008. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra
note 133. The county makes up approximately 2% of Illinois’s total population. Id. Within
Madison County, 89.6% of people are white, 8.1% are black, 2.2% are Hispanic or Latino,
and 0.7% are Asian. Id. For a comparison to Illinois’ demographical makeup, see supra note
133 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois). The 2008 murder rate in
Madison County was 5.6 murders for every 100,000 persons, or 15 murders committed
during that year. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 121.
137
Bordering DuPage and Cook Counties to the west, Kane County had a population of
501,021, or approximately 4% of the population of Illinois, in 2008. U.S. Census Bureau,
State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra note 133. U.S. Census data reports from 2008
indicate that 89.6% of people living in Kane County are white, 5.6% are black, 28.6% are
Hispanic or Latino, and 3.2% are Asian. Id. For a comparison to Illinois’ demographical
makeup, see supra note 133 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois).
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an average per capita murder rate of 7.07. 138 Lake County, with 100
murders during the period, and an average per capita murder rate of
1.63/100,000, prosecuted thirteen murders as capital cases. 139
In short, the total number of murders during the period and the average
annual murder rate do not correlate with the number of capital prosecutions
in the county. The counties with the most murders are not the counties
most likely to declare a case capital. Nor is this a pattern limited to Illinois.
It has been documented in other states as well.140 Since so few persons
were sentenced to death at all, commentary on the rate of death sentences
imposed is not warranted.
Noteworthy also is the distribution at the opposite end of the scale:
Winnebago County, with 176 murders during the period and an average per
capita murder rate of 6.81, prosecuted only two cases capitally. Sangamon
County with a total of seventy-nine cases and a murder rate of 4.59 per
100,000, prosecuted three cases capitally. The distribution, once Cook
County is excluded, shows that the counties with the largest number of

Kane County has a homicide rate of one murder for every 100,000 persons and five murders
were committed within the county in 2008. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 99.
138
Macon County is located in central Illinois. In 2008, it had a population of 108,732
and made up 0.8% of Illinois’s total population. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County
QuickFacts 2008, supra note 133. In Macon County, 82.2% of people are white, 14.9% are
black, 1.4% are Hispanic or Latino, and 1.0% are Asian. Id. For a comparison to Illinois’
demographical makeup, see supra note 133 (providing demographic information for the state
of Illinois). In 2008, nine murders were committed in the county at a rate of 8.3 murders for
every 100,000 residents. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 117.
139
Lake County, which abuts Cook County to the north, had a population of 712,567 in
2009, making up approximately 5.5% of Illinois's total population. U.S. Census Bureau,
State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra note 133. In Lake County, 85.3% of residents
reported their ethnicity as white in 2008, 6.9% reported as black, 19.6% reported as Hispanic
or Latino, and 5.8% reported as Asian. Id. For a comparison to Illinois’ demographical
makeup, see supra note 133 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois).
The most recent data on crime rates in Lake County recorded ten murders in the county in
2008, a homicide rate of 1.4 murders for every 100,000 residents. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra
note 109, at 110.
140
As in Illinois, all California county district attorneys (prosecutors) can declare a case
capital, however, “in almost half the counties, 28 of the 58, no death sentences were imposed
during the 1990’s, although 1,160 homicides took place in these counties.” CALIFORNIA
REPORT, supra note 33, at 150 n.120. Furthermore:
those counties with the highest death sentencing rates tend to have the highest proportion of nonHispanic whites in their population, and the lowest population density. The more white and
more sparsely populated the county, the higher the death sentencing rate.

Id. at 150.
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Table 3
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Expenditures, Individual Counties (Excluding
Cook) by Total Amount Disbursed, 2000–2009
Total Amount
Disbursed from
CLTF

No. of Capital
Cases
Prosecuted 141

No. of Death
Sentences
Imposed 142

Col. 1

Col. 2

Col. 3

Jefferson

$2,599,553.01

2

0

$1,299,776.51

St. Clair

$2,066,226.19

17

1

$121,542.72

DeWitt

$1,833,270.66

3

0

$611,090.22

Hancock

$1,573,305.30

1

1

$1,573,305.30

Kankakee

$1,251,631.06

9

0

$139,070.12

Gallatin

$1,109,896.87

2

0

$554,948.44

DuPage

$1,027,729.41

21

3

$48,939.50

Macon

$943,858.64

14

0

$67,418.47

Sangamon

$911,876.98

3

0

$303,958.99

Lawrence

$836,985.50

2

0

$418,492.75

Totals

$14,154,333.62

74

5

N/A

All Other
Counties

$10,760,595.21

139

6

N/A

County

Average
Expenditures
from CLTF
Col. 4
(Col. 1/Col. 2)

Sources: Illinois State Treasurer’s Office for details of county disbursements; Supreme Court
of Illinois for number of death sentences.

141

This includes capital cases that had been certified as death-penalty-eligible prior to
the year 2000 and were pending during the date universe displayed. The numbers of capital
prosecutions for each county are the total number of cases, by case number, receiving funds
from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, as reported by the Illinois state treasurer for the years
2000–2009. Co-defendants prosecuted under the same case number were counted as one
case.
142
This includes all death sentences imposed as of December 31, 2009.
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murders and the highest murder rates are not the most likely to prosecute a
murder as a capital murder case.143
Of course, these rates do not control for the seriousness or aggravated
nature of the murders reported. Only a systematic proportionality review
study could do that. However, with such a large number of murders in the
state, it is unlikely that all of the serious or aggravated murders would be
concentrated only in those counties that have a high propensity to declare a
case capital. Indeed Cook County with the most murders, and presumably
with the highest number of aggravated murders, has a relatively low rate of
declaring cases capital.
Table 3 compares grants to individual counties from the CLTF for the
total period that the CLTF has been in operation, ranked by the amount of
funds received by individual counties, again excluding Cook County. Once
again, the amount of money received by individual counties seems to have
little relationship to the murder rate or to the total number of murders, or
even to the total number of capital prosecutions. Jefferson County received
the largest amount of money after Cook County. Some fraction of this
amount is accounted for by the disproportionately large payments to private
counsel in a single case, over $1 million in the Cecil Sutherland case. This
case was one of the reasons why the legislature imposed restrictions and a
reasonableness requirement on approval of the request for funds from the
CLTF. 144 Yet the appointment in that case, which was widely regarded as
an abuse of the resources of the fund, did not prevent that same attorney
from being appointed again in a capital case, although he had been declared
incompetent in another case. 145
Outside of the ten counties that received the largest amounts from the
CLTF, an additional five death sentences were imposed in seventy-four
capital prosecutions across the rest of the state. DuPage County did not
receive the most money from the CLTF, although it had the most capital
prosecutions and the largest number of death sentences imposed (three) in a
single county. As Table 3 shows, counties received widely disparate
amounts not particularly related to the number of capital prosecutions or

143

The counties outside of Cook County accounted for 40% of all capital prosecutions
(210/507), although these counties accounted for only 25% of all murders (2131/8403). See
CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 32–187. If St. Clair and Cook Counties are excepted,
all other counties accounted for approximately one-fifth (21.6% (2131-311)/8403) of all
murders in the state. Id. If St. Clair and Cook Counties are removed from the number of
capital prosecutions, then other counties account for 38.6% of all capital prosecutions. Id.
Without precise data on the number of capital trials by county, it is not possible to know
whether St. Clair has a higher rate or number of pleas after notices are filed.
144
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10 (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
145
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 110 n.174.
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Table 4
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Appropriations, Fiscal Years 2000–2010
Fiscal
Year 146

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

146

Cook County

Counties Outside of Cook

Appointed Counsel: $3,457,100
Public Defender: $812,500
State’s Attorney: $1,095,600

Appointed Counsel: $962,000
Public Defender: $212,000
State’s Attorney: $500,000

Total: $5,365,200

Total: $1,674,000

Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,191,200

Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000
Public Defender: $424,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $10,730,400

Total: $3,348,000

Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,191,200

Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000
Public Defender: $424,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $10,730,400

Total: $3,348,000

Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,191,200

Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000
Public Defender: $424,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $10,730,400

Total: $3,348,000

Appointed Counsel: $800,000
Public Defender: $1,462,500
State’s Attorney: $2,191,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $4,453,700

Total: $4,500,000

Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,691,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $5,516,200

Total: $4,500,000

Fiscal Years in this instance run from July 1–June 30. Fiscal Year 2000 began July 1,
1999 and ended June 30, 2000. Fiscal Year 2010 began July 1, 2009 and ended June 30,
2010.
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Table 4
(Continued)
Fiscal
Year146

2006

2007

2008

2009

Cook County

Counties Outside of Cook

Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,691,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $5,516,200

Total: $4,500,000

Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000
Public Defender: $1,625,000
State’s Attorney: $2,691,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $5,516,200

Total: $4,500,000

Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000
Public Defender: $1,750,000
State’s Attorney: $2,941,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $6,691,200

Total: $4,500,000

Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000
Public Defender: $1,750,000
State’s Attorney: $2,941,200
Total: $6,691,200

2010

Totals for
fiscal years
2000–2010

Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000
Public Defender: $2,750,000 148
State’s Attorney: $2,941,200

Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney:
$0 147
Total: $3,500,000

Appointed Counsel: $3,500,000
Public Defender: $500,000
State’s Attorney: $1,000,000

Total: $7,691,200

Total: $5,000,000

Appointed Counsel: $34,599,700
Public Defender: $18,275,000
State’s Attorney: $26,757,600

Appointed Counsel: $28,234,000
Public Defender: $4,984,000
State’s Attorney: $9,500,000

Grand Total: $79,632,300

Grand Total: $42,718,000

Source: Illinois State Treasurer’s Office.
147

Governor vetoed appropriation.
The Cook County Public Defender’s Office received an additional $500,000
supplemental—over and above the $2,250,000 initially appropriated—that had lapsed from
Fiscal Year 2009 and became effective in Fiscal Year 2010.
148

1336

LEIGH B. BIENEN

[Vol. 100

death sentences imposed. After Cook County, Jefferson County, with two
capital prosecutions, received the most money from the CLTF. Hancock
County, however, received more than $1.5 million for one case. DeWitt
County spent $1.8 million on three cases, whereas Kankakee spent $1.25
million on nine capital prosecutions. These stark discrepancies go beyond
differences attributable to differences or idiosyncrasies in individual cases.
Table 4 shows the appropriations made to the CLTF by fiscal year,
2000–2010, by receiving agency. 149 In all counties, including Cook
County, appointed counsel were appropriated more funds than the public
defender. Does this imply that appointed counsel represented more
defendants in capital cases than the public defender? Also noteworthy is
that the state’s attorneys in all counties regularly and consistently were
appropriated more money from the CLTF than were the public defenders.
Only if all monies for appointed counsel and the public defender are
counted together as funding for the defense of capital cases, are the funds
for the defense more than the funds received by the state’s attorneys.
Outside of Cook County, the appropriations for appointed counsel are
consistently higher than for the public defender or the state’s attorney. 150
The amount of the appropriation may not signify the immediate receipt of
that money. 151 There are also sharp discontinuities in these appropriations
across various years. 152 Both state’s attorneys and public defenders are
state employees; both presumably use the funds for the same purposes when
they stand off against one another in a capital trial. The public defender
cannot receive funds for its salaried attorneys from the CLTF, according to

149

The sole source of this data is information from the Illinois state treasurer in the
NULSCCD, supra note 1.
150
For example, in Cook County, the appointed counsel and the public defender were
appropriated $2,825,000 and the state’s attorney was appropriated $2,691,200 for Fiscal
Year 2006 (FY 2006). STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS
APPROPRIATIONS:
FISCAL
YEAR
2006
113
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm. Outside of Cook County in FY 2006, the appointed
counsel and public defender were appropriated $3.5 million and the state’s attorney $1.0
million. Id. at 113–14.
151
In 2009 and 2010, money from the CLTF has been significantly delayed. Arnold,
supra note 108.
152
C.f. STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS:
FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2003), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm; STATE OF
ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2004),
available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm (comparing Fiscal Year 2003 with
Fiscal Year 2004, where appropriations for appointed counsel in Cook County decreased
from $6.9 million to $800,000, and appropriations for appointed counsel outside of Cook
increased from $1,924,000 to $3,000,000).
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the statute. 153 The public defender can only offload the expenses of
investigation, the costs of DNA testing, and other similar documented
expenses required for capital litigation. When private counsel is appointed,
however, all costs, all incidental expenses, all office expenses, overhead,
and all hourly fees to the lawyers are charged to the CLTF. Even when the
public defender is appointed in a capital case, the public defender does not
receive the same remuneration as the appointed counsel, either absolutely or
by the hour. This is another kind of systemic inequity, and it pushes cases
towards the assignment of counsel, even if this costs the state more money.
The bureaucratic incentive is always to spend money once it is
appropriated and available for expenditure. State’s attorneys have an
economic incentive to declare a case capital if they can offload the expenses
of prosecution to the CLTF, even if they cannot charge salaries to the
CLTF. 154 Both state’s attorneys and public defenders have a bureaucratic
and economic incentive to keep the present system going: the CLTF pays
for the training of attorneys, as well as for some expenses of litigation, and
for expenses that can be segregated out of general expenses for both
sides. 155 There may be an unintended incentive to declare a case capital
when the CLTF money is actually in the county account in Cook County.
Across the state, there may be an economic incentive not to declare cases
capital when the transfer of money is delayed by state budgetary cuts, or

153

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15(e) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010), which
provides that moneys in the CLTF shall be expended only: “(3) To pay the compensation of
trial attorneys, other than public defenders or appellate defenders, who have been appointed
by the court to represent defendants who are charged with capital crimes or attorneys . . . .”
(emphasis added).
154
See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 97–98. The CPRSC has been
informed by downstate judges and lawyers that in several downstate counties, state’s
attorneys served notices of intent to seek capital punishment, and just before trials were
to begin, withdrew the notices; it appeared (or was suspected) that the notices were filed
for the purpose of transferring the costs of investigation and trial preparation from the
local county to the CLTF. The motive for doing this was attributed to economic pressure
on prosecutors owing to a shortage of funds in county budgets to pay for the cost of
investigation and trial preparation. Id.
The Committee was also told that when this occurred, and the notices of intent were
withdrawn on the eve of trial, the appointed defense lawyers immediately lost the ability
to obtain fees from the CLTF for the preparation for trial or for the trial itself, and instead
are required to seek funding from county boards, which often were not receptive to their
requests, had inadequate funds to meet the requests, or both. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
REFORM STUDY COMM., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2008), available at
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/CPRSC Fourth Annual Report.pdf.
155
See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 98 (testimony of trial judge explaining
strong budgetary and public relations incentives considered by state’s attorneys when
deciding whether to serve a capital punishment notice; the pressure is particularly strong in
counties other than Cook County).
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Table 5
Summary Table: Capital Litigation Trust Fund Appropriations, by Type of
Recipient, Fiscal Years 2000–2010 156
Cook County

Counties
Outside
of Cook

(Col. 1)

(Col. 2)

Appointed
Counsel

$34,599,700

$28,234,000

$62,833,700

Public
Defender

$18,275,000

$4,984,000

$23,259,000

State’s
Attorney

$26,757,600

$9,500,000

$36,257,600

Totals:

$79,632,300

$42,718,000

$122,350,300

Recipient

Totals
(Col. 3)
(Col. 1 + Col. 2)

Source: Illinois State Treasurer’s Office.

refusals to release funds, or when state funds are not expected to appear at
all, as has happened recently.
Table 5 summarizes all county appropriations from the CLTF, by
recipient, for the life of the fund to date, 2000–2010.157 The total amount
appropriated to state’s attorneys over the period for prosecuting
approximately 500 murders as capital cases, in which seventeen death
sentences were imposed, was over $35 million. Much less, $23 million,
went to public defenders. The bulk of the money from the CLTF, $63
million, went to appointed counsel, presumably overwhelmingly for trial
work. These trial counsel typically do not continue to represent the
defendant if a death sentence is imposed, or for other appeals. Since over
500 cases were noticed and seventeen death sentences were imposed, most
of that money was spent on cases where the jury or the judge did not find
death to be the appropriate sentence. The capital defense unit of the
Appellate Office of the Public Defender takes over the appeals of death
sentences after the cases have been tried, perhaps expertly, perhaps not, by

156

Fiscal Years in this instance run from July 1–June 30. Fiscal Year 2000 began July 1,
1999 and ended June 30, 2000. Fiscal Year 2010 began July 1, 2009 and ended June 30,
2010.
157
The source of this data is the Illinois state treasurer in the NULSCCD, supra note 1.
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private counsel at the expense of the CLTF. 158
Whether appointed counsel represent capital defendants more
competently or even as well as public defenders is an open question which
will only be answered when the final judgments are handed down on
effective or ineffective representation many years later. Another important
question is whether the assignment of appointed counsel by trial court
judges in the county, or even by the assignment judge in the county, is a
process without conflict of interest. In Illinois, there is no ethical
prohibition against an attorney contributing to the election campaign of a
judge before whom he appears. 159 The assignment of private counsel to
represent a capital defendant typically represents the award to that attorney
of hundreds of thousands of dollars in the direct payment of legal fees, and
perhaps more than a million dollars in revenue for that law office. 160
Especially in counties where the judges and the attorneys who try cases are
likely to know one another, it would be surprising if the trial counsel
assigned did not contribute to judges’ election campaigns. There are no
objective criteria or guidelines governing the assignment of trial counsel in
a capital case. There is no one who asks if the trial court judge assigned
counsel appropriately, or upon whose recommendation the judge assigned
that attorney. 161
In Illinois, where judges are elected in partisan elections and attorneys
contribute monetarily to the judges’ election campaigns, the questions
regarding the standards for appointment of trial counsel in capital cases and
who appoints should be examined closely. This is another fault line in the
present system. A stated purpose of the requirement of the special
certification of trial counsel for capital cases was to ensure a minimal level
of competency for defense trial counsel, yet the requirement of certification
also reduces the list of eligible attorneys to be appointed. It has been

158

See, e.g., the case of Robert O. Marshall, discussed infra note 204. In the case of
Robert Marshall in New Jersey, private trial counsel represented the defendant when he was
sentenced to death. After many legal proceedings, the private trial counsel was declared to
have been ineffective at trial, twenty-six years after the death sentence was imposed. During
the entire twenty-six years and through many, many appeals, Robert Marshall was
represented at the state’s expense by the Office of the Public Defender. See Marshall v.
Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005).
159
Michael Sneed, Chuck Neubauer & John Carpenter, Donor Had Case Before
Swick; Law Permits Contributions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 26, 2000, at A1 (describing
case in which gifts to appellate judge by law firm with case in front of judge were found
to be legal).
160
See details on payments to assigned counsel in CLTF county records, NULSCCD,
supra note 1.
161
See also Marshall, supra note 47, at 958 (describing a concern that local judges may
appoint counsel as a form of patronage rather than credentials).
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alleged that some trial attorneys in the smaller counties do not seek
certification because they do not wish to be appointed to capital cases.162
The state’s attorneys are exempt from the requirements of training and
experience for capital certification. Certainly, the prospects of receiving
adequate assistance are improved if there are funds to pay for
representation. 163 However, the availability of funds alone does not
guarantee effective defense representation, especially in a system where
appointments and compensation may be rife with possibilities for conflicts
of interest, and especially if attorneys are picked from a small pool.
The total of all appropriations for the CLTF for its entire period of
operation through Fiscal Year 2010 (ending June 30, 2010), all of which
has presumably been spent as of July 1, 2010, was more than $122 million,
a nontrivial amount of state resources by any measure of accounting.

Table 6
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Expenditures, Cook County, 2004–2009 164
Cook County Disbursements to
Public Defender’s Office

$9,973,595.20

Cook County Disbursements to
State’s Attorney’s Office

$15,873,082.62

Cook County Disbursements to
Cook County Court System

$7,409,979.19

Total Cook County
Disbursements 165

$33,256,657.01

Source: Cook County Treasurer’s Office.

Table 6 shows the expenditures in Cook County for the years 2004–
2009. The source of these figures is the Cook County treasurer, since Cook
County, unlike all other counties in the state, receives its funds directly

162
The records of expenditures of the state’s attorneys and public defenders in Cook
County, however, indicate that a number of attorneys from both offices were newly certified
as death-qualified attorneys in recent years. ILL. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH
PENALTY, DEATH PENALTY REFORM IN ILLINOIS: FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE 11 (2008), available
at http://www.icadp.org/docs/ICADPannualreport08.pdf.
163
See Marshall, supra note 47, at 958 (describing the dangers of underfunding legal
services for indigent defendants).
164
Figures are only available for 2004–2009.
165
This figure accounts for a date range of November 2003 through November 2009.
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from the CLTF as block grants. For the other counties, the state treasurer
disburses money to the counties for individual cases upon request. Until
recently the state treasurer had no authority to question or challenge the
amount of a request or its reasonableness. If a trial court judge approved
the request, the state treasurer was obliged to pay. The fact that payments
were requested for individual cases has allowed for a count of the number
of individual capital prosecutions by county, based upon the number of
cases for which funds were requested. 166 Once again, it is noteworthy that
the amount of money disbursed to public defenders is significantly less than
the amount of money granted to the state’s attorneys. Again, without
knowing how many and what proportion of cases were handled by public
defenders in Cook County, as opposed to the number and proportion of
cases assigned to private counsel, it is impossible to know whether this
allocation of funds is disproportionately or appropriately disbursed. 167 Nor
is there any way to judge whether appointed counsel, which as a group
received more money than the public defender but less than the state’s
attorney, received payments appropriately or whether the appointment of
counsel was made appropriately. 168
Absent some independent evaluation of many cases, it is impossible to
know the quality of representation by appointed counsel in Cook County
cases. Most cases declared capital in Cook County were decided by plea.
Did this mean that the capital charge was simply an instrument to extract a
plea, or a plea to a longer sentence? Were defendants effectively
represented during plea negotiations, whether by private counsel or public
defenders? Sentences imposed after a plea negotiation will not be
examined carefully on appeal, if they are examined at all. Without detailed
information on cases, it is impossible to answer that question. 169
166
There was a supplemental appropriation of $500,000 to the public defender in 2009,
and this may account for the fact that the figures from the Cook County treasurer do not
exactly coincide with the amount of appropriations to Cook County. STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 113 (2009),
available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm. Also note that details on disbursements
from Cook County are only available for the years 2004–2009. For the period 2000–2004,
the Cook Country treasurer did not have automated accounts for the amounts spent from the
Capital Litigation Trust Fund.
167
In Cook County, no account of expenditures for individual cases was available for the
years prior to 2004, although money was disbursed during that period.
168
Together, appointed counsel and the public defender in Cook County received more
state funding than the Cook County state’s attorney. Since appointed counsel can charge all
expenses, including office expenses and staff expenses, which the public defender and state’s
attorney cannot in Cook County, this is not surprising. A breakdown of how the money was
spent in individual cases is not available at present.
169
Detailed information on the individual charges in indictments for all first-degree
murders during 2003–2009 by county is available in the Northwestern School of Law

1342

LEIGH B. BIENEN

[Vol. 100

D. OTHER EVIDENCE OF DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION AND
DISPOSITION OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
2003 REFORMS

At the request of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee,
Professor David Olson and research criminologists from Loyola University
examined the patterns of imposition of the death penalty across Illinois and
prepared for the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee detailed,
offender-level data based upon information from the official records of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). 170 A summary of this research
is presented in Appendix B. This systematic research analyzed information
pertaining to 9,592 offenders convicted of and sentenced for first-degree
murder and admitted to prison in Illinois from July 1988 through June 2010.
This is a longer time period than that reported earlier, and it includes cases
and convictions prior to 2000. The study design allows for the assessment
of long-term changes by period.
Tables A through F in Appendix B detail the patterns in capital case
prosecutions in Illinois as measured by the number of offenders convicted
of first-degree murder in Illinois, and the number and proportion of these
offenders who received a sentence which was determinate (i.e. a sentence to
a specific number of years in prison), a sentence of natural life, or a death
sentence across different regions and time periods. The data are classified
by type of county, and across the three periods described above. 171
Data is reported on the basis of the state fiscal year (SFY) from SFY
1989 (July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989) through SFY 2010 (July 1, 2009 to
June 30, 2010). During this twenty-one-year period, a total of 150 persons
were convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The collection of
data over such a long period allowed for an analysis of patterns in three
distinct periods: the pre-moratorium period (from July 1988 to December
1999); the moratorium period (January 2000 to June 2005); 172 and finally
the post-reform period (July 2005 to 2010). 173
Capital Crimes data set. Coupled with data on sentences imposed, which are a matter of
public record, the record of charges with the record of sentences imposed would at least be a
starting place for that investigation.
170
Note, this is an entirely different and independent set of data than that reported in
Tables 1–7, infra. The Tables published here were distributed to the Capital Punishment
Reform Study Committee at its meeting in September 2009. They are available to the public
as part of the Reform Study Committee’s Final Report. Dr. Olson and his colleagues also
conducted surveys of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and administrators and prepared
other data relevant to the 2003 reforms. See infra Appendix B.
171
Note, these records do not indicate whether the sentence was imposed at trial or
pursuant to a plea bargain.
172
This includes the appointment of the Governor’s Commission and the publication of
the Governor’s 2002 Report; the establishment of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in 2000;
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In addition to separating the convictions by time period, the data on
convictions are broken down by geographic region: All Illinois; Cook
County, Illinois; Illinois outside of Cook County; the Illinois “Collar
Counties” (those that border Cook County); the Illinois Urban Counties
(excluding Cook and the Collar Counties); and the rural counties. These
standard geographic distinctions are based upon the census categories for
metropolitan areas. Cook County accounts for the largest absolute number
and proportion of murders in the state and must always be examined
separately in order to understand the extent to which it drives the numbers
for the entire state.
These tables compare statewide patterns in prosecutions and
sentencing in the period prior to the Ryan commutations and the
establishment of the CLTF, with patterns in prosecution and sentencing
during the moratorium period and after the commutations, and then with
patterns in sentencing during the post-reform period, after 2003, while
controlling for county size and type. 174 The periods are designed to allow
for lags in the effect of changes in policy. 175 For example, some changes,
such as the requirement of two defense attorneys for a capital case, imposed
by a rule of the Illinois Supreme Court, were instituted immediately after
pronouncement. Other changes, such as the requirement that interrogations
be recorded, or changes in line up procedures, were implemented
piecemeal, and sooner in some counties than in others.
It is also important to note what these tables do not measure or include.
They do not include data on the number of capital prosecutions or the
number of first-degree murders, or the number of murder charges that
resulted in either an acquittal or a conviction for an offense other than firstdegree murder. 176 Tables A–F do not identify the incidence of the decision
the Ryan commutations emptying death row in 2003; and the passage of an additional set of
reforms by the legislature in 2003 and 2004.
173
Beginning the post-reform period with fiscal year 2005 allows for the 2003 reforms to
have taken effect. The effective dates of various reforms differed. By June 2005, however,
all would have been in effect. Cullerton et al., supra note 41.
174
The moratorium on executions, imposed in 2000 by Governor George Ryan and
continued by Governor Blagojevich, remains in effect in 2010, but it is not a moratorium on
capital prosecutions. CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.
175
Because the effect of the reforms will be uneven, the length of the time periods
addresses that discontinuity as well. By separating out Cook County and by grouping the
remainder of the counties, the unevenness is smoothed out to some extent. The goal of these
groupings is to get away from an analysis which simply points to one county, say Cook
County, or DuPage County, and compares data across counties without controlling for
county type or size. Looking at patterns across hundreds of murder convictions allows for
generalizations beyond a single case analysis.
176
In other words, they do not include capital prosecutions in which the capital charge
was dropped, or where the first-degree murder charge was dropped and the defendant pled to
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not to charge capital murder when there was a factual basis for a statutory
aggravating factor. The tables do not measure the incidence of the decision
to prosecute a case capitally, although a conviction and sentence for firstdegree murder is at least an indication that there might well have been a
factual basis for a capital charge in that case. Tables A–F begin at the end
of the trial stage, at the point of sentencing and analyze patterns in
prosocutions, retrospectively.
These tables do not indicate how many first-degree murder cases were
noticed or identified for possible capital prosecution. They also do not
show how many first-degree murders were death-eligible for that period,
nor do they show how many times a capital charge resulted in a sentence
other than death, whether because the capital charge was dropped during
pretrial plea bargaining or because a verdict of death-eligible first-degree
murder was not found at capital trial. Further, these tables do not indicate
the total number of capital trials in the state during the period. The tables
measure the end, not the beginning or middle, of the stages of a prosecution
for first-degree murder, and they report only the end stage of a capital
prosecution for murder.
These tables highlight strong changes in patterns and trends in
sentencing by period and type of county. The tables corroborate that there
has been a significant shift in patterns in the incidence of murder and
homicide, and in patterns of capital prosecution across the state, both since
the Ryan commutations and since the moratorium on executions. Some of
these patterns mirror patterns in the country as a whole.177 During this
period, the reported number of homicides in Illinois fell.178 The same
pattern was observed across the country and especially in other urban
During this entire period, the number of capital
jurisdictions. 179
prosecutions dropped in Illinois generally and across all categories of
counties, but not in the same proportion across all geographic categories of
counties. 180

a charge less than first-degree murder (e.g. felony murder, manslaughter, or another felony
such as robbery or arson or burglary).
177
See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38; John Schwartz, Death Sentences Dropped
but Executions Rose in ‘09, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A22 (noting decline in death
sentences nationally).
178
See Chicago Homicides Drop, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 2009, at A4 (reporting 453
homicides in Chicago for 2009 through December 28, 2009 and analyzing the 2009
homicides in Chicago by type, e.g. gang-related, type of weapon, etc.).
179
Al Baker, Homicides Near a Record Low Rate in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2009, at A1, (describing decline in homicide rates in Atlanta, Chicago, and Boston,
and increase in homicide rates in Detroit, Baltimore, and New Orleans).
180
See infra Appendix B, tbls.A–F.
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Over the time periods examined, the proportion of first-degree
murderers sentenced to death statewide fell from 1.9% in the premoratorium period (118/6,224 per col. 2 Table A) to 0.6% in the postreform period (10/1,525 per col. 2 Table A). In other words, a defendant in
a first-degree murder case in Illinois was three times as likely to be
sentenced to death in the pre-reform period as in the post-reform period.
The death-sentencing rate in Illinois declined significantly during the period
measured; this is a significant overall difference.
Across all separate geographic regions (Tables B–F) the proportion of
first-degree murderers sentenced to death fell significantly and unevenly
between the pre-moratorium and post-reform periods.
Significant
differences were also found between the likelihood of receiving a death
sentence in the pre-moratorium period and the post-moratorium period
within specific geographic categories, and within Cook County in
comparison to outside of Cook County. While this is not surprising, the
extent of the differences is startling, especially given the nature of the data
set. These discrepancies have been found after sentencing. Thus, they
represent the outcome of disparities in capital case charging at a late stage
of the process, as measured by sentences imposed, death sentences, and
other sentences.
These results are not based upon a tabulation of persons prosecuted for
capital murder or an estimate of the proportion of death eligible murders,
where there may be errors in the reporting of cases or inaccuracies in data
collection at the local level. These findings are based upon persons found
guilty of first-degree murder, sentenced for murder, and actually in prison
in Illinois, according to Department of Corrections records.181 The data
collection here is not subject to the allegation that it was biased or
incomplete. It is the Department of Corrections’ own record of the number
of people they have in prison convicted for first-degree murder and what
sentences they received from the trial courts, sentences presumably upheld
after appeal, during the identified time periods. These are not estimations
of sentences, or speculations as to who might be guilty or eligible for the
death penalty. These are 9,592 defendants who were convicted of at least
9,592 actual first-degree murders, with the sentences actually imposed by a
trial court in 9,592 sentencing proceedings. The data were collected
without reference to the death penalty, except that the number of death
sentences was recorded.

181

See infra Appendix B.
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Within the post-reform period, for example, 1.0% of all sentences in
Cook County were death sentences (72/7,189 per col. 2 Table B); whereas
in the counties outside of Cook, 3.1% of all sentences were death sentences
(78/2,543 per col. 2 Table C). In other words, during the pre-reform period
a defendant was three times more likely to be sentenced to death outside of
Cook County than in Cook County, other things being equal.
A defendant was more than four times more likely to receive a death
sentence in a rural county than in Cook County. In the rural counties, 4.3%
of all sentences for first-degree murder were death sentences (25/577 per
col. 2 Table F). These disparities, between Cook County and rural counties,
and between Cook County and other categories of counties, result in large
discrepancies in odds ratios and persist across all time periods. These
disparities have been reduced, but not removed, by the passage of the 2003
reforms, as can be seen by comparing the percentages and odds ratios for
the pre-moratorium period with the post-reform period.182 Nor is this
pattern unique to Illinois. The discrepancy between rural and urban
counties, or large differences based upon individual prosecutors’ charging
policies, has been well documented in other states.183
Some of these disparities between Cook and other counties, and
between types of counties, were reduced after the reforms. Nonetheless, in
the period after the passage of the reforms, the likelihood of being
sentenced to death if found guilty of first-degree murder in a rural county is
still almost eight times higher than the likelihood of being sentenced to
death in Cook County. 184 Subsequent empirical analysis, were it to be
made, could conceivably show that the relative seriousness of the crimes
partly accounts for these discrepancies in both jurisdictions, but the
geographic disparity remaining even after the reforms is striking. There is
no reason to assume the most serious or aggravated murders regularly occur
in nonurban jurisdictions. In fact, there is reason to assume the opposite:

182
For example, in the pre-moratorium period 5.4% of the sentences for first-degree
murder were death sentences in Illinois rural counties (18 of 331 per Table F); and the
percentage of death sentences imposed in the collar counties was 4.7% in the premoratorium period (20 of 424 per Table D). The disparities between Cook County and the
rural and collar counties remains.
183
See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33; Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen
Thaman, Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 329 (2009) (“The broad discretion afforded
prosecutors in Missouri translates directly into disparities in outcomes across different
geographic regions.”); Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38.
184
Compare Table F, with Table B. Overall, 3.8% of all sentences for first-degree
murder in Illinois rural counties resulted in a death sentence in the post reform period, while
in Cook County during the post-reform period, 0.5% of all sentences for first-degree murder
resulted in a death sentence being imposed.
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more aggravated murders are likely to occur in Cook County, where there is
the largest absolute number of murders. The result is again somewhat
contradictory: urban jurisdictions generally have more murders and
presumably more aggravated murders, but a lower rate of prosecuting cases
capitally.
The issue of county disparities is not limited to Illinois; it exists in
every capital punishment state.185 The findings from systematic research in
this area are similar in every state: the likelihood of being prosecuted for
death-eligible capital murder is generally lower in a high crime, urban
jurisdiction than it is in a rural or suburban jurisdiction with a relatively low
homicide rate.186 According to study after study, the chance of prosecution
for capital murder is significantly higher in rural and suburban counties. 187
The offered explanations for this are many, multilayered, and largely
speculative. 188 Whatever the reason, a defendant in Illinois is more likely to
be prosecuted for capital murder and sentenced to death in some counties
than in others and this pattern has been observed over and over, not just in
Illinois. 189
185

Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38.
See Leibman & Marshall, supra note 36, at 1676–82 (identifying high death
sentencing counties in Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and Oklahoma, and showing a death
verdict in 64 out of every 1,000 homicides and an error rate of 71% in Pima, Arizona
(Tucson), the highest county; counties with low death sentencing rates had significantly
lower error rates; a few counties had error rates of 100%).
187
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating
Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010); Leibman & Marshall,
supra note 36, at 1676–82; see also Scott W. Howe, Race Death and Disproportionality, 37
N. KY. L. REV. 213 (2010); Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases,
Notwithstanding President Obama’s Election, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 243 (2010).
188
Some of the offered explanations include: that the greater likelihood of being
prosecuted for a capital case in a rural or suburban district is a proxy for embedded racism in
the system; that the likelihood of actually getting a death verdict is higher in counties where
the juries are from rural or suburban counties; that murders are less frequent and
consequently more “shocking” when they occur in rural or suburban counties; that state’s
attorneys in rural or suburban counties must, or perceive they must, campaign more
vigorously as being “tough on crime” whereas urban state’s attorneys or prosecutors are less
visible in the prosecution of individual cases and judged by their constituents on other
criteria; that the voting population in urban areas is less in favor of capital punishment than
the voting constituencies in rural and suburban counties, and many other reasons. The
reasons may be multiple; the pattern is observable across states, and seems to be
characteristic of northern and southern states, states with many capital cases, and states with
few. See infra Part IV.
189
For example, in California, ten counties (Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino,
Alameda, Orange, Contra Costa, San Diego, Sacramento, Tulare, and Ventura) accounted for
more than 70% of all death sentences between 1977 and 1999. Since 2000, these ten
counties accounted for 83% of all death sentences. ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL.,
DEATH BY GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN
186
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E. THE 2006 GUIDELINES FOR STATE’S ATTORNEYS IN ILLINOIS

The publication of guidelines for state’s attorneys was one of the
reforms recommended by the 2002 Governor’s Commission and adopted by
the State’s Attorney’s Association in 2006. They are published here as
Appendix A. The 2006 guidelines for the selection of cases for capital
prosecution in Illinois are the first formal articulation of a uniform
statewide standard to govern the selection of cases for capital
prosecution. 190 They were issued in response to the 2002 Governor’s
Commission finding, documenting county-by-county disparities in charging
The guidelines state that following these
and sentencing. 191
recommendations is “voluntary” and that the guidelines do not “have the
force of law.” 192 This was also part of the recommendation of the 2002
Governor’s Commission. There are no sanctions or penalties for failure to
follow the guidelines. 193 The guidelines state that they articulate the current
law and practice regarding the charging of capital murder currently used by
state’s attorneys throughout Illinois. No empirical evidence is presented in
support of this statement.
According to the guidelines, “each capital case is unique and must be
evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the
crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and
retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the
death penalty.” 194 The guidelines urge state’s attorneys to “resist the
temptation or public pressure to seek a death penalty based solely on the
brutality of the crime without reference to other relevant factors.” 195 The
Illinois guidelines further state that, “[t]he probability of a conviction is the
central factor in any charging decision.”196

CALIFORNIA 3 (2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/
death_penalty/death_by_geography/death_by_geography.pdf.
190
The guidelines are reproduced in Appendix A. The Illinois guidelines are similar to
the New Jersey Prosecutors’ Guidelines for the Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital
Prosecution, reprinted in Leigh B. Bienen et al., supra note 5, at 791–93 (Appendix B).
191
ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23, at 24–25.
192
See infra Appendix A.
193
By contrast, in New Jersey the state attorney general has supervisory authority over
the twenty-one county prosecutors in New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:17B-103 (West 2006)
(“The Attorney General shall consult with and advise the several county prosecutors in
matters relating to the duties of their office and shall maintain a general supervision over
said county prosecutors with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of the
criminal laws throughout the State.”).
194
See infra Appendix A, at 7 (quoting People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989)).
195
Id. at 5.
196
Id.
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The “probability of a conviction,” however, could mean several things:
that the evidence of guilt must be overwhelming; that the crime itself was
“super-aggravated,” i.e., that it was characterized by multiple statutory
aggravating factors, or that the circumstances were unusually antisocial,
heinous, or depraved, such as a shooting of innocent children in a school.197
Alternatively, the high probability of a conviction could mean that a jury
would be more likely to sentence a defendant to death because the
defendant is a member of a despised or unpopular group, has a criminal
history, because the victim was a member of a highly valued segment of
society, or because juries in that county generally are willing to recommend
a sentence of death.
The statement that state’s attorneys should consider mitigating and
aggravating factors in the decision to charge capital murder raises another
set of issues. According to the statutory structure embraced in Gregg v.
Georgia, it is the exclusive and special province of the capital jury at
penalty phase to weigh the statutory aggravating factors against the
statutory mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose death. 198 It is the
province of the jury as representatives of the community to decide who,
ultimately, should be sentenced to death and executed.
Another troubling issue with regard to the state’s attorney weighing of
statutory mitigating factors in the decision to charge capital murder is that
typically, the evidence presented to the jury in the penalty phase of a capital
trial as mitigating evidence includes factors that would not be relevant or
exculpatory at the guilt phase, but nonetheless might be appropriate to the
consideration of mitigating factors at sentencing. Such factors include
childhood abuse, mental incapacity or infirmity, or other issues related to
the defendant’s mental state or developmental issues (e.g., stress
syndromes, a history of drug or alcohol abuse, or other aspects of family
history). Mitigating evidence need not meet the evidentiary standards for
relevence or admissibility during the capital trial.199 The defense will
almost certainly not know of the existence of any of this evidence in the
early stage of the case when the state’s attorney is deciding whether or not
to serve a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 200 And if the case is
going to be assigned to appointed counsel after the filing of a notice of
intent, the public defender is even less likely to know of such evidence or to
197

See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 93–95.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976).
199
Mitigating factors may be something as simple as the testimony of the defendant’s
mother, wife, or children.
200
The Committee considered and voted to recommend that the state’s attorney be
required to offer an opportunity to the defense to meet in person prior to the serving of a
notice of intent. See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 75.
198
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be motivated to develop it, or to have such evidence to present to the state’s
attorney prior to the filing of a notice of intent. Nor will the public defender
have the resources to begin those investigations so early in the case, when
the public defender does not have access to funds from the CLTF because
the notice of intent has not yet been filed.
The facts supporting mitigating evidence for submission at the penalty
phase typically take months or years to develop for presentation to the
capital jury. 201 Both the defense and the prosecution may call special
mitigating experts, psychologists, and forensic social workers. 202 The
detailed records of expenditures from the CLTF show large amounts
allocated to mitigation specialists.203 The difficulty of discovering and
presenting mitigating evidence is one of the reasons capital trials in all
capital jurisdictions take so much longer to prepare than non-capital trials.
In the 120-day period in which the state’s attorney must decide whether to
serve a notice, the defense will not have discovered all or perhaps any of the
mitigating evidence which might be presented at penalty phase, if there
were to be a penalty phase. Moreover, by the time the case reaches a
penalty phase, if it ever does, a different attorney will probably be
representing the defendant and will have developed the mitigating evidence
differently.
The testimony before the Committee that the 120-day requirement for
filing a death notice is routinely waived does not address this concern. The
purpose of the 120-day notice requirement is to put the defense on notice to
prepare for the capital trial and penalty phase, not to expect that the defense
counsel will be prepared for capital trial in 120 days. During the 120-day
period prior to the filing of a notice of intent, the public defender will not
have access to funds from the CLTF. Defense attorneys are concerned that
if they are required to present mitigating evidence prior to the filing of a
notice, they will be precluded from presenting newly found evidence later.
The failure of defense counsel to bring forward mitigating evidence is a

201

See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38, at fig.2.
The detailed annotation of capital expenditures from the CLTF includes repeated
expenditures for mitigation specialists by appointed defense counsel and state’s attorneys.
See, for example, extensive payments to clinical psychologists, neuropsychological experts,
forensic psychologists, forensic social workers etc. in Case No. 96-CF 46, Hancock County,
in Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology).
203
See, e.g., Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
202
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frequent reason for a subsequent finding of ineffectiveness of counsel, and
this is not a trivial concern.204
Capital cases are complicated and difficult to defend, both at trial and
on appeal, and a capital defendant may go through several defense attorneys
before being represented by an attorney who is competent, able, and willing
to look for and find the appropriate and convincing mitigating evidence to
present at the penalty phase. Many strategic decisions are involved in
presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. 205 For strategic
reasons, the defense may not wish to divulge otherwise incriminating
mitigating evidence (for example, evidence of prior violent or antisocial
behavior by a defendant that did not result in a criminal conviction) before
the penalty phase (i.e., to try to convince the prosecutor not to seek death)
or even at the penalty phase. The potentially mitigating evidence may turn
into evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors and be admissible and
unfavorable to the defense at penalty phase.
One reason for waiver of the 120-day filing requirement by the defense
may be the lack of knowledge of the presence of mitigating factors, or how
the evidence will develop as to mitigating or aggravating factors. 206
Another reason may be that the defense has not yet decided upon any plan
or strategy for the penalty phase, especially if the expectation on the part of

204

See, e.g., Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005). In Marshall, Robert
Marshall’s death sentence in New Jersey was set aside by the Third Circuit after twenty
years of state and federal litigation on the grounds that his original defense attorney at trial
did not present, prepare, or discover mitigating evidence for the penalty phase of his capital
trial. In 2005, the Third Circuit held that Robert Marshall’s death sentence should be
overturned, fourteen years after it had first been upheld by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, on the grounds of incompetence of the private defense counsel who represented him
at trial because that attorney called no witnesses in mitigation at his penalty phase trial,
although Robert Marshall had children who might have testified in his defense, and other
members of his community who might have testified on his behalf. Id.
205
It is the difficulty of finding and developing such mitigating evidence which has
resulted in the use of mitigation evidence specialists, adding another layer of specialty and
expense to the capital trial. Mitigation specialists are typically not lawyers, but investigators
who are specially trained to work with families and to uncover decades-old evidence of
circumstances relevant to mitigation. Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L.
359, 366–68 (1997).
206
Take, as an example, the potentially death-eligible defendant who is an Iraq War
veteran. That fact, perhaps itself known immediately, could be a mitigating factor. Should it
influence the state’s attorney’s decision to charge death-eligible murder? What if it were not
yet known that this same defendant had committed violent acts in the military and was
dishonorably discharged, or, in contrast, that the defendant was suffering from post traumatic
stress disorder or depression? The interpretation of the fact that the defendant is a war
veteran will require a great deal of expert research and the compilation of records prior to the
presentation of evidence at the penalty phase.
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all attorneys is that another defense attorney will be trying the case. If the
defense does not yet know of the presence of mitigating evidence, or if the
public defender does not think it will be representing the defendant at the
time of a hypothetical penalty phase, why or how should the defense bring
mitigating evidence to the attention of state’s attorneys prior to trial?207 In
fact, if the filing of the notice is to allow for the appointment of private
counsel, and to gain access to funds from the CLTF, why is it in the interest
of either side to waive the 120-day notice requirement? The state’s
attorney’s knowledge or awareness of statutory mitigating factors will
necessarily be incomplete at the 120 day point, since the defense attorneys
themselves are unlikely to be aware of any or all mitigating factors prior to
the filing of a notice of intent. Certainly there is no obligation for the
state’s attorney to investigate or take into account mitigating evidence.208
The Illinois guidelines further state that race, income, and geographic
disparity shall not be factors in charging a defendant with capital murder. 209
However, without systematically examining charging patterns throughout
the state, there can be no measure of whether capital notices are filed
consistently or without bias. This is especially the case with regard to
geographic disparity. In addition, geographic disparities can rise to the
level of constitutional infirmity. The counties are widely separated, and
while in theory a single set of rules governs all counties in Illinois, in fact

207
As a example of how a capital case can involve many more procedural and strategic
issues than an ordinary prosecution for murder, see People v. Ramsey, 2010 WL 3911466
(Ill. Oct. 7, 2010). The offense occurred on July 9, 1996. The defendant was convicted of
two counts of murder and sentenced to death in 1996 by a jury in Hancock County. His
convictions were reversed in 2000 by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Ramsey, 735
N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 2000). He subsequently pled guilty to the intentional murders, and was
again sentenced to death. A series of issues regarding capital punishment procedures were
raised again on appeal, the status of his plea, including incompetence of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, insanity and other mental mitigating factors, and the retrospective
applicability of Amended Supreme Court Rule 701 requiring defense attorneys in capital
cases to be members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar and the applicability of the
fundamental justice act. Ramsey, 2010 WL 3911466, at *35, *60. The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and upheld the imposition of the death penalty.
208
The CPRSC recommended that the state’s attorney offer the defense an opportunity to
meet prior to the filing of a notice. CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 75.
209
Appendix A, infra, p. 1396–97. The comparable provision in New Jersey provides:

The twenty-one County Prosecutors in the State of New Jersey reaffirm the fact that race, sex,
social or economic religion [sic] and/or national origin of a defendant or victim has not in the
past, nor will in the future be considered in any fashion to determine whether or not a case
warrants capital prosecution. . . .

NEW JERSEY PROSECUTOR'S GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNATION OF HOMICIDE CASES FOR CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (reproduced in Bienen et al., supra note 5, at 792).
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the practice varies widely across the state, as is shown by the data presented
here. 210
The guidelines mention that Illinois state’s attorneys may consult one
another or the Office of the Attorney General; however, it is not required
that they do so before deciding whether to charge a case as a capital case. 211
Death penalty experts from the state Office of the Attorney General are
available to advise on capital cases and to travel to counties to assist with or
take over the prosecution of capital cases in the counties.212 However, the
local state’s attorney must call in these lawyers from the central Office of
the Attorney General. 213 Capital prosecutions, especially in high profile
cases, have always been characterized by the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, and political maneuvering has long been accepted and is well
documented. 214 One purpose of centralized review is to allow for an
objective review of decisions made in a politically charged atmosphere.

210
The state’s attorneys have very different constituencies. As a matter of practice they
may not spend time travelling to other jurisdictions to hear what other state’s attorneys are
doing.

It is to a certain extent in the eye of the beholder whether a murder case is capital eligible or not.
You know, when I would make my trips to Springfield three or four years ago when we were in
the midst of the, I don’t know, it was pre-commutation and the post-commutation fallout. We
were testifying, and coming here, and going to meetings, and there were statements made that
were on both sides of it. Well, you know, the prosecutors can prosecute every murder case as a
death case, and then the other side. So it is somewhat problematic, and I don’t know if there is
enough money in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. That would be a legislative budget issue, to
fund the defense of every murder case. I am sure there is not.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., PUBLIC HEARING NOV. 13, 2006, at 84 (2006),
available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/PublicHearings/CPRSC_Public_
Hearing_Nov._13_2006_transcript.pdf (testimony of Robert B. Haida).
211
Appendix A, infra page 1395.
212
E-mail from Richard D. Schwind, Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division, Illinois
Attorney General’s Office, Chicago, IL to Leigh Bienen (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
In contrast to this relatively unstructured decisionmaking, at the federal level the Attorney
General of the United States requires all ninety-four United States Attorneys to submit for
their centralized review the decision to prosecute a case as a capital case. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040, available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (“In all cases subject to the provisions of this Chapter,
the Attorney General will make the final decision about whether to seek the death penalty.”).
213
E-mail from Richard D. Schwind, supra note 212.
214
See, e.g., GILBERT GEIS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD
AND LOEB TO O.J. SIMPSON 102 (1998) (summarizing the case of Bruno Richard
Hauptmann).
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Even if arbitrary or capricious patterns were shown by individual
county differences in charging, as is suggested by the data reported here,
there is at present in Illinois no central authority to review or discover such
patterns. The record of federal death penalty prosecutions, which can only
take place after centralized review, indicates that an institutionalized
centralized review process resulted in fewer capital cases being
prosecuted. 215
Even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, bias, or undue
influence, the decentralized nature of decisionmaking and the fact that the
102 local state’s attorneys from very different parts of the state are
answerable only to the county electorate makes it inevitable that there will
be geographic disparity in the interpretation of the statute. The question
becomes, is it constitutionally acceptable for a state capital punishment
system to tolerate such significant disparities in practice across a single
legal system ostensibly governed by a single set of laws?
Since the Illinois guidelines have only been in effect since 2006, and
there is no sanction for not following them, nor any record of whether they
have been followed or if they do indeed represent the current or past
practice, it is difficult to attribute any direct effect to their passage. Since
there has not been any systematic data collection on the notices of intent
filed by state’s attorneys since 2003, it is impossible to measure whether the
anecdotal reports of significant differences in the political policies of
individual prosecutors are important or accurate. There is no reason to
think that Illinois is different from other state capital punishment systems,
however, where such geographic disparities have repeatedly been identified
and evaluated, and where they have risen to a level to imply a due process
violation.

215

A recent summary and review of the patterns in capital cases charging at the federal
level indicated that the Attorney General of the United States approved less than 25% of all
requests from the United States Attorneys in districts throughout the United States. Federal
Death Penalty Resource Counsel, Recent Summaries of the Results of Federal Capital
Prosecutions,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFORMATION
CENTER
(Sept.
4,
2010),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty#statutes. Note, the federal central
reviewing process cannot recommend a capital prosecution where none was sought. The
federal review can only grant or deny the local prosecutor’s request that the case be brought
as a capital case.
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III. THE DOCUMENTED COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC INCENTIVES TO MAINTAIN
THE CURRENT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM

As soon as the notice of intent to seek the death penalty is filed, the
state’s attorney and the public defender are both immediately eligible to
apply to the CLTF for the reimbursement of non-salaried expenses in
connection with that case. The typical pattern is that as soon as the case is
declared capital the case is usually out of the Public Defender’s Office.
Nonetheless, state’s attorneys, public defenders, and assigned counsel all
expend monies from the CLTF prior to trial on capital cases once a notice is
filed, as well as on training for staff and other expenses. 216 None of these
agencies or actors repay the monies granted for the preparation of a
particular capital case to the CLTF if the notice of intent is later
withdrawn. 217 This provides a strong economic incentive to file a notice of
intent, even if there is no intention to actually prosecute a case to capital
trial. 218 On the other hand, postponing the filing of the notice of intent does
not hurt the defense if the defense is not required to do any work on the
case because the case is going to be transferred to appointed counsel. There
is, however, no incentive for the defense to prepare for capital trial or to
discover or investigate possible mitigating factors.
There is no significant cost to filing the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty; the state’s attorney assigned to the case simply files a piece
of paper with the clerk of the court upon the approval of the trial court
judge in the county. At that moment the CTLF monies are available to be
drawn upon by both the state’s attorney and the defense, whether private
counsel or public defender. In this sense the public defender also “benefits”
from the filing of a notice of intent. There is no requirement that a central
agency or court review the charge. The Office of the Illinois Attorney
General does not receive information that a notice has been filed, unless it
receives a request for trial assistance. There is no requirement that the

216

See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology).
217
At any time prior to the imposition of a capital sentence, the state’s attorney may
unilaterally withdraw the notice of intent, immediately transforming a capital case into a
non-capital case. The withdrawal typically occurs prior to trial, and typically occurs as part
of the defendant’s acceptance of a sentence of years, or a sentence of life without possibility
of parole, pursuant to a plea bargain. See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 105–08.
218
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMMITTEE, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 154, at 31–32.
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Illinois Supreme Court be notified. 219 There is no systematic record kept of
when notices are filed, or where they are filed, or how often they are filed
and then dropped. 220
Every state’s attorney’s office and every public defender’s office need
more resources, more attorneys, and more money for training attorneys. 221
Especially when state agencies have been mandated to cut costs across the
board, and state employees are taking mandatory furlough days without
pay, more funds, from whatever source, are needed for the responsible
prosecution and defense of all criminal cases, not just capital cases. The
availability of funds from the CLTF creates an economic incentive for a
county state’s attorney to declare a case capital, since this gives the state’s
attorney immediate access to previously unavailable funds, and it also

219

The establishment of a statewide review committee was, however, a principal
recommendation of the 2002 Governor’s Commission. ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 23, at 25 (Recommendation 30).
220
Given that neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the Office of the Illinois Attorney
General keep centralized records, the only organization attempting to keep a statewide
record of the number of notices filed and their disposition is the Illinois Coalition Against
the Death Penalty. Their tabulation is made publicly available in their Annual Reports. Cf.
ILL. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, ANN. REP. (2003–2010),
http://www.icadp.org/content/annual-reports. The ICADP reported the following:
Footnote Table A
Pending Capital Cases in Illinois
Year

Pending Cases in
Cook County

Pending Cases
Outside of Cook

Resolved Cases
in Cook County

2009

154

*

68

Pending Cases
Outside of Cook
County
*

2007

169

22

55

6

2006

151

16

53

14

2005

170

26

*

*

2004

164

30

*

*

2003

175

24

22

15

Source: Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty Annual Reports 2003–2010.
221
John
Byrne,
Public
Defender:
No
Money,
No
Death
Penalty,
CHICAGOBREAKINGNEWS.COM
(June
3,
2009,
5:58
PM
CST),
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/06/public-defender-no-money-no-deathpenalty.html. According to the article:
Cook County Public Defender Abishi Cunningham Jr. said this money shortage means attorneys
in his office will file dozens of motions this week asking judges to either bar the state from
seeking death or allow public defenders to withdraw from capital cases because the attorneys can
no longer mount adequate defenses. The Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office opposes the
move, spokeswoman Sally Daly said. Cost should not be a factor in determining whether a
defendant is eligible for capital punishment, she said.
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makes funds available to the public defender, or it may remove a
troublesome and expensive case from the public defender’s office.222
The public defender may be off of the case as soon as it is declared
capital, and that may be welcome. Or, if the case is declared capital and the
public defender represents the defendant, the public defender’s office at that
point can request monies unavailable before from the CLTF. There is a
demonstrated inequity in the fact that appointed counsel are reimbursed for
attorney’s fees and the public defender is not. On the other hand, by
declaring a case capital the state’s attorneys may find themselves facing a
relatively well-funded private attorney rather than the public defender.
Testimony was presented at the public hearings of the CPRSC that some
state’s attorneys did use the availability of funds from the CLTF
strategically, rather than substantively. 223 The decision to file a notice of
intent may be influenced by several contradictory economic and strategic
incentives.
The defense may also have a bureaucratic and economic incentive not
to oppose the state’s attorney’s motion to declare the case capital as this
opens up accessibility to CLTF funds to the defense as well, or may even
allow the case to be offloaded from the public defender’s staff to outside
paid counsel. However, as soon as the notice of intent is withdrawn, access
to funds from the CLTF is removed. At that point, the case will probably
come back to the public defender, as appointed trial counsel will have no
further access to funds from the CLTF. Given these considerations, the
strategic timing of when a case is noticed and when the notice is withdrawn
become critical, and perhaps inappropriately the subject of plea
negotiations.
If the case remains within the public defender’s office, the expenses of
investigation and of experts can be paid for by the CLTF as long as the case
is designated capital, giving the public defender more resources, and an
incentive not to oppose the filing of a notice of intent. If the defendant is
represented by appointed counsel, paid for by the CLTF, that defense
counsel has an economic incentive to postpone the decertification, or the
“de-deathing” of the case as long as possible, in order to continue to be paid

222

The money from the CLTF is not to be designated for salaries, yet disbursements to
the state’s attorneys and the public defenders include payments listed as “salaries.” In
testimony before the CPRSC, a trial judge stated that budgetary concerns often weigh
heavily on the state’s attorney’s decision of whether to seek the death penalty. See CPRSC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 97–98.
223
Id.; see also CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMMITTEE, FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 154, at 33 (summarizing testimony that notices of intent were in
some cases withdrawn on the eve of trial, preventing appointed defense attorneys from
obtaining fees from the CLTF).
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from the CLTF. These bureaucratic and economic incentives are likely to
differ radically from county to county, depending upon the budgetary
situation of the county and the number of first-degree murders in that
county.
While the Illinois CLTF may be a step towards ensuring adequate
representation and investigation for capital defense attorneys and may
provide needed funds for state’s attorneys, the establishment of the CLTF
by itself is not enough to result in indigent defendants receiving the best, or
even adequate, representation, contrary to the public perception and the
intent of the legislature. Indeed the establishment of the CLTF, with its
ready access to large amounts of cash reimbursements for attorney’s fees
and unreviewed expenses, may have created yet another layer of bizarre
bureaucratic and economic incentives which further encumber the effective
representation of defendants by public defenders and private counsel,
because they provide monetary incentives to declare a case capital and to
keep it as a capital case as long as possible.224
Furthermore, delays in the receipt of disbursements of alreadyappropriated state funds due to the state budget crisis have become
commonplace in Illinois. State’s attorneys might have an incentive to
declare a case capital soon after funds are appropriated and received, while
they might be less likely to declare cases capital after the year’s
appropriated funds have run out. The incentives would be very different in
Cook County than in other counties because of the different way CLTF
monies have been appropriated to Cook County compared with other
counties. The delay in the receipt of funds from the CLTF might also result
in capital cases remaining pending for longer than they would otherwise, so
that money can continue to be drawn from the CLTF. 225
The expenditures from the CLTF outside of Cook County go primarily
to costs associated with appointed outside counsel. Outside counsel might

224
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15(e) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010) (Capital
Litigation Trust Fund).

“Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be expended only as follows:
(3) To pay the compensation of trial attorneys, other than public defenders or appellate
defenders, who have been appointed by the court to represent defendants who are charged
with capital crimes. . . . Moneys expended from the Trust Fund shall be in addition to county
funding for Public Defenders and State’s Attorneys, and shall not be used to supplant or
reduce ordinary and customary county funding.”

Id. (emphasis added).
225
The Illinois Coalition Against the Death Penalty’s tabulation of the number of
pending capital cases in Cook County suggests that shortage of funds might be one reason
for cases being pending for so long, being neither pled nor going to capital trial. See
Footnote Table A supra note 220.
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or might not provide more effective representation for the defense than the
public defender in the county. 226 Absent an independent investigation
showing to the contrary, there are economic incentives for judges as well
when a case is declared capital. The judge decides who of the eligible
attorneys in the county will receive substantial disbursements from the
CLTF. This may turn out to benefit the judge when collecting campaign
funds or in numerous other ways. 227 The court may also be able to offload
certain expenses to the CLTF if a case is declared capital.
As discussed previously there are substantial county disparities in the
allocation of funds from the CLTF. 228 Outside of Cook County, the
counties with the greatest number of murders are not the counties receiving
the largest disbursements from the CLTF. The funding of capital cases in
Illinois, as elsewhere, has always been a mix of county and state funds, with
counties paying some but not all of the salaries of state’s attorneys and
public defenders. And different counties are in different states of fiscal
health. All counties have been hurt by recent across-the-board cuts in the
Illinois budget.
For the first nine years of its operation, the administrators of the CLTF
had no authority to deny or approve requests for funds. The trial court
judge alone approved the application of funds. There were some
restrictions on the use of the funds, such as the general restriction on using
funds for the CLTF to hire county staff, but no centralized state agency
made any review of these substantial expenditures of tens of millions of
dollars. As of 2010, an amendment to the CLTF statute mandates that trial
court judges require appointed defense lawyers to provide a proposed
litigation budget under seal. The amendment further provides that no
226

Private counsel must be capital-crimes certified. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 714. The quality of
private counsel nonetheless may be uneven. The relative competence of public defenders
and private counsel can only be evaluated by seeing how many persons sentenced to death
raise incompetence of counsel on their appeals, and in how many capital cases appellate
courts have granted that claim in public defender cases versus in private counsel cases, in the
state and federal courts. Those appeals take years, and often involve changes in
representation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that public defenders may provide better
representation due to their experience in defending capital cases. For example, in Marshall,
the Third Circuit overturned the defendant’s death sentence on the basis of the incompetence
of his private counsel at the penalty phase of his initial trial. The private counsel called no
witnesses at penalty phase. See Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452, 474 (3d Cir. 2005). It is
unlikely that a public defender at the time would have made that mistake.
227
The state regulation of public officials, including judges, state’s attorneys, and others,
has recently been the subject of much attention in the aftermath of the trial of former Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich. However, an indicted state’s attorney was recently allowed to
continue his job. See Robert McCoppin & Amanda Marrazzo, Indicted State's Attorney to
Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2010, at A7.
228
See supra Part II.C.
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payment will be made from the CLTF without a properly itemized and
detailed bill examined ex parte and approved by both the trial and presiding
court trial judge. 229 Under this legislation, for the first time in nine years
the state treasurer is authorized to question or conduct an independent
review of applications for payments from the fund.230 This review and
approval, however, is not required for the disbursement of funds to state’s
attorneys.
The CLTF has helped defense attorneys provide adequate defense in
capital cases, and has substantially benefitted state’s attorneys and the
attorney general, if benefits are measured by the fact all those agencies
received money they would have not had otherwise for the prosecution and
defense of Illinois capital cases. In fact, it is unclear whether the
availability of more than $100 million from the CLTF over nine years has
improved the quality of counsel. All that is clear is that this money has
been spent.
B. THE HIGH COST OF CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS

It is well established by national research and systematic, detailed
studies in other states that capital cases cost more to prosecute and defend
than non-capital cases. 231 Capital cases are particularly costly for defense
counsel because it is the ethical obligation of defense counsel to present any
and all mitigating evidence that might conceivably influence a jury, or even
a single juror, not to impose the death penalty. 232 If a defendant is

229

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(a)(b). This legislation was passed after publicity
concerning payments of over $1 million to a court appointed defense attorney from out of
state in the Cecil Sutherland case, tried in Jefferson County in 2006. See CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., SECOND ANN. REP. 9 (2006); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
REFORM STUDY COMM., THIRD ANN. REP. 24–25 (2007). The new legislation provides that
the state treasurer may object to submitted expenses as unreasonable, unnecessary, or
inappropriate. The appointed lawyer then has seven days to respond, and the trial court must
promptly rule on the treasurer’s objections. The CPRSC endorsed this provision. CPRSC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 111.
231
See infra Part IV (discussing cost studies). For an analysis of the differing costs of
the prosecution of capital cases and non-capital murders, see Robert M. Bohm, The
Economic Costs of Capital Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 573–94 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, &
Charles S. Lanier, eds. 1998). This article provides specific dollar figures for the five stages
of a capital prosecution and future costs of appellate and postconviction procedures,
concluding that capital punishment systems in the United States are always more expensive
than non-capital punishment systems. Id. at 592.
232
AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL
IN
DEATH
PENALTY
CASES
104–06
(2003),
available
at
230
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sentenced to death, defense counsel’s every action at trial will be
scrutinized during subsequent state and federal appellate proceedings. 233 If
subsequent investigation uncovers evidence that might have persuaded the
jury not to impose death, the failure to investigate and present such
evidence may result in a reversal of the capital sentence on grounds of
incompetence of counsel. 234 The United States Supreme Court found this
standard appropriate based on the American Bar Association’s Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Capital
Cases, 235 even though these guidelines may be aspirational as a matter of
practice. 236 This high standard makes the preparation for the penalty phase
of a capital trial particularly compelling, complicated, expensive, and
burdensome for the defense. 237 It also results in both the defense and the

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf.
[hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES].
233
Those sentenced to death generally acquire new counsel after being convicted.
Additional funds may be available through the federal public defender system if the
procedural standards for habeas corpus have been met. This may allow for a complete
investigation of mitigating factors to be conducted for the first time, years after the trial.
234
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). The public discussion typically
focuses on public defenders; however, there are noteworthy cases where private counsel has
been found incompetent after failing to conduct investigation into mitigation. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005).
235
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 232.
236
Many of the attorneys appointed to represent defendants in capital cases do not even
live up to the standards that any lawyer would be expected to meet:
Before dismissing the stories of the sleeping and drunk lawyers in capital cases as freak
occurrences, consider that in Illinois, thirty-three defendants who were sentenced to death were
represented at trial by an attorney who had once been, or was later, disbarred or suspended. One
of these lawyers had been the subject of seventy-eight disciplinary complaints. Another had
been disbarred but was later reinstated despite serious issues regarding his emotional stability
and drinking. He soon proceeded to represent four men who landed on death row. Shortly
thereafter he was disbarred again. Among the other attorneys who have been appointed in
Illinois to represent indigent defendants in capital cases are “a tax lawyer who had never before
tried a case, an attorney just two years out of law school” who was juggling his capital case with
one hundred other criminal cases, and “another attorney just ten days off a suspension for
incompetence and dishonesty” exhibited in six separate cases.

Marshall, supra note 47, at 958–59.
237
A competent, thorough investigation into the defendant’s mental health and social
history often requires travel to other jurisdictions and hiring of death penalty investigation
experts, persons experienced and trained in finding and gaining access to school and health
records, finding family members, and investigating circumstances and events which occurred
decades ago which the family and others may be reluctant to discuss. There may no longer
be living family members available as potential witnesses. Evidence of childhood neglect,
abuse, abandonment and the brutality of family members to children or others is not easily
discovered or authenticated, and it may take years to identify and reliably document.
Sometimes, reliable records will only be found in institutions or schools. In addition, capital
defendants are often uncooperative, or unable to articulate or recall aspects of their family or

1362

LEIGH B. BIENEN

[Vol. 100

prosecution seeking expert testimony from mitigation specialists to support
the verdict at penalty phase. If a death sentence is imposed the performance
of both the defense and prosecution will be reviewed carefully by the
appellate courts. 238
High visibility capital trials are the cases where trial errors due to
prosecutorial misconduct are most likely to occur.239 When prosecutors
aggressively pursue the death penalty, as in cases involving false
confessions, often there is public pressure for a speedy conviction, and such
public pressures may lead to errors, prosecutorial misconduct, and the
imposition of guilty verdicts for defendants who are wrongfully
prosecuted. 240 The verdicts of the wrongfully convicted add another layer
to the cost calculation.
The cases of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez provide an
example of a prosecutor becoming so locked into a commitment to a capital
prosecution and a death sentence that no contradictory evidence could
change his mind or derail that prosecution. 241 In these cases, the defendants

institutional history which might be persuasive to a capital jury. Head injuries are often
important for the establishment of disabilities and incompetence, and the source of such
injuries may be decades old. Tomes, supra note 205, at 368–72.
238
See Capital Litigation Trial Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology).
239
Gershowitz, supra note 187, at 311.
240
Public pressure in high-profile cases also can lead to police misconduct. Burge
Found Guilty, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2010, at A1 (describing torture of criminal defendants by
former Chicago police commander, Jon Burge, which resulted in false confessions and
wrongful convictions); see also Warden, supra note 9, at 413–14 (discussing Cruz and
Hernandez case); TUROW, supra note 83, at 28–46. There is also public pressure on judges
to be “tough” on crime:
Why is the death penalty such a salient issue for judges? The media play an important role both
in creating the culture in which being tough on crime is all, and in reducing judicial races and
even judicial decision to simplistic sound bites. Judges who seek to flout conventional wisdom
and uphold procedural safeguards are pilloried. The media, as we’ve seen, are not often inclined
to convey procedural complexities. Even the most serious errors tend to be reduced to sound
bites that translate to “he let him off on a technicality because he is soft on crime.” In the
particular context of judicial races, judges are placed in the position of needing to create those
very sound bites, and there is no substitute for touting one’s own demonstrated commitment to
the death penalty, or attacking that of one’s opponent, as a quick and easy way to garner media
attention and prove that one is not soft on crime.

Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 596 (2004) (citations omitted).
241
Cruz and Hernandez were falsely convicted of murdering Jeanine Nicarico. People v.
Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 639 (Ill. 1994). Every time the death sentence was overturned, the
prosecutor was committed to continuing the prosecution, even after additional evidence
identified Brian Dugan as the actual perpetrator. Eric Zorn, DuPage Got It Wrong, Wrong,
Wrong, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2009, at C21:
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were wrongfully convicted multiple times based on unreliable evidence
including a statement that was not even a confession. 242 Yet the DuPage
County state’s attorneys who tried these cases were able to persuade
multiple juries to convict the wrong defendants and sentence them to death.
In such cases, the cost of trial and appeal is multiplied as the case goes to
capital trial, is appealed, is reversed, goes to capital trial again, results in
another death sentence being imposed, is appealed, is reversed, and is
brought to capital trial again. Along the way, the appeals become more
technical, more controversial, and more costly. While these appeals are
proceeding, time passes, and the taxpayers pay for the costs of the trials and
retrials and appeals, and for the defendant to sit on death row consulting
with attorneys at state expense. Meanwhile the actual murderer is out
committing other crimes. If the justification for the imposition of the death
penalty is deterrence or retribution, then these cases teach us that deterrence
and retribution are neither swift nor sure. This wasteful charade is no
solace for victims or the public.
C. THE PRICE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

A wrongful conviction for capital murder is like a doctor amputating
the wrong leg: there is no positive benefit to society, to the victim of the
crime, to the wrongfully prosecuted individual, or to the credibility and
integrity of the professionals involved and their institutions. Sometimes the
wrongful conviction involves malice and deliberate wrongdoing, such as
with the police torture cases or the cases where exonerating evidence was
withheld or ignored deliberately by prosecutors, as in Cruz. 243 These cases
involve prosecutorial misconduct at its worst, and certainly a violation of
the ABA’s recommended ethical standards for prosecutors.244 Yet few, if
any, sanctions have been meted out to state’s attorneys in cases of wrongful
convictions. The stubborn, overly aggressive prosecutions of innocent
defendants in Illinois resulted in the exoneration of ten persons on death
row by January 2003, the time of the Ryan commutations. Monetary
compensation never will make those defendants whole, nor will it
compensate the victims’ families for undergoing unnecessary trials and
retrials. Some of those individual defendants can and have recovered some

Dugan’s public defender told DuPage County authorities that fact in 1985 after Dugan was
arrested and confessed to a strikingly similar rape and murder in LaSalle County. But DuPage
didn’t get it. They’d already put Rolando Cruz and Alex Hernandez onto death row for the
crime, and so dismissed Dugan as a liar.
242

Warden, supra note 9, at 381–82.
See Zorn, supra note 241, at C21.
244
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/rule_3_8.html (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor).
243
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Table 7
State Expenditures on Wrongful Convictions in Illinois Capital Cases,
County and Date of Conviction, Court of Claims Awards, Civil Rights
Settlements, as of 2010 245

Petitioner

Burrows,
Joseph

County and
Year of
Conviction 246

Court of
Claims
Award and
Year 247

Legal Fees
Accrued 248

Amount and
Year of
Settlement

(Col. 1)

(Col. 2)

(Col. 3)

(Col. 4)

Iroquois

None

N/A

$100,000

[1989]
Cook

$120,300
[2001]

Cruz,
Rolando

DuPage

$120,300

[1985]

[2003]

Fields,
Nathson

Cook

$199,150

[1986]

[2010]

McHenry

$60,150

[1994]

[2004]

DuPage

None

Gauger, Gary

Hernandez,
Alejandro
Hobley,
Madison

(Col. 5)
(Col. 2+3+4)
$100,000

[1997]

[1979]

Cobb, Perry

Total State
Payments to
Petitioner and
Counsel

N/A

None

$120,300

$1,960,743

$2,892,564

$4,973,607

[2000]
N/A

None

$199,150

$2,197,391

None

$2,257,541

$377,864

$1,366,085

$1,743,949

[1985]

[2000]

Cook

$161,005

[1990]

[2004]

$3,119,228

$7,500,000

$10,780,233

[2008/2009]

245
This does not include all capital cases, or all wrongful convictions, during the years
1987–2010, but only those for whom final judgments or settlements have been reached.
Pending cases, as of August 1, 2010 are not included. Some cases remain under
investigation.
246
Column 1 displays the year that the first death sentence was imposed. In the case of
Cruz, for example, a death sentence was imposed in 1985 and again in 1990. Alejandro
Hernandez, Cruz’s co-defendant, was sentenced to death in 1985 and again in 1991.
247
There must be a court certified finding of innocence of the offense for which the
petitioner was convicted before the court of claims can issue an award. Section 505/8 (c) of
the Illinois Court of Claims Act. The amount received is a statutory amount based upon the
number of days wrongfully imprisoned.
248
Column 3 displays the legal fees paid by defendant cities, counties, or both to defend
against federal civil rights suits brought by exonerated persons as plaintiffs against the cities,
counties, or both, and employees indemnified by them.
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Table 7
(Continued)

Petitioner

Court of
Claims
Award and
Year247

Legal Fees
Accrued248

Amount and
Year of
Settlement

(Col. 1)

(Col. 2)

(Col. 3)

(Col. 4)

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

$767,466

$800,000

$1,728,471

Howard,
Stanley

Cook

$161,005

[1987]

[2007]

Jimerson,
Verneal

Cook

$120,300

[1985]

[1997]

Cook

$125,036

[1989]

[2001]

Cook

$199,150

[1988]

[2010]

St. Clair

$120,300

[1990]

[2003]

Jones, Ronald

Kitchen,
Ronald

Lawson, Carl

Orange,
Leroy

Cook

$161,005

[1985]

[2004]

Patterson,
Aaron

Cook

$161,005

[1989]

[2003]

Cook

$145,875

[1983]

[2000]

Cook

$125,036

[1986]

[2003]

Cook

$120,300

[1979]

[2001]

Porter,
Anthony

Smith, Steven

Tillis, Darby

Williams,
Dennis

Total State
Payments to
Petitioner and
Counsel

County and
Year of
Conviction246

Cook

$140,350

[1979]

[1998]

Totals:

$2,240,267

(Col. 5)
(Col. 2+3+4)

[2008]
$1,054,061

$8,800,000

$9,974,361

[1999]
$11,126

$2,200,000

$2,236,162

[2003]
$23,118

None

$222,268

N/A

None

$120,300

$994,257

$5,500,000

$6,655,262

[2008]
$2,663,761

$5,000,000

$7,824,766

[2008]
$661,027

None

$806,902

$288,328

None

$413,364

N/A

None

$120,300

$1,054,061

$12,800,000

$13,994,411

[1999]
$15,172,431

$46,958,649

$64,371,347

Source: Freedom of Information Act requests by the Center on Wrongful Convictions and
other public information, on file with Rob Warden, Director of the Center on Wrongful
Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University.
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recompense from the city or county that prosecuted them as well as from
the State of Illinois. This money is another item in the cost of capital
punishment in Illinois.
Table 7 is an omnibus table for state expenditures for wrongful
convictions. 249 The total of more than $64 million for all cases includes
some, but not all, legal payments by counties and the City of Chicago for
their defense in these cases. The total does not include, for example, the
2010 civil rights case against Jon Burge, the police officer in charge of the
Area 2 police station in Chicago where the Ford Heights Four and others
were tortured and then signed coerced confessions. 250 Nor does it include
the more than $10 million in legal fees the City of Chicago has paid to
defend Burge and other detectives. 251
The Court of Claims provides statutory awards representing a
particular dollar amount for each day the person was wrongfully
imprisoned. The statute is not new, however most of the claims in Illinois
were awarded after 2000, perhaps because of the greater availability of
counsel after the discovery of so many wrongful convictions. 252 Awards in
civil cases are likely to be larger if the defendant was sentenced to death.
The statute for federal prisioners explicitly provides for a larger award if the
defendant has been sentenced to death.253

249

The source for figures in individual cases is Rob Warden, Director of the Center on
Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law (on file
with the Center for Wrongful Convictions); see also CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/.
250
See Marshall, supra note 47, at 967. Marshall describes the large sums paid by
Cook County in cases involving police and prosecutorial misconduct:
Ultimately, Cook County paid the men [in the Ford Heights four case] thirty-six million dollars
to settle their civil rights actions. . . . Beyond these payouts, Cook County spent well over two
million dollars in defending the civil rights lawsuits. In addition, the State of Illinois has paid the
five defendants approximately $600,000 under its compensation statute for the wrongly
convicted. In addition to these costs, the State also incurred the needless expense of imprisoning
these innocent defendants for seventy-six years collectively. At the current rate of approximately
$22,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate, these seventy-six years cost Illinois taxpayers another
$1.7 million in wasted resources. Thus, without even trying to assess the costs of the multiple
trials and appeals involving these innocent individuals, the tab for the errors in this one case
come out to over forty million dollars in direct expenditures (with one major lawsuit still
pending). . . .

Id.
251
See Matthew Walberg, Ex-Inmate Sues Daley, Burge; Lawsuit: Mayor Did Nothing to
Stop Torture, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2010, at C8.
252
Infra Table 7. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1993 & West Supp.
2010). The Ford Heights Four award of $36 million was a record-breaking amount at the
time.
253
28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2006).
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The costs and price of wrongful convictions can be measured in
several ways. First, there is the cost of the wrongful prosecution, the trial,
and the appeals themselves—all money that has been wasted on the
prosecution of an innocent person while the actual killer was not being
sought or prosecuted. The amount of wasted money amplifies with each
retrial and re-prosecution of the wrongfully convicted person, as well as
with the successive appeals and collateral reviews of the same case. Then,
there are additional specific costs to the state associated with state payments
for the wrongful convictions. Additionally, there are the relatively smaller
Court of Claims payments. A number of the wrongful conviction cases
resulted in judgments amounting to millions of dollars paid for by the
county, the City of Chicago, and the State of Illinois.
Table 7 shows the particularities of the costs of some of those
wrongful convictions that resulted in death sentences in Illinois. These
costs are not trivial, and the Illinois taxpayers in one form or another pay
for them all. Finally, there is the immeasurable cost to society of
sentencing an innocent person to death. Wrongful convictions not only
allow the real murderer to remain at large to commit other crimes, thus
perverting norms of civil protection, but they also erode public confidence
in the criminal justice system. Victims’ families, as well as defendants and
their families, are needlessly subjected to the rigors of a capital trial. The
total of over $64 million to date will only increase.
What is exceptional in Illinois was not the number of wrongful
convictions, but rather the long-term commitment of Illinois lawyers,
students, journalists and others willing and able to spend years on the
laborious, often thankless task of uncovering evidence of innocence and
prosecutorial misconduct, and to then pursue these cases until the death
sentence is set aside. 254 Newspaper staff and persistent journalists
frequently uncovered critical factual evidence of wrongful convictions,
thereby providing attorneys with the information needed to file civil rights
suits and to bring actions against those responsible.255 The role of college
students, law students, and faculty members from many institutions over a
254

The stories of these cases have been fully chronicled elsewhere. See generally
Warden, supra note 9; Marshall, supra note 19.
255
The roles of the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Reader, and the Chicago Lawyer in
uncovering the wrongful convictions in Illinois have been pivotal. Not only did the Tribune
conduct its own research and maintain a database of homicides and capital prosecutions in
Illinois, but it published a series of articles which were critical in educating the general
public and galvanizing the legal community. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Posseley, Trial
and Error; How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1; John
Conroy,
House
of
Screams,
CHI.
READER
(Jan
26,
1990),
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/house-of-screams/Content?oid=875107; see also
articles cited in Warden, supra note 9, at 399 n.77.
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long period of time was also extensive. There is little, however, in the
chronicles of these cases to provide much faith in the accuracy or reliability
of the Illinois capital punishment system. Nor is there much reason to think
that Illinois is unique in this respect.
IV. COST STUDIES AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REVIEWS IN OTHER STATES
On October 23, 2009, the Council of the American Law Institute voted
overwhelmingly to withdraw § 210.6, the death penalty provisions of the
Model Penal Code, due to “the current intractable institutional and
structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for
administering capital punishment.” 256 The Council’s decision was based on
a report prepared at the director’s request by Professors Carol Steiker and
Jordan Steiker, a report which sets forth in detail the major reasons why the
American Law Institute no longer stands behind its own influential
statutory formulation of provisions for the principled imposition of the
death sentence:
[M]any thoughtful and knowledgeable individuals doubt whether the capitalpunishment regimes in place in three-fourths of the states, or in any form likely to be
implemented in the near future, meet or are likely ever to meet basic concerns of
fairness in process and outcome. These include (a) the tension between clear statutory
identification of which murders should command the death penalty and the
constitutional requirement of individualized determination; (b) the difficulty of
limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as they do in a
number of state statutes now) a large percentage of murderers; (c) the near
impossibility of addressing by legal rule the conscious or unconscious racial bias
within the criminal-justice system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death
sentences based on the race of the victim; (d) the enormous economic costs of
administering a death-penalty regime, combined with studies showing that the legal
representation provided to some criminal defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood,
especially given the availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons
sentenced to death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not have committed
the crime for which they were sentenced; and (f) the politicization of judicial
elections, where—even though nearly all state judges perform their tasks

256
Message from Lance Liebman, Director, American Law Institute (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.ali.org/_news/10232009.htm. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
established the theoretical framework and legal architecture to address the constitutional
problems with the application of capital punishment statutes identified by the United States
Supreme Court. In 1976, the Supreme Court relied explicitly upon the Model Penal Code to
rule that Georgia’s new death penalty statute addressed the constitutional infirmities
identified in Furman v. Georgia. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality
opinion). The states were eager to reenact capital punishment, and state legislatures quickly
adopted statutes incorporating the Model Penal Code’s structure of statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. See Bienen, supra note 2, at 139.
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conscientiously—candidate statements of personal views on the death penalty and
257
incumbent judges’ actions in death-penalty cases become campaign issues . . . .

The ALI report further notes that there is at present “widespread
reflection” about the American capital punishment system, and that its use
has declined significantly. 258
One manifestation of this widespread reflection is the decision by
many states to create commissions to study the operation of their death
penalty system after becoming aware of systemic inequities or discovering
innocent persons on death row. These commissions typically make
recommendations to the state legislature or the state governor. 259 In the
three decades since Gregg allowed for the reestablishment of capital
punishment, the reenacting states have had generations of experience with
the impact of capital punishment on state legal institutions. The current
economic situation and the fiscal crises in many states have encouraged
states to investigate the costs and benefits of capital punishment as well. 260
It has been proven repeatedly that capital cases cost substantially more than
sentencing a defendant to life in prison. 261 State money is needed to pay for
capital trials and adjudication, for extended pretrial incarceration and
incarceration in special facilities for capital defendants, for the longer trials
and protracted appeals of capital cases, and for the costs of the executions
themselves. Further state money is needed for the costs of defending legal
challenges to all aspects of the prosecution and trial, as well as extensive
legal challenges to the method and procedures concerning executions
themselves and the conditions of confinement on death row.
The methodology for conducting a cost and implementation study is
now well settled: a statewide study must examine all cases of first-degree
murder or potentially death-eligible murder, and those cases must be
tracked through the entire state capital punishment system for the results to
be credible. 262 The identification of murders and death-eligible murders
must be objective and systematic, and the study must disclose its data
257

STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 5. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2–3.
259
See, e.g., CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33. The 2002 Illinois Governor’s
Commission, with its extensive report, was among the first and most comprehensive of such
Commissions. See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR’S COMM’N REPORT, supra note 23.
260
See, e.g., infra Part IV.C (discussing CALIFORNIA REPORT).
261
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 146; Cook, supra note 34, at 524.
262
For a detailed report on the capital punishment cost studies to date and how a credible
study must be structured, see David Baldus et. al., Empirical Studies of Race and
Geographic Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key
Methodological Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE
NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 153, 153–93 (Charles S. Lanier et
al., eds., 2009).
258
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collection methodology and methods of analysis. The state studies
presented here, in order to compare their findings with patterns seen in
Illinois, take somewhat different methodological approaches; however, they
are all rigorous, exemplary, and, most important, transparent in the
disclosure of their methodology, data collection, identification of cases and
in the empirical support for their findings and recommendation. These are
some, but not all, of the leading case studies of state capital punishment
systems and their costs.263
A. THE NORTH CAROLINA ECONOMETRIC STUDY

A recent detailed study of the cost of the death penalty in a single state
is the econometric analysis of the cost of the North Carolina death penalty
system during the fiscal years 2007 and 2008.264 This study uses traditional
econometric analytic techniques to compare the actual incurred costs of the
death penalty over two years with what would have been spent had the
death penalty not been the law during that time. 265
North Carolina has many similarities to Illinois. Both states reenacted
the death penalty in 1977 and both have seen a sharp decline in the number
of death sentences imposed over the past few years. 266 North Carolina and
Illinois both have around 100 counties, and in both states the district
attorney in each county has the independent authority to declare a case
capital. 267 In 2001, a special Office of Indigent Defense Services was
created in North Carolina to provide a new source of funds for the defense
of capital cases. 268 North Carolina has not executed anyone since 2006 due

263

For a brief overview of cost studies performed in particular states and nationally, see
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at app. 10.
264
Cook, supra note 34.
265
Id. at 499. The study in North Carolina describes the research design used in detail.
The empirical analysis was based upon a data set of 1,034 indictments for first-degree,
potentially capital, murder cases during the study period, fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Id. at
513 fig.3. The actual disposition at trial for these cases was as follows: 174 individuals were
convicted of first-degree murder, irrespective of whether the case was declared capital; 276
cases resulted in a dismissal of the murder charge or a jury verdict of not guilty of murder;
274 cases (26.5%) were designated capital; 58 cases went to capital trial and 9 death
sentences were imposed in 49 penalty phase trials; 2 defendants received a death sentence
after pleading guilty. The most common outcome in the 1,024 cases was a conviction of
second-degree murder. Approximately five times more cases were declared capital (274)
than actually went to trial as capital cases (54) and roughly one in twenty-five cases
designated capital resulted in the imposition of a death sentence (11 out of 276). Id.
266
Id. at 504.
267
Id. at 524.
268
Id. at 503. Note, this fund, unlike the CLTF, was created to provide state funds only
to defense attorneys in capital cases, not to provide funds to prosecutors.
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to litigation challenging the use of lethal injection as a method of
execution. 269
The North Carolina study found that the state would have saved almost
$11 million in each of the examined years had the death penalty been
abolished prior to the two years under review.270 Much of the saving would
have come in the form of reduced expenditures for specific legal
requirements in the prosecution of a capital case. For example, in an
ordinary murder prosecution, there is no requirement for the selection of a
death-qualified jury, which costs the state extra days in voir dire and in
preparations. 271 Without the possibility of a capital trial, there is no need
for state’s attorneys or defense attorneys to prepare for a penalty-phase trial.
The North Carolina study documented the extra costs to the defense of
prosecuting a case capitally. 272 These itemized expenditures did not count
the extra cost to the prosecution of proceeding capitally. In addition, there
are other system costs for the defense besides the direct payments to
individual defense attorneys. 273 The study also found that prisons would

269
270
271

Id. at 504. See generally Symposium, The Lethal Injection Debate, supra note 27.
Cook, supra note 34, at 525.
Id. at 520:

An additional savings from abolishing the death penalty would be a reduction in jury costs. The
thirty-two capital cases concluding in the two-year window (FY 2005 and 2006) lasted an
average of 11.7 days longer than noncapital trials of cases that had once proceeded capitally.
Given that North Carolina pays jurors $40 per day after the first five days, I estimate $224,640 of
extra juror payments. That figure does not include the extra payments for the jury pool during
voir dire, or the reimbursement for parking and meals.
272

Id. at 511. Extra defense costs for capital cases are by far the greatest extra expense
for the state. This is because of extra “super due process” protections put in place for
defendants by state law and constitutional precedent. Id.
273
Id. at 519–520. Cook explains:
In addition to expenditures on private attorneys who are appointed by IDS [Indigent Defense
Services] to represent defendants in capital cases, the IDS Office of the Capital Defender has a
staff of full-time attorneys and investigators who assist with capital cases and other murder cases
around the state. The budget for this office totaled $3,296,795 for the two years under
consideration. IDS officials estimated that 23.8% of the office’s budget currently goes to
noncapital murder cases . . . [Additionally,] the Center for Death Penalty Litigation (CDPL)
helps recruit and train defense attorneys for capital case representation, and consults on specific
cases. While CDPL is a private nonprofit agency, it receives part of its budget from the state,
amounting to $1,187,482 during the two years. In sum, the state’s extra expenditures on defense
in trial phase of capital cases amounted to the following:
$9,560,181 ‘Extra’ payments to private attorneys and other fees
2,432,722 IDS Office of the Capital Defender
1,187,482 Center for Death Penalty Litigation
$13,180,385 Total, two years [for FY2005 and 2006].

Id. at 519–20.
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save a substantial amount per year if those on death row were reassigned to
incarceration with the non-death populations. 274
The study distinguishes between “cash costs” and “in-kind costs.”
Cash costs are additional documented dollars that must be spent
immediately out of the state budget to prosecute capital cases. 275 In-kind
costs include the allocation of existing staff and budgetary resources, for
example staff salaries or office overhead, to a particular death-eligible
murder case, resources that otherwise would have been available for other
criminal cases within the same criminal justice agency. 276
The North Carolina Study concludes: “If the death penalty had been
abolished on July 1, 2004, it is likely that the $13 million in extra
expenditures on defense in capital cases would have been available to fund
other activities of state government or to be returned to taxpayers over the
subsequent two years.” 277 Note, this is only the savings of costs incurred by
the defense. This represents savings of cash costs only, not in-kind costs.
The study assumes that freed-up state resources in courts, prosecutors’
offices, and the offices of public defenders would be devoted to other cases,
rather than result in an overall reduction in state budgets for attorney and
court costs, or a decline in staff at correctional institutions. 278
As in Illinois, North Carolina prosecutors can use the possibility of a
capital trial and a death sentence as a bargaining tool, allowing prosecutors
to extract pleas for longer sentences if a case is declared capital. The North

274

Id. at 524 (finding a total savings of $169,617 in prison costs over the two years
studied).
275
Id. at 514. The “cash cost” includes such items as payments by Indigent Defense
Services (IDS) for private attorneys retained to represent indigent defendants in capital
cases, payments by IDS for expert witnesses on behalf of the defense, and payments to
jurors for cases that go to capital trial. For each of these cost items, there is a reasonable
presumption that if the expenditures for any one case were reduced, the overall state
expenditures on criminal justice as a whole would be reduced correspondingly. For example,
if IDS is not required to appoint a second defense attorney for a murder defendant (because
the district attorney decides to proceed non-capitally), and as a result avoids paying $50,000
in attorney’s fees, that $50,000 would not be reallocated to another IDS case, but rather
could be used for other state government programs (education, Medicaid) or returned to the
taxpayers in the form of lower tax rates. Id.
276
Cook, supra note 34, at 515. Examples of in-kind costs include “time spent by
attorneys and other staff in the district attorney’s office, and the use of courtrooms, judges’
time, and all the associated personnel required for hearings and trial days” in capital cases.
Id. at 515–16.
277
Id. at 520.
278
In the face of a proposed abolition of capital punishment, state employees in a variety
of institutions might well be worried about losing jobs or having their institutional budgets
cut. This study found that North Carolina could realize significant savings without cutting a
single state job. See id. at 505.
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Carolina Study notes that the actual length of sentences for murder imposed
might be affected by the absence of the possibility of a death penalty as a
tool for the prosecutor in plea bargaining. 279 However, the study found that
“[r]emarkably, noncapital cases that went to trial had lower defense
expenditures . . . than capital cases that were disposed of by pleas.”280 This
implies that the trials themselves are not high in cost; rather the designation
of a prosecution as capital increases costs for both the prosecution and the
defense.
B. THE MARYLAND STUDY

The cost of capital punishment in Maryland was analyzed in detail in a
2008 Report by the Urban Institute’s Justice Policy Center. 281 The
Maryland Study measured the differential costs of a death-eligible case
according to each stage of the capital prosecution, analyzing all deatheligible cases since the reenactment of the death penalty in 1978.282 This
study uses an individualized, “bottom-up” approach to tabulate actual costs
at the trial level.283 In other words, the Maryland study looked at the cost of
an individual case starting at its inception. Notice, however, that
Maryland’s relatively complete “bottom-up approach” does not include the
cost of retrials after reversal. 284 Currently, capital punishment is on hold in
Maryland pending resolution of the challenge to its lethal injections
procedures. 285
The Maryland study found the cost of an average death-eligible case
that went to trial in which prosecutors did not seek death was $1.1 million,
279

Id. at 510–11; see supra Part III.A.
Cook, supra note 34, at 517.
281
See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
MARYLAND (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_
death_penalty.pdf.
282
Id. at 4.
283
This “bottom-up” approach is more complete than the more common “top-down”
analysis, which assumes that all cases cost exactly the same. See id. at 5 for a summary of
prior studies and description of these two types of analysis. Several studies do not use
random or other sampling procedures to estimate different costs among different cases but
rather estimate the cost of a typical case and multiply that by the number of death sentences
imposed. Id. at 6 tbl.1. This is a less precise estimate of the costs of a capital trial.
284
Id. The study also did not examine “the costs of cases where the death notice did not
‘stick’ and was not prosecuted as a death notice case at trial.” Id. at 31.
285
Scott Calvert & Kate Smith, In Secret Move, Death Row Inmates Sent to W. Md.,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 2010, at 1A (“Maryland’s death penalty has been on hold since
the Court of Appeals ruled in December 2006 that executions could not continue until a
regulatory committee of the legislature adopted lethal injection protocols. That hasn’t
happened, creating a de facto moratorium on state executions.”); see also John Wagner,
Ehrlich Takes Issue with Death Penalty Delays, WASH. POST, May 8, 2010, at B1.
280
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including $870,000 in costs of imprisonment over the projected life span of
the defendant, and $250,000 for the cost of trial adjudication. 286 A deatheligible case that went to trial as a capital case, but in which the death
penalty was not imposed, cost the taxpayers $1.8 million, $670,000 more
than a comparable case in which the death penalty was not sought. 287 Most
of this increased cost was due to a three-fold increase in the costs of
adjudication ($850,000). The current and projected costs of incarceration
were roughly the same ($950,000). 288
A death-eligible case in Maryland that resulted in the death sentence
being imposed cost considerably more: approximately $3 million, $1.9
million more than a case where the death penalty was not sought. 289 Costs
of imprisonment were 150% higher (roughly $1.3 million), but the majority
of the increased costs were associated with adjudication, which, at $1.7
million, was double the cost of a case where the death penalty was not
imposed and almost seven times the cost of a case where the death penalty
was not sought. 290 This number includes the additional costs of appeals,
collateral motions, and other legal proceedings unlikely to be necessary or
used in non-capital cases. 291
Between reenactment in 1978 and 1999, the study identified 6,000
first- and second-degree murders, 1,227 of which were death-eligible under
the Maryland statute. 292 A death notice was filed in 173 of these cases
(roughly one in seven), which resulted in 162 capital trials and 56 death
sentences imposed. 293 The vast majority of those death sentences were

286

JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 281, at 2.
Id.
288
Id. (“About 70% of the added cost of a death notice case occurs during the trial phase.
These additional costs are due to a longer pre-trial period, a longer and more intensive voir
dire process, longer trials, more time spent by more attorneys preparing cases, and an
expensive penalty phase trial that does not occur at all in non-death penalty cases. In
addition, death notice cases are more likely to incur costs during the appellate phase even if
there is no death sentence.”).
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
For example, capital trials involve a more lengthy voir dire processes, and consume
greater judicial resources. Id. at 11. They also include a penalty phase, a second trial in
which the jury is required to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 11–12. Cases
in which a death sentence have been imposed often have multiple post-sentencing reviews at
the trial court level, while non-death cases are limited to one. Id. at 13. Death sentences also
undergo a more lengthy and involved appeals process. Id. at 13–16.
292
Id. at 15. The study identifies 1,311 death-eligible cases, but eighty-four of them were
“multiple records of the same event, (usually retrials for the same homicide).” Id.
293
Id. at 3, 15. In comparison to Illinois, relatively few notices of intent to seek capital
punishment were withdrawn prior to trial (11 of 173). See comparable figures for Cook
County, Footnote Table A, supra note 220.
287
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overturned on appeal. As of March 2008, five persons had been executed
and five others were awaiting execution on death row. 294
The Maryland Study estimates that reenacting the death penalty will
cost Maryland taxpayers over $186 million over the life of the cases that
have been brought to present. 295 It will have cost the Maryland taxpayers
more than $107.3 million to have sentenced fifty-six persons to death in the
twenty-one years prior to 1999, and to have executed five. 296
Unsuccessfully seeking the death penalty in an additional 117 cases cost an
additional $71 million. 297 The state spent an additional $7.2 million for the
Maryland Capital Defender’s Division. 298 Much of the $186 million in
identified costs are expenses that have not yet been incurred, and will need
to be paid out of future state budgets. Furthermore, the $186 million does
not include the costs of any new capital prosecutions.
These costs were estimated conservatively, including only
expenditures that could be empirically verified. 299 They do not include
cases where the death notice was served, but then was waived or dropped
because of a plea bargain, or cases where a death notice was filed but there
was a verdict of not guilty. 300 Nor do these enumerated costs of state
capital prosecutions include the attorney and court costs of a federal habeas
corpus proceedings and appeals to the Fourth Circuit or the United States
Supreme Court. 301
The study considered the possibility that capitally prosecuted cases
contain more egregious acts, and consequently would be more expensive to
prosecute than cases that are not death-eligible, even if no capital statute
were to exist. The actual cost of maintaining the present system of capital
punishment in Maryland, which must include these additional expenditures,

294

JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 281, at 1.
Id. at 3.
296
Id. at 28–29. The capital cases continue to cost more than non-capital cases after the
imposition of the death penalty for several reasons: the costs of direct appeal for a capital
case are more expensive, and the appeals are more extensive and raise issues which would
only be raised in capital cases. Then, there are additional costs for collateral and federal
appeals in capital cases. The special legal issues related to challenges to the method of
execution, for example, raise issues on appeal, which, of course, would not come up if the
defendant were sentenced to life. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 143–44.
297
JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 281, at 28–29.
298
Id. at 28. A substantial amount of the public defender’s budget in every state which
has capital punishment goes to the defense of capital cases. See supra Part III.B for a
discussion of costs to the defense in Illinois.
299
See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 281, at 3.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 14–15.
295
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therefore must be higher than this study’s estimate of an additional $3
million for every new capital sentence imposed after 1999.
C. THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE

California represents an extreme example of the contradictions of
death penalty jurisprudence, with over 670 inmates on death row at the time
of the report (the largest number in the country) but only thirteen executions
since the death penalty was reenacted in 1978. Like Illinois, the California
legislature created a commission to study and review the administration of
criminal justice in capital cases, and to determine the extent to which that
legal process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful executions or the
wrongful convictions of innocent persons. 302 The California Commission
was composed of persons representing a broad spectrum of views and
backgrounds, and conducted its own research. Like the Illinois 2003
CPRSC Committee and the 2002 Illinois Governor’s Commission, the
California Commission did not view its charge as calling for a judgment or
recommendation on the morality of the death penalty itself, or whether
capital punishment should be retained. 303 However, the California
Commission did conclude that the California death penalty system is
dysfunctional. 304 California is currently considering reinstating lethal
injection under a new procedure that addresses concerns with its previous
three-drug procedure, while California continues to be in a state of
budgetary crisis. 305
As in Illinois, most first-degree murders are technically death-eligible
under California’s broad statutory definition of special circumstances that
provide the legal foundation for a capital charge, but the majority of deatheligible murders are not charged as capital cases.306 Also like Illinois, the

302

CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 113.
As in Illinois, the members of the Committee held a broad spectrum of views on the
death penalty. See id. at 114.
304
Id. at 114 n.6 (citing testimony of California Chief Justice Ronald M. George, January
10, 2008).
305
In the early 1980s, Michael Morales was convicted of raping and murdering
seventeen-year-old Terri Lynn Winchell and sentenced to death. He was scheduled to die on
Feb. 21, 2006, but his execution was stayed when the two anesthesiologists who were to
monitor his execution backed out at the last minute. Without their oversight, there is no
guarantee that the three-drug lethal injection will not subject Morales to excruciating pain,
which would violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Sam Stanton &
Denny Walsh, California Has High Hopes of Reinstating Death Penalty, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 5, 2010, at 1A.
306
It is estimated that 87% of first-degree murders are technically death-eligible under
the broad definitions of the California statute. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 120.
303
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individual county prosecutors in California decide whether to prosecute a
murder as a capital case, and there is no statewide review panel. 307 Again
like Illinois, patterns of racial and geographic disparities have been
identified in California. 308 As in Illinois, there are vast differences in the
handling of death cases in different California counties, in part due to
different political climates in the counties and the proclivities of individual
prosecutors, and in part due to funding issues.309
It takes an average of two decades for California to execute a prisoner
who has been sentenced to death. 310 “To keep cases moving at this snail’s
pace” costs the taxpayers roughly $137 million every year. 311 The
Commission further found that:
[t]he strain placed by these cases on our justice system, in terms of the time and
attention taken away from other business that the courts must conduct for our citizens,
is heavy. To reduce the average lapse of time from sentence to execution by half, to
the national average of 12 years, we [the State of California] will have to spend
nearly twice what we are spending now. The time has come to address death penalty
reform in a frank and honest way. To function effectively, the death penalty must be
carried out with reasonable dispatch, but at the same time in a manner that assures
312
fairness, accuracy and non-discrimination.

To support its factual conclusions regarding the cost of the death
penalty, the Commission relied on a series of conservative
approximations. 313 It estimated that, under the current system in place in
California, the cost of a capital trial is $500,000 more than an equivalent
non-capital trial. 314 The Commission had more precise data regarding the

307
Id. at 150 n.120. However, “in almost half the counties, 28 of the 58, no death
sentences were imposed during the 1990’s, although 1,160 homicides took place in these
counties. The current District Attorney for San Francisco, Kamala Harris, and her
predecessor, Terrence Hallinan, pledged never to seek the death penalty.” Id.
308
Id. at 150 (noting that those counties with the highest death sentencing rates tend to
have the highest proportion of non-Hispanic whites in their population and the lowest
population density; and that those who kill African Americans or Hispanics are less likely to
be sentenced to death); see also ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH BY
GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 1,
3 (2009) (providing statistics on the disparities in capital sentencing among California
counties).
309
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 92–93. The California Commission
recognized that under the present system the provision of funds for the prosecution and
defense of capital cases was a critical need.
310
Id. at 116.
311
Id. at 116–17.
312
Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
313
Id. at 144–46.
314
Id. at 145. The Commission compares its estimates to the conclusion of a recent
ACLU study, which found that the least expensive death penalty trial was $1.1 million more
expensive than the most expensive non-death penalty trial. See NATASHA MINSKER, THE
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annual costs of postconviction appeals and habeas reviews, which it found
was at least $54.4 million per year. 315
The Commission was also able to estimate, in collaboration with the
state department of corrections, that confining a prisoner on death row costs
an additional $90,000 per year in addition to the normal confinement costs
of $34,150 for a prisoner sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. 316 Thus, California pays $63.3 million more every year than it
would if its death row population of what was at the time of the report 670
were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 317
The California Commission reported significant county-by-county
disparity in sentencing, with death sentences being ten times more likely to
be imposed in some counties than in others. 318 The trends in these data are
similar to Illinois: death sentences are more likely to be imposed in rural
counties than urban areas. 319 California prosecutors testifying before the
Commission argued that this disparity “is not a problem, because locally
elected District Attorneys are responding to the demands of the electorate
which they represent.” 320 The Commission, however, concluded that
“evidence of disparities in the administration of the death penalty
undermines public confidence in our criminal justice system.” However,
the Commission was “unwilling to recommend that death penalty decisions
be reviewed by a statewide body . . . without additional data and
research.” 321 Due to the difficulty of obtaining data from county
prosecutors’ offices individually, the Commission recommended that the
state legislature impose reporting requirements upon prosecutors to collect
and make publicly available data regarding the charging decisions made by
prosecutors in murder cases at the county level. 322

HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 32 (2008),
available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/The_Hidden_Death_Tax.pdf.
315
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 146.
316
Id.
317
Id. As of the writing of this article in November 2010 there are 697 people on death
row. For a current count of the number of people on death row in each state, see DPIC State
by State, supra note 16.
318
Id. at 150. The Commission’s report relied on a study that found that death
sentencing ratios varied from between 0.58% of murder prosecutions to more than 5% of
murder prosecutions (after excluding counties with five or fewer death sentences during the
study period). See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2005).
319
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 150.
320
Id. at 151.
321
Id. at 152.
322
Id. at 153–54.
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The primary concern of the California Commissioners was not that the
death penalty was being applied unfairly, but rather that not enough
resources were being appropriated to carry it out expediently. The delay
between sentencing and execution is longer in California than in any other
state; the Commission projects that it takes twenty-five years for a
defendant to exhaust the available stages of review, as compared with the
national average of eleven to fourteen years.323 These delays largely are a
result of inadequate resources in the capital punishment system; a defendant
can expect to wait three to five years after sentencing for counsel to be
appointed to handle a direct appeal. 324 After the direct appeal is decided,
the defendant will have to wait for habeas counsel to be appointed, which
generally does not occur until eight to ten years after sentencing. 325 To
address these delays the Commission unanimously recommended that the
California legislature immediately address “the unavailability of qualified,
competent attorneys” to handle various death penalty appeals by hiring
additional government lawyers, reimbursing counties for death-penalty
related expenses, and providing adequate funding for the appointment of
trial counsel. 326
Even after a lawyer has been appointed and has conducted the
extensive investigation required to prepare a direct appeal of a death
sentence, there is still a substantial delay in scheduling court hearings to
have those appeals heard. 327 At the time of the Commission’s report, the
California Supreme Court had a backlog of eighty fully briefed death
penalty cases on direct appeal awaiting argument, making the average wait

323

Id. at 123–25. A study by Senior Judge Arthur Alacon of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals identified five major periods of delay:
"First is the delay in appointing counsel to handle the direct appeal. . . . Second is the delay in
scheduling the case for a hearing before the California Supreme Court . . . Third is the delay in
appointing counsel for the state habeas corpus petition . . . Fourth is the delay in deciding state
habeas corpus petitions. . . . Fifth is the delay in deciding federal habeas corpus petitions."

Id. at 122–23.
324
Id. at 122.
325
Id. (“Prompt appointment of habeas counsel would permit the habeas petition to be
prepared while the appellate briefing is being prepared, so it can be promptly filed shortly
after the direct appeal is decided.”).
326
Id. at 116–17. The Commission further emphasizes that private council being
appointed must be compensated at hourly rates, rather than on a flat-fee basis. Flat-fee
arrangements create conflicts of interest between a lawyer and his client by encouraging the
lawyer to maximize his return by minimizing the time and expenses incurred in a case. Id. at
117.
327
Id. at 122–23 (“The California Supreme Court currently has 100 fully briefed habeas
corpus petitions awaiting decision. . . . [T]here is now an average delay of 22 months
between the filing of the petition and the decision of the California Supreme Court.”).
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for oral argument after the filing of a motion two-and-a-quarter years. 328
There is an additional two-year wait to receive a decision from the supreme
court in a state habeas proceeding. 329 After that comes the federal habeas
appeal, which takes an average of 6.2 years in federal district court and
another 2.2 years before the case is decided by the Ninth Circuit, in large
part because inadequate records in the state proceeding make it difficult for
the federal courts to determine why state relief was denied.330
To address these delays, the Commission recommended that the
California state legislature make more funding available to the state Public
Defender’s Office, the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the
Office of the Attorney General, and to the California Supreme Court for the
appointment of private counsel.331
The Commission also recommended that the state legislature
appropriate additional funds to reimburse the counties for payments for
defense services and trial costs. 332 The recommended reimbursement of the
counties would be following through on an existing unmet obligation.
When California’s death penalty law was originally enacted in 1978, the
legislature addressed the serious financial burdens that death penalty trials
impose on counties by adding section 987.9 to the California Penal Code
which provided that defense counsel in capital cases “may request the court
for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts and others for
the preparation or prosecution of the defense.”333 The State of California
was supposed to provide these funds. However,
no funds have been appropriated for such reimbursement for more than fifteen years,
leaving counties to foot the bill. As a result, the willingness of courts to grant section
987.9 requests varies significantly from county to county, with greater reluctance to
grant requests in cash-strapped counties. Access to investigators and experts
necessary for the defense of death penalty cases should not depend upon the vagaries
334
of county budgets.

328

Id. at 122. The California Supreme Court ordinarily hears twenty to twenty-five
death penalty cases each year.
329
Id. at 123.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 116–17.
332
Id. at 117.
333
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2008). This provision is analogous to law
establishing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in Illinois. However, the funds are only
granted to the defense.
334
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 128 (emphasis added). “The estimated annual
cost of Section 987.9 payments for death penalty cases in Los Angeles County in 2007 was
$4.5 million.” Id.
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The exacerbation of the California budget crisis can only mean that
such shortfalls will be more extreme and occur more often in the future. 335
The reforms suggested by the Commission, if fully implemented, are
projected eventually to reduce delays in death penalty processing to the
national average of eleven to fourteen years between sentencing and
execution, at a price tag of $95 million per year above what currently is
being spent. 336 However, California had over 670 inmates on death row at
the time of the Commission report, and it is unclear how quickly the system
could process their cases. The Commission pointed out that:
[i]f the current average of 20 new death judgments per year is maintained, full
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations could begin to reduce the size
[of death row]. But the backlog is now so severe that California would have to
execute five prisoners a month for the next twelve years just to carry out the sentences
of those currently on death row. 337

California has executed thirteen prisoners since it reenacted capital
punishment in 1978, and two of those were volunteers who withdrew their
appeals. It seems unlikely that California would move to executing five
death row prisoners a month, even if the current moratorium were lifted. 338
Recognizing the impracticality of increasing the amount allocated to
capital cases from $137 million per year to an estimated $232.7 million per
year to cure California’s systemic dysfunctions, the California Commission
First, California could
offers two alternative recommendations.339
significantly narrow the “special circumstances” that allow for imposition
of the death penalty from twenty-one to roughly five. 340 The Commission
heard testimony that the primary reason that California’s death penalty law
is dysfunctional is because it is too broad, and that twenty-one special
circumstances “open the flood gates beyond the capacity of our judicial
system to absorb.” 341 This is similar to the situation in Illinois. The
Commission presented the findings of several other studies that have

335

New Furloughs for State Workers in California, N. Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A17
(noting that California plans to add new mandatory furlough days for state workers, and that
the state would probably be issuing I.O.U.s instead of paychecks after September).
336
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 117, 123–24.
337
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
338
Id. at 122 n.25. Two of these executions were “volunteers” who withdrew their
appeals and requested execution. Id.
339
Id. at 117.
340
Id. at 138.
341
Id. (“A number of research projects have concluded that the narrower the category of
those eligible for the death penalty, the less the risk of error, and the lower the rate of racial
or geographic variation.”).
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recommended narrowing the statutory aggravating factors for deatheligibility to the five recommended by the Constitution Project:342
The murder of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her official duties
when done to prevent or retaliate for that performance;
The murder of any person . . . occurring at a correctional facility;
The murder of two or more persons . . . as long as the deaths were the result of an
intent to kill more than one person, or a reckless disregard for such a possibility;
The intentional murder of a person involving . . . torture; and
The murder by a person who is under investigation for . . . a crime that would be a
felony, or the murder of anyone involved in that investigation, prosecution, or defense
343
of that crime . . .

These factors would be exhaustive, and they do not include felony
murder as a basis for imposing the death penalty. 344 The Commission did
not suggest “any particular formula,” leaving the specifics of the list “to the
legislative process,” but it did caution that “the list must be carefully
measured to actually achieve the benefits of narrowing that have been
identified.” 345 The Commission found that if the death penalty statute had
been so narrowed previously, the present enormous death row population
would have been reduced by half. 346 If the death penalty was to be so
narrowed, the Commission recommended that those whose death judgments
were not based upon one of the narrower special circumstances should have

342

Id. (The Constitution Project is a “blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission of judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, elected officials, FBI and police officials, professors and civil
and religious leaders” assembled to assess the death penalty. It has achieved broad
consensus that the death penalty should be reserved for the most culpable offenders.”). See
generally THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY
REVISITED
xxiv–xxv
(2005)
available
at
www.constitutionproject..org/pdf/
MandatoryJusticeRevisited.pdf.
343
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 139.
344
Id.; cf. CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 62–67 (reviewing the
recommendation of the 2002 Governor’s Commission in Illinois that the eligibility for
capital punishment be reduced similarly and recommending that the Illinois General
Assembly address the issue).
345
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 139–41. The Commission pointed out that
“the current list of special circumstances could still be utilized to impose sentences of life
without possibility of parole.” Id. at 141.
346
Id. at 139 (“[S]ince 1978, one of the five special circumstances identified by the
Constitution Project was found in 55% of California death cases, or a total of 451 of the
cases examined. This means that if the California death penalty law had limited itself to the
‘worst of the worst’ as identified by the Constitution Project and the Illinois Commission, we
would have approximately 368 on death row, rather than 670.”). As of September 13, 2010
the California death row population stood at 697, sixteen of them women. DPIC State by
State, supra note 16.
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their sentences commuted to life without possibility of parole.347 This
would reduce the current death row population from its then level of 670 to
368, and result in a capital system that would cost California about $130
million a year going forward, which, it is estimated, is roughly the same as
the current, broken system. 348
The second alternative the California Commission proposed is for
California to follow the lead of New Jersey by abolishing capital
punishment and commuting the sentence of all inmates at present on death
row to life in prison. The Commission estimates this would save the State
of California roughly $126 million every year. 349 While there is no
evidence that California has executed an innocent person, six inmates on
death row have been exonerated of the murders for which they had been
sentenced to death.350 If this “New Jersey approach” were used in
California, there would be no risk of wrongful executions.351 The death
penalty backlog would also disappear, freeing up state judicial resources
and allowing all appeals to be handled more expeditiously. 352
D. THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION

The New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission was created by
statute in 2006 and published its Final Report in January 2007. 353 Like the
California Commission, the 2002 Governor’s Commission, and the Illinois
Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee, it included both men and
women from the community who were not lawyers, as well as persons with

347

As a practical matter, this

would actually have little impact for the death row inmates involved. Most of them will never be
executed, but will die in prison. Changing their sentence . . . would only change the location in
which they will serve their sentence. But just that change could save the State of California $27
million dollars each year over the current cost of confining these prisoners on death row.

Id. at 141. Presumably the Governor would perform these commutations as Article V,
Section 8(a) of the California constitution grants the Governor the power to commute a
death sentence.
348
Id. at 117, 142.
349
Id.
350
Id. at 126 n.40. Between 1989 and 2003, there were 205 exonerations of defendants
convicted of murder nationwide. Fourteen of them were in California, and six of those had
been sentenced to death. Id.
351
Id. at 143.
352
Id.
353
See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31; see also Mary E. Forsberg, Money for
Nothing? The Financial Cost of New Jersey’s Death Penalty, N.J. POL’Y PERSP., Nov. 2005,
available at www.njpp.org/rpt_moneyfornothing.html. Mary Forsberg is the Research
Director of New Jersey Policy Perspective, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization established
in 1997 to conduct research on state issues.
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extensive experience with the legal system, judges, former prosecutors and
legislators, as well as Senator John F. Russo, the “father of the death
penalty in New Jersey.” Former Senator Russo was the lone dissenter to
the New Jersey Commission’s recommendation that the New Jersey death
penalty be abolished.354 In creating the New Jersey Commission, the New
Jersey legislature found:
[T]he experience of this State with the death penalty has been characterized by
significant expenditures of money and time; the financial costs of attempting to
implement the death penalty statutes may not be justifiable in light of other needs of
this State; There is a lack of any meaningful procedure to ensure uniform application
of the death penalty in each county throughout the State; There is public concern that
racial and socio-economic factors influence the decision to seek or impose the death
penalty. There has been increasing public awareness of cases of individuals
355
wrongfully convicted of murder, in New Jersey and elsewhere in the nation . . . .

The New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission was established to
“study all aspects of the death penalty as currently administered,” including:
whether the death penalty serves a legitimate penological intent such as deterrence;
whether there is a significant difference between the cost of the death penalty from
indictment to execution and the cost of life in prison without parole . . . whether the
death penalty is consistent with evolving standards of decency, whether the selection
of defendants in New Jersey for capital trials is arbitrary, unfair, or discriminatory in
any way and there is unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory variability in the sentencing
phase or at any stage of the process; whether there is a significant difference in the
crimes of those selected for the punishment of death as opposed to those who receive
356
life in prison . . . .

The New Jersey Commission was composed to be representative of the
diversity of the population of New Jersey and to include representatives
from crime victim groups as well as representatives of the county
prosecutors, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Public
Defender, and others. 357 The enabling legislation for the New Jersey
Commission also put in place a moratorium on executions in the state for
the duration of the Commission. 358 At the time of the moratorium, there
354

NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 79.
Id. at 118 (original formatting omitted).
356
Id. at 118–19.
357
Id. at 119. As with the California Commission and the Illinois Commission, the New
Jersey Commission solicited testimony from the public and institutional representatives. The
Commission was ordered to report its findings and recommendations, including
recommended legislation, to the Governor and legislature, with the assistance of staff from
the Office of Legislative Services. Members were to serve without compensation, as was
also the case in Illinois and California.
358
Id. at 120. The resulting legislation was C: 2c: 49 – 3, effective Jan. 12, 2006, which
provides: “Beginning on the effective date of this act, if a defendant has been sentenced to
death pursuant to subsection c. of N. J. S. 2c: 11 – 3, the sentence of death will not be
355
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were nine men on death row in New Jersey. However, in February 2004,
prior to the 2006 effective date of the statutory moratorium on executions,
in response to a challenge to the legality of the procedures for lethal
injection in New Jersey, a unanimous New Jersey appellate court had
already suspended all executions throughout the state of New Jersey. 359
The New Jersey Commission recommended that the death penalty be
abolished and replaced with life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, to be served in maximum security prison. 360 The New Jersey
legislature adopted that legislation and abolished the death penalty in
December 2007. 361
Among its major findings, and one basis for the recommendation to
repeal the death penalty, was the finding that the Office of the Public
Defender alone would save approximately $1.46 million per year if the
death penalty were eliminated.362 At that point, the New Jersey Office of
the Public Defender had nineteen pending death cases. 363 The savings
would come from not having to investigate in preparation for a penalty
phase trial, as well as savings in additional attorney and staff time for
capital trial jury selection and the preparation of motions that are only
required in capital cases.
The New Jersey Report is particularly useful because the state
Department of Corrections provided estimates for the money that it would
save by the abolition. 364 The Department of Corrections in New Jersey

executed prior to 60 days after the issuance of the commission’s report and
recommendations.” NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 60.
359
In re Readoption with Amendments of Death Penalty Regulations, N.J.A.C. 10A-23,
by the New Jersey Department of Corrections, 842 A.2d 207, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004). In New Jersey, the decisions of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court are
binding upon the entire state, even though the intermediate appellate court is divided into
parts and hears cases by region. See State v. Rembert, 383 A.2d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978) (“Decision of an intermediate appellate court is the law of the State until reversed
or overruled by the court of last resort.”).
360
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 2.
361
Act of December 17th, 2007, 2007 N.J.Ch. 204 (abolishing the death penalty and
providing for life in prison without the possibility of parole). As was the case with the Ryan
commutations, unpredictable, idiosyncratic political events and external circumstances
contributed to this dramatic outcome. The statute was enacted during a brief period in
December of 2007 before the new legislature was sworn in and when none of the legislators
were up for reelection. Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The
First State in Modern History to Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485,
530–31 (2010).
362
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 31.
363
Id.
364
Id. at 33. In many states the Department of Corrections has not provided such figures.
However, the New Jersey Commission also cited studies in Tennessee, Kansas, Indiana,
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estimated that eliminating the death penalty would save the State of New
Jersey $947,430 to $1,299,240 over the lifetime of each inmate sentenced to
death. 365 These figures were based upon the Department of Corrections’
own estimate that it cost $72,602 to house an inmate in the capital
sentencing unit, $32,481 more than to house an inmate in the general
population of that same maximum security prison.
This figure was based upon an assumption that an inmate sentenced to
death in New Jersey would spend decades on death row.366 That
assumption is reasonable given the experience in New Jersey and other
states. Take, for example, Robert O. Marshall, who spent more than
twenty-five years on death row as his case was reviewed in multiple state
and federal appeals before the final decision not to re-prosecute him for
capital murder was made at the county level after a reversal of his death
penalty by the Third Circuit. 367
The New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts submitted its
internal finding that with the abolition of the death penalty, reduced trial
court costs and savings from not having to conduct the required
proportionality review of each death penalty imposed would lead to savings
to the operation of the court system. 368 The Administrative Office of the
Courts estimated that it cost the courts and court staff $93,018 to conduct
the mandated proportionality review of each death sentence imposed.369
The Administrative Office of the Courts did not include a separate estimate
for the extra days of trial time for capital cases, or the extra time required
for death qualification and jury selection in capital cases.
The attorney general of New Jersey reported that the abolition of the
death penalty would result in little cost saving in that office since local
prosecutors would have to prepare for guilt determinations in murder cases
with or without the death penalty. 370 The New Jersey Commission noted
that while there might not be a savings to the central Attorney General’s
Office or to the operation of the county prosecutors’ offices, presumably
Florida, and North Carolina, which all concluded that the costs associated with death penalty
cases are higher than those associated with life without parole cases. Id.
365
Id. These studies further illustrate that each study and every state computes cost
differently. In New Jersey the Department of Corrections estimated cost by taking the
projected life span of each capital defendant, instead of totaling the entire cost of death row
and dividing by the number of persons on death row.
366
Id. at 32.
367
See Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005); Bienen, supra note 9, at 102.
368
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 32. Like the Department of Corrections, it is
common for the Administrative Office of the Courts to separately estimate the costs of the
death penalty within its budget.
369
Id.
370
Id. at 32–33.
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there would be a change in the allocation of staff resources.371 Those
attorneys and their support staff now spending time and resources on the
preparation of capital cases would be able to devote themselves to other
cases, or to other areas. Since all public defenders and county prosecutors
work under financial constraints and against a substantial backlog of cases,
eliminating capital prosecutions might well go to the reduction of
institutional backlogs. 372
The New Jersey Commission took note of the emotional and
psychological costs of the death penalty for victims, their families, and the
families of defendants, as well as the effects upon third parties, the staff of
courts and justice and corrections departments, and others.373 The New
Jersey Commission further found that rationales for maintaining the death
penalty were inadequate, 374 and that the death penalty was inconsistent with
evolving standards of decency. 375 The Commission did not find invidious
racial bias in the application of the death penalty in New Jersey. 376
However, the Commission noted that there was county-by-county
variability in the application of the death penalty, and perhaps that
variability was related to the race or socioeconomic status of the victim. 377
Former Senator John Russo expressed the minority opinion that the
cost of the death penalty should not be considered in the decision regarding
its retention. 378 He also dissented from the majority’s characterization of
how the New Jersey capital punishment system operated in practice. His
view was that the death penalty should continue as “an expression of
society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function
may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that

371

Id. at 33.
Id. at 32–34.
373
Id. at 34–35, 62. The Commission made an additional finding that “sufficient funds
should be dedicated to ensure adequate services and advocacy for the families of murder
victims.” Id. at 62. This is analogous to the 2010 recommendations of the CPRSC in
Illinois. See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 150–56.
374
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 51, 56. The Commission found that the
penological interest in executing a small number of persons guilty of murder is not
sufficiently compelling to justify the risk of making an irrevocable mistake. Id. at 51. The
Commission also found that the alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum security
institution without the possibility of parole would sufficiently ensure public safety and
address other legitimate social and penological interests, including the interests of the
families of murder victims. Id. at 56.
375
Id. at 35–40.
376
Id. at 41.
377
Id. at 42.
378
Id. at 78–83.
372
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asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate
their wrongs . . . .” 379
The attorney general of New Jersey abstained from the Commission’s
recommendation to abolish capital punishment on the ground that the
attorney general, as the chief law enforcement officer of the state, is sworn
to uphold the laws of the state, and that the legislature has come to a
consensus that capital punishment is an appropriate penalty in certain
egregious circumstances. Therefore, as attorney general, his official
position must be to support and uphold the existing law. 380 The attorney
general, however, noted that in the twenty-four years since the reenactment
of the death penalty, not one person had been executed:
The death penalty is irreversible, and that fact alone demands that the sanction be
pursued with extraordinary care and circumspection. But delay and uncertainly in the
imposition of sentence undermine its deterrent effect. Also, when after so many years
381
a sentencing option has never been used, it is difficult to characterize it as real.

V. CONCLUSION
Whether to do nothing, to make the investments necessary to fix the current system, to
replace the current system with a narrower death penalty law, or to replace capital
punishment with lifetime incarceration are ultimately choices that must be made by
the . . . electorate, balancing the perceived advantages gained by each alternative
against the potential costs and foreseeable consequences. We hope the balancing
required can take place in a climate of civility and calm discourse. Public debate
about the death penalty arouses deeply felt passions on both sides. The time has come
for a rational consideration of all alternatives based upon objective information and
realistic assessments. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens observed . . .
“The time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs that death
penalty litigation impose on society with the benefit that it produces has certainly
arrived.” 382

Had Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2000 instead of imposing a
moratorium on executions, the State of Illinois would not have spent the
$122 million from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, nor would it have
spent the tens of millions of dollars of other expenditures incurred by
keeping the capital punishment system in Illinois going over the following
decade. Not only is the amount of the expenditure a budgetary concern, but
also much of the money seems to have been spent without societal
justification, purpose, or benefit. Some state actors with the discretionary
379
Id. at 79–80 (The Honorable John F. Russo, Minority View) (quoting Justice Potter
Stewart in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
380
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 85.
381
Id. at 86.
382
CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 117–18 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 81
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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power to do so have made unilateral decisions to prosecute a few cases
capitally. As a result, more than $150 million, at the most conservative
estimate, was spent to put seventeen people on death row, where some of
them will likely remain for years. At the same time, there have been at least
2,000 defendants eligible for capital prosecution under the statutory
definitions of death eligibility, and many of those murders were heinous
and aggravated, and yet death was not sought at the discretion of the county
state’s attorney.
The economic and bureaucratic pressures encourage political actors to
spend public money when it is made easily available and to continue prior
legal practices, no matter how dysfunctional or counterproductive they may
be. The political incentives seem equally uncontroverted: state’s attorneys,
state legislators, elected judges, and other elected officials are afraid to
come out and say that maintaining the present capital punishment system is
dysfunctional and irrational at best, and at worst destructive of the legal
principles that are the bedrock of our system of due process of law and
other constitutional guarantees. What is the justification for a capital
punishment system that metes out sentences arbitrarily? Or one in which
systemic disparities are documented? Such concerns are before the
question of sending innocent persons to death row is even reached. Should
capital punishment remain in effect so that the present, flawed system can
send more innocent people to jail, so that when their innocence is
discovered—which it may never be—they can then successfully sue and
collect millions of dollars from the already bankrupt State of Illinois?
It is not just that this is a waste of taxpayer dollars, at a time when
Illinois needs every dollar for other services, but that the money has been
spent foolishly, cynically, heedlessly, and without a discernible indication
of responsibility to the state or the public. If one family feels vindicated by
a death sentence imposed a quarter of a century after a brutal murder, does
that justify the waste of state resources, or the wrongful conviction and
arbitrary prosecutions of others? The rule of law is based upon something
other than the personal revenge of individuals. A public that sees some
murders prosecuted capitally does not see the thousands of other murders
that were, by comparison, never avenged.
For example, the state of Illinois wasted millions imposing a death
sentence on Brian Dugan, who was already serving life in prison without
possibility of parole for another murder. This is not a wise or sober use of
public monies. It is no solace to the public, to the thousands of other
murder victims’ families, or to the professionals committed to a principled
criminal justice system. To make matters worse, this prosecution came
only after two other people were wrongfully convicted, retried, and
convicted again for the crime Dugan admitted to having committed. The
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state spent millions of dollars prosecuting these capital cases, and then paid
out millions more to the men it had wrongfully sentenced to death.
When a legal system’s legitimate authority to prosecute, to convict, to
punish, and even to take a life is perverted and exploited for personal or
political expediency, the state loses, and the community loses. We are all
the poorer when the legal system we trust, and the law enforcement
agencies and the lawyers whom we expect to protect us and act in our best
interests, are locked into a self-perpetuating system where irrational
incentives encourage decision making which results in systemic disparities
with no checks or monitors on aberrant individual choices. Those
responsible for maintaining the present system must justify its continuation
on grounds consistent with constitutional principles in the interests of all of
us, taxpayers, citizens, and members of a legal community and a criminal
justice system deserving of, and dependent upon, our respect.
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Appendix A: Illinois State’s Attorneys’ Death Penalty Decision
Guidelines *
INTRODUCTION
The Illinois State’s Attorney’s Association and the Illinois Attorney
General, acting pursuant to the Illinois’ First Degree Murder Statute, have
consulted and hereby recommend these “voluntary guidelines for
procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty,” 720 ILCS
5/9-l(k). These guidelines reflect the policies and practices already in place
in many counties across the state. The drafters also incorporated relevant
recommendations of the various task forces and committees that reviewed
Illinois’ capital punishment system. These guidelines do not have the force
of law, but they are intended to assist State’s Attorneys in exercising their
discretion in conformance with the highest standards of justice.
The Illinois State’s Attorneys and the Attorney General recognize that
seeking the death penalty is the most difficult decision within the criminal
justice system and appreciate the awesome responsibility vested in them by
the citizens of Illinois. The “exercise of informed discretion by the State’s
Attorney after a review of all available information, including information
that might be mitigating, is an important safeguard against injustice in the
administration of capital punishment.” (Supreme Court Committee on
Capital Cases, Supplemental Findings and Recommendations, page 71).
We recognize that the primary expression of public and social policy
of this state emanates from the legislature and that as the elected
prosecutors we have a responsibility to respect society’s judgment which
allows for the imposition of the death penalty for the most heinous murders.
720 ILCS 5/9-l(b). The primary factors in making a decision to seek a
death sentence are the need to not only have absolutely no doubt regarding
the defendant’s guilt but also his/her eligibility for the imposition of death
pursuant to the first degree murder statute. The basis of both the charging
decision and the decision to seek death must be fundamentally fair and
consistent with the law. The decision to seek death should not be automatic
simply because the defendant appears to be clearly guilty and clearly
eligible. In making this decision, State’s Attorneys should be focused on
the strength of the case and the background and character of the defendant.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,49 L.Ed.2d 859, 903 (1976).
When deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty, the State’s
Attorney should have the benefit of as much information as possible about
the offense and the offender and a reasonable time to make the decision.
*
Prepared by the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois State’s
Attorneys Association. Promulgated Febuary 22, 2006.
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Prosecutors recognize that because the decision is so visible to the public
and vital to the administration of justice that it will reflect on the legal
system as a whole. Through these guidelines prosecutors seek to ensure
that in cases where the death penalty is sought, trials are fair and justice is
done. In exercising discretion, the State’s Attorney is responsible for
protecting the rights of society and the rights of the defendant.
These proposed guidelines are not intended to be a substitute for
adopting appropriate policies and procedures at a local level. These
guidelines are illustrative of certain basic factors which should be
considered in the exercise of discretion.
CHARGING
The probability of a conviction is the central factor in any charging
decision. This is especially true in first degree murder cases in which the
defendant may be exposed to the death penalty. While the concept of
“residual doubt” has been held not to be a “mitigating circumstance”,
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988); and People v.
Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d 201, 623 NE 2d 329 (1993); the strength of the case
and the likelihood of a conviction must be clear based upon the available
evidence. Charging decisions, which may be modified as the State’s
Attorney gains additional information about the offense and offender,
should appropriately reflect both the nature of the offense and the
culpability and eligibility of the offender. The State’s Attorney should file
charges which adequately encompass the offenses believed to have been
committed by the defendant. The State’s Attorney should be confident in
the quality of the evidence and its ability to meet, and even surpass, the
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. The observations of the
United State’s Supreme Court in 1976 are instructive regarding the exercise
of discretion in capital cases. “Thus defendants will escape the death
penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the offense is
not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong.”
Gregg 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 903 (1976).
In order to make an appropriate charging decision, it is crucial that the
State’s Attorney takes steps to ensure that investigative personnel have
provided all material and information relevant to the accused and the
offenses under consideration. See Supreme Court Rule 412(f) and 725
ILCS 114-13. The failure to obtain and evaluate all relevant evidence can
have a detrimental effect on not only the charging decision, but the ultimate
disposition of a case. Investigative power and responsibilities of State’s
Attorneys are inherent and incidental to our prosecutorial powers. People v.
Thompson, 88 Ill.App.3d 375 (1980). We have a continuing duty in all
cases, but especially in capital cases, to evaluate and investigate the facts of
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a case. All reports, items of evidence and other relevant material should be
evaluated in order to determine whether additional evidence is necessary in
order to reasonably assure that a conviction may be obtained. The strengths
and weaknesses of a case should be evaluated in light of anticipated
defenses.
THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
The State’s Attorney must determine whether the murder is the type of
crime that calls for the ultimate punishment. Factors such as premeditation; torture; dismemberment and other depraved conduct should be
considered. However, State’s Attorneys must resist the temptation or
public pressure to seek a death sentence based solely on the brutality of the
crime without reference to other relevant factors.
ELIGIBILITY (STATUTORY FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION)
The existence of aggravating factors which make the defendant
eligible for the death penalty pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/9-l(b) must be
carefully evaluated in light of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. In cases where the death penalty is sought, the factors relied upon
must be included in the notice provided to the defense pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 416 (c). Statutory aggravating factors should be evaluated in
light of both the proofs and an examination of the decisions of the United
States and Illinois Supreme Courts. The following examples demonstrate
the importance of careful evaluation of potential aggravation:
a. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) of the Illinois statute makes a defendant eligible for death if
“the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and pre-meditated manner pursuant
to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life. . .” State Courts
interpreting this factor have determined that time is a critical element in assessing
whether this factor is satisfied. A substantial period of reflection or deliberation is
required. The prosecutor must prove more than that the murder was technically premeditated. By applying this type of analysis the Courts properly narrow the class of
death eligible defendants and provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which (the death penalty) is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”
Gregg, 49 L.Ed.2d at 883.
b. To be eligible based upon murder of a peace officer (or for that matter any special
class of victims) the evidence must show that the defendant knew or should have
known that the victim was a peace officer. 720 ILCS 5/9-l(b)(l).
c. Eligibility under the multiple murder provision may depend upon the proofs and
findings supporting the prior conviction. For example, evidence of a prior conviction
based on accountability, without more, is not sufficient for eligibility under 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3). It must be certain that the prior conviction is for murder. The date of the
murders is generally of no significance. The case in which the defendant is being
sentenced may be considered for multiple-murder eligibility. He is “convicted” under
9-l(b)(3) once the court enters judgment on the verdict. A defendant is also eligible
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under 9-l(b)(3) if he has killed more than one victim in the case for which he is being
sentenced.
d. Under the felony murder provision (section 9-1(b)(6)) a number of factors must be
considered. Generally, timing of the acts which cause death does not affect eligibility
as long as it can be shown that the murder was in the “course of” the other felony. In
an accountability case, it must be proven that the defendant’s mental state and
participation satisfy the Court’s interpretation of the statute. See Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987).
e. Murder of a victim under age 12 (9-l(b)(7)) must be accompanied by
“exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” Murder by
suffocation almost immediately after injuries that could have been inflicted by a single
blow does not satisfy this requirement. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 548 N.E. 2d
1003 (1989). Deliberate starvation and exposure satisfies this requirement. People v.
Banks, 161 Ill.2d 119, 641 N.E. 2d 331 (1994).
f. Generally, the murder of a witness provision (9-1 (b)(8)) does not include
investigation or prosecution for offenses which occurred in the course of commission
of the murder, including the murder itself. In People v. Brownell, 79 Il1.2d 508, 404
N.E. 2d 181 (1980) the Court said:
Otherwise, were we to adopt the trial court’s finding, this aggravating factor could
apply in every prosecution for murder where another offense contemporaneously
occurs because the victim could have been a witness against the defendant. Or,
even more broadly, this aggravating factor could apply to every prosecution for
murder since every victim, obviously, is prevented from testifying against the
defendant. We do not think the General Assembly intended the death penalty to be
applied in every murder case, and, if it did, the General Assembly could certainly
find a more direct way to express its intent than through this aggravating factor.”
In other cases, the courts have held that this factor is satisfied where the evidence
clearly shows that the defendant contemplated killing the victim for the specific
purpose of preventing his/her testimony, even when the murder is in the course of
various felonies. See People v. Hernando William, 97 Il1.2d 252, 454 N.E. 2d 220
(1983), Williams v. Chrans, 945 F 2d 926 (7th Circuit 1991).

While evidence supporting a single statutory aggravating factor is
sufficient to support a decision to seek death, the number of aggravating
factors should be considered. Similarly, the State’s Attorney should
consider each potential mitigating factor and while more than one
mitigating factor may exist, it is the weight of such evidence compared to
the nature and circumstances of the murder that should guide the decision to
seek or not to seek the death penalty.
CAPITAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE
It has long been recognized that the State’s Attorney is entrusted with
exclusive discretion to decide which charges shall be brought, or whether to
prosecute at all. This discretion extends to the decision of whether or not to
seek the death penalty in a first degree murder case. “Each capital case is
unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the
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circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that
the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be
served by imposing the death penalty.” People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253
(1989). While the death penalty decision rests exclusively with the State’s
Attorney, it is advisable that the State’s Attorney seek input from
experienced prosecutors in making necessary decisions regarding potential
capital cases. State’s Attorneys in counties with an adequate number of
sufficiently experienced Assistant State’s Attorneys should form a
committee, which includes the Assistants assigned to the case, to consult
and assist the State’s Attorney in making death penalty decisions. State’s
Attorneys in counties without an adequate number of sufficiently
experienced prosecutors, if they choose to do so and so request, may
consult with a committee of experienced State’s Attorneys appointed by the
President of the State’s Attorneys Association in making death penalty
decisions. A fact sheet is helpful to committee members. Appended to
these guidelines is a sample Capital Litigation Fact Sheet. Notes of the
committee that pertain to the State’s theories, opinions or conclusions,
should not be discoverable, as they qualify as work product pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 412(j)(i).
Experienced capital litigators from the Office of the Illinois Attorney
General and the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutors Office are
resources available to assist State’s Attorneys in all counties. All
prosecutors appearing as lead or co-counsel in a capital case must be
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar as provided in Supreme Court
Rule 714.
VICTIM’S FAMILY
Under 725 ILCS 120/4, family members of murder victims, like all
victims of crime, have specific rights which include:
1. The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice process.
2. The right to be notified of all court proceedings.
3. The right to communicate with prosecutors.
4. The right to make a statement to the court at sentencing.
5. The right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release
of the accused.
6. The right to a timely disposition of the case.
7. The right to be reasonably protected from the accused during the criminal justice
process.
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8. The right to be present at the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis
as the accused, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that the victim’s
testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at trial.
9. The right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence,
an advocate or other support person of the victim’s choice.
10. The right to restitution.

The State’s Attorney or his/her representative should consider the
views expressed by the victim’s family in making the decision to seek or
not seek the death penalty. The family should be advised that the decision
regarding what penalty to seek is the State’s Attorney’s and although the
family’s views are important, their views are only one factor in making the
decision. See People v. Mack, 105 Ill.2d 103,473 N.E.2d 880, 85
Ill.Dec.281 (1985).
DEFENSE COUNSEL INPUT AND MITIGATION
Prior to announcing a decision to seek death, the State’s Attorney
should provide defense counsel with an opportunity to present matters in
writing and/or in person, which might affect the decision to seek or not seek
death. This communication should not be used to negotiate a disposition,
but give defense counsel a fair opportunity to present valid reasons why the
death penalty should not be sought in his/her client’s case. It is important
that the offer to the defense be an open offer and that the State’s Attorney
be willing to review information presented by the defense at any reasonable
time.
In addition to information provided by the defense, the State’s
Attorney should carefully assess all potential mitigating factors; both
statutory and non-statutory, and evaluate them in light of the nature of the
offense.
The investigation of the defendant’s background should include a
review of any and all information concerning the defendant. The
defendant’s prior criminal record, including police reports and jail records,
should be evaluated and witnesses interviewed. All other available
information relevant to the defendant’s life history and character should be
considered.
FACTORS THAT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
The basis of a State’s Attorney’s decision to charge and to seek the
death penalty must be grounded upon the strength of the case, the
background and character of the accused and other relevant factors.
a. The race, ethnicity, religion, sex, social or economic standing of the defendant or
the victim should play no role in the prosecutor’s decision.
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b. The wealth of the defendant or the quality of his/her representation should not be
factors in the decision.
c. The prosecutor should not seek a death sentence solely because the defendant
refuses to plead guilty. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the conscious exercise
of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a Federal constitutional violation
absent a showing that the selection (offer) is based on an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion or other arbitrary classification. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 72
Ed.2d 446 (1962). A plea of guilty entered by the defendant to avoid a possible death
sentence is not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 167 (1970). The record must clearly
establish that “the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Alford, 27 L.Ed. 2d at 168. It is
critical to protecting the integrity of judgments that Supreme Court rules governing
guilty pleas are followed. If a plea offer is communicated and rejected, it is important
to make a record. In many cases, the defendant who receives the death sentence will
later claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The objective of making a complete
record is to avoid providing the defendant with grounds in support of post-conviction
proceedings. For a particularly compelling example of why a clear record is essential
read People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill.2d 642, 736 NE 2d 1025, 249 Ill.Dec. 587 (2000).

State’s Attorneys must always be mindful of the impact the
prosecutor’s decisions will have on the administration of justice and respect
for the rule of law in this State.
TIMING OF THE DECISION AND NOTICE
The purpose of providing notice to the defense is to allow for
meaningful preparation and representation of the defendant by counsel in
good standing with the Capital Litigation Trial Bar pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 714. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(c) requires:
“The State’s Attorney or Attorney General shall provide notice of the State’s intention
to seek or reject imposition of the death penalty by filing Notice of Intent to Seek or
Decline Death Penalty as soon as practicable. In no event shall the filing of said
notice be later than 120 days after arraignment, unless for good cause shown, the
Court directs otherwise. The Notice of Intent to seek imposition of the death penalty
shall also include all of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in section 9-l(b)
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)) which the State intends to
introduce during the death penalty sentencing hearing.”

In cases where the State’s Attorney has decided early on to seek the
death penalty, it is prudent to inform defense counsel informally of the
decision and complete all follow up investigation before formally filing
timely notice pursuant to Rule 416. There is always the possibility that new
information may develop which causes the State’s Attorney to change the
decision that “death is the appropriate sentence.” The State’s Attorney
should not lead defense counsel to believe that the death penalty will not be
sought unless that actually reflects a formal decision. State’s Attorneys
should be aware of the possibility of de-certification of a capital case by the
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trial court following conviction. Under 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h-5), the trial court,
on its own motion or on written motion of the defendant, may decertify the
case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence
supporting the defendant’s conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an
informant witness concerning the confession or admission of the defendant
or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or
single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence.
CONCLUSION
The fair and impartial administration of Capital Punishment in this
State depends largely on the decisions of the State’s Attorneys and the
Illinois Attorney General. In those few cases in which the death penalty is
successfully sought and actually imposed the citizens of Illinois must, at all
times, be assured that the process was fair and that the conclusion was just.
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APPENDIX B: TABLES SUMMARIZING THE SENTENCING OF FIRST DEGREE
MURDERERS IN ILLINOIS, STATE FISCAL YEARS 1989 THROUGH 2010 *
General Overview
In an effort to examine the patterns of death penalty imposition across
Illinois, researchers from Loyola University obtained detailed, offenderlevel data from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) that included
information pertaining to the 9,592 offenders convicted of first-degree
murder and admitted to prison in Illinois from July 1988 through June 2010,
or state fiscal year (SFY) 1989 (which covers the period from July 1, 1988
to June 30, 1989) to SFY 2010. During this twenty-two-year period, a total
of 150 individuals were convicted and sentenced to death.
The tables on the following pages summarize the total number of
offenders convicted of first degree murder in Illinois and the number and
proportion of these offenders who received a death sentence across different
regions of Illinois and across different time periods. The time periods used
in the analyses were the “Pre-Moratorium” (July 1988 to December 1999),
the “Moratorium & Governor’s Capital Punishment Commission” period
(January 2000 to June 2005) and the “Post-Reform passage” period (July
2005 to June 2010).
Over the time periods examined, the proportion of first-degree
murderers sentenced to death statewide fell from 1.9 percent in the premoratorium period to 0.6 percent in the post-reform passage period (Table
A). In purely statistical terms, this decrease from 1.9 percent to 0.6 percent
translates to roughly a 66 percent reduction in the likelihood of the death
penalty being imposed over these time periods. Across all separate
geographic regions of Illinois examined (Tables B through F), the
proportion of first degree murderers sentenced to death fell between the premoratorium and post-reform passage periods.
Separate tables are included that summarize the sentences imposed on
convicted murders across different regions of Illinois, including Cook
County (Chicago), the suburban Collar Counties (Lake, McHenry, Kane,
DuPage, and Will counties), other urban areas outside of Cook and the
Collar Counties (counties that fall within a metropolitan statistical area
based on U.S. Bureau of the Census classifications) and the remaining rural
counties in Illinois.

*

Prepared for the Illinois Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee in September
2010 by David E. Olson, Ph.D., Donald Stemen, Ph.D., and Jordan Boulger of Loyola
University.
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Table A
Statewide Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois
Non-Death
Sentences

Death
Sentences

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

6,106
(98.1%)

118
(1.9%)

6,224
(100.0%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

1,961
(98.9%)

22
(1.1%)

1,983
(100.0%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

1,515
(99.4%)

10
(0.6 %)

1,525
(100.0%)

9,582
(98.4%)

150
(1.6%)

9,592
(100.0%)

Total

Table B
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Cook County, Illinois
Non-Death
Sentences

Death
Sentences

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

4,655
(98.8%)

58
(1.2%)

4,713
(100.0%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

1,405
(99.3%)

10
(0.7%)

1,415
(100.0%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

1,057
(99.6%)

4
(0.4%)

1,062
(100.0%)

7,117
(99.0%)

72
(1.0%)

7,189
(100.0%)

Total
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Table C
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois Outside of Cook
County
Non-Death
Sentences

Death
Sentences

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

1,451
(96.0%)

60
(4.0%)

1,511
(100.0%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

556
(97.9%)

12
(2.1%)

568
(100.0%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

458
(98.7%)

6
(1.3%)

464
(100.0%)

2,465
(96.9%)

78
(3.1%)

2,543
(100.0%)

Total

Table D
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois’ “Collar Counties”
(Lake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will Counties Combined)
Non-Death
Sentences

Death
Sentences

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

405
(95.3%)

20
(4.7%)

425
(100%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

133
(98.5%)

2
(1.5%)

135
(100%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

129
(97.8%)

3
(2.2%)

132
(100%)

667
(96.4%)

25
(3.6%)

692
(100%)

Total
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Table E
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois’ Urban Counties,
Excluding the Cook and “Collar” County Region
Non-Death
Sentence

Death Sentence

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

725
(97.1%)

22
(2.9%)

747
(100%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

276
(97.9%)

6
(2.1%)

282
(100%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

247
(100%)

0
(0%)

247
(100%)

1,248
(97.8%)

28
(2.2%)

1,278
(100%)

Total

Table F
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois’ Rural Counties
Non-Death
Sentence

Death Sentence

Total

Pre-Moratorium
(July 1988 through
December 1999)

319
(94.7%)

18
(5.3%)

337
(100%)

Moratorium
(January 2000)
through Passage of
Reforms (June 2005)

154
(97.5%)

4
(2.5%)

158
(100%)

Post-Reform Passage
(July 2005 through
June 2010)

79
(96.4%)

3
(3.6%)

82
(100%)

552
(95.6%)

25
(4.4%)

577
(100%)

Total

